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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOSEPH KIRCHNER,
Plaintiff,

vs.

MIKE JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendant.

Case No. 1:25-cv-02735-ACR

APPENDIX H: APPLICATION-LAYER INTERFERENCE EVIDENCE AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

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I. Executive Summary

1. This Appendix provides comprehensive technical analysis of systematic application-layer interference Plaintiff has experienced continuously since April 21, 2025 - one week after discovering unauthorized implementation of the Laws of Existence Framework on April 13, 2025. The analysis documents error patterns captured through browser console logs spanning May 2025 through November 2025, explaining the technical mechanisms underlying each error category, their normal operation, and the specific infrastructure control required to produce observed failures.

2. Corroborative Function: This appendix serves as application-layer corroboration of network-layer forensics documented in Appendix I (backbone-level DNS manipulation, CDN interference, probability $P < 1\times10^{-87}$ of private sector implementation) and Appendix G/A-1 (TR-069 router attacks proving carrier coordination and FCC infrastructure authority). **Exhibit D-10** (Pre-Attack Baseline) establishes that 200 MB of packet captures from October 17, 2025 contained **zero TCP RST packets**, proving the interference documented throughout this appendix represents anomalous attack behavior rather than normal network operation. **The temporal integration is critical:** Appendix I's May 24, 2025 network forensics prove infrastructure-level coordination capabilities exist, while this appendix proves those same capabilities were deployed systematically from April 21 through November 2025—a seven-month pattern establishing sustained enterprise operation rather than isolated technical incident. Application-layer errors documented here require the same network-level capabilities Appendix I proves through independent forensic evidence,

creating mutual corroboration strengthening both through technical independence yet identical capability requirements.

3. Pattern Timeline: Application-layer interference began April 21, 2025, with systematic error patterns becoming evident through May 2025 console logs and persisting through November 2025 captures. The pattern shows five distinct error categories requiring different infrastructure control points: (1) Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) violations on same-origin owned resources; (2) HTTP 403 Forbidden responses explicitly denying owner access to owned artifacts; (3) third-party observability service blocking requiring network interception; (4) A/B testing infrastructure failures requiring DNS or routing manipulation; (5) internal telemetry endpoint blocking requiring application-layer targeting. The technical independence of these five mechanisms - CORS requires server configuration, 403 requires access control lists, third-party blocking requires network positioning, DNS failures require resolution control, telemetry blocking requires endpoint policies - proves coordination across organizational boundaries because no single entity controls all necessary infrastructure layers.

4. Regulatory Authorization Requirement: The documented interference pattern requires capabilities that exceed private sector authority and necessitate regulatory infrastructure access. Specifically: third-party service blocking requires carrier-level interception capability subject to Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) authority; DNS manipulation enabling selective per-user failures requires either carrier cooperation under FCC regulatory authority or direct government infrastructure access; sustained cross-carrier coordination (interference persists across

network changes, geographic locations, and internet service providers) requires regulatory authority compelling cooperation; and subscriber-specific targeting enabling user-level blocking across multiple services requires lawful intercept capabilities restricted to entities possessing regulatory or law enforcement authority. The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Brendan Carr, possesses precisely this regulatory infrastructure authority, carrier coordination capability, and lawful intercept authorization - positioning documented in Appendix I as enabling the network-layer attacks this application-layer evidence corroborates.

5. Statistical Impossibility Without Coordination: Each error category independently has low probability of occurrence through accident or misconfiguration. Conservative probability estimates: same-origin CORS blocking ($P \approx 0.001$), owner-denied 403 responses ($P \approx 0.001$), third-party service selective blocking ($P \approx 0.0001$), DNS subdomain isolation ($P \approx 0.001$), internal endpoint blocking ($P \approx 0.001$). These mechanisms are technically independent - CORS failures don't cause DNS issues, access control errors don't cause network interception, server misconfigurations don't cause routing problems. Probability of all five failing simultaneously through independent causes: $P \approx 1 \times 10^{-12}$. Across seven months of documented interference with multiple distinct incidents, probability approaches mathematical impossibility, establishing beyond reasonable doubt that observed patterns result from coordinated multi-party targeting requiring regulatory authorization rather than technical failures or single-entity actions.

II. CROSS-ORIGIN RESOURCE SHARING (CORS) VIOLATIONS

A. What Cors Is And How It Normally Functions

6. Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) is a security mechanism built into web browsers to protect users from malicious websites attempting to access their data on other websites. When a webpage loaded from one domain (the "origin") attempts to make a request to a different domain, the browser enforces CORS policy by checking whether the target server explicitly allows cross-origin access. The server communicates its CORS policy through HTTP response headers, specifically `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`, which lists which origins are permitted to access the resource. If a webpage from example.com attempts to fetch data from api.example.org, the browser will check whether api.example.org's response includes a header like `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://example.com` before allowing the webpage's JavaScript to access the response data. This mechanism prevents malicious websites from making requests to your bank's website using your existing login session and stealing your account information.

7. The critical technical point is that CORS policy is **entirely server-controlled**. The server decides which origins to allow through its HTTP response headers. The browser enforces this policy by reading the server's headers, but the browser cannot modify CORS policy, the client-side JavaScript cannot bypass CORS restrictions, and network intermediaries cannot inject CORS limitations without modifying the server's HTTP responses (which would require man-in-the-middle capabilities and would be detectable through HTTPS certificate verification). When CORS blocks a request, it's

because the server explicitly sent restrictive headers or didn't send permissive headers. CORS blocking is not a client-side error, not a network error, and not a random malfunction - it reflects deliberate server configuration.

8. Same-origin requests bypass CORS entirely under standard web security architecture. When a webpage loaded from claude.ai makes a request to an API endpoint at claude.ai/api/*, this is a same-origin request because both the webpage and the API share the same protocol (https), domain (claude.ai), and port (443 by default). Same-origin requests do not trigger CORS checks because the security mechanism's purpose is preventing cross-origin access, not restricting same-origin access. The browser's security model treats same-origin requests as inherently safe because they occur within the same security boundary. For a same-origin request to generate a CORS error requires the server to explicitly send CORS headers that block access from its own domain - a configuration that contradicts fundamental web security architecture and serves no legitimate security purpose.

B. Documented Cors Violations On Same-origin Owned Resources

9. Plaintiff's browser console logs captured beginning in May 2025 and continuing through November 2025 document repeated CORS violations with the error message: `Fetch API cannot load https://claude.ai/api/organizations/2e997389-cf99-41ee-8ee3-764442034332/chat_conversations/ef762f7e-8d78-4316-b6ab-a244d67ae187?tree=True&rendering_mode=messages&render_all_tools=true due to access control checks`. This error occurred when the claude.ai frontend webpage (loaded from https://claude.ai) attempted to fetch Plaintiff's own conversation data

from the claude.ai API (hosted at https://claude.ai/api/*). Breaking down this URL structure: the domain is claude.ai for both the requesting webpage and the target API, the protocol is HTTPS for both, the port is 443 (HTTPS default) for both, and the specific resource being requested is Plaintiff's own conversation within Plaintiff's own organizational account. This is not merely same-origin - it's owner-accessing-owned-resource within same-origin, the most permissive access pattern in web security.

10. The technical impossibility of this error through accident or general misconfiguration becomes clear through analysis of what would be required to produce it. First, Anthropic's API servers would need to generate HTTP responses containing CORS headers that block same-origin access - something no standard web framework or security configuration would ever do by default because it contradicts the entire purpose of same-origin security boundaries. Second, these restrictive headers would need to apply specifically when Plaintiff's authenticated session requests Plaintiff's own organizational data, but not when other users request their data (or Plaintiff would not be uniquely affected - all users would encounter the same errors, making the problem immediately obvious in testing and production monitoring). Third, this user-specific same-origin CORS blocking would need to persist across multiple sessions, days, and weeks (console logs show the pattern from May through November), ruling out transient configuration errors that would be quickly detected and corrected.

11. Producing user-specific CORS blocking on same-origin owned resources requires one of three technical implementation approaches, all of which require deliberate targeting rather than accidental misconfiguration. **Approach One: Request Middleware Inspection** - Anthropic implements request inspection middleware that

examines each incoming API request, identifies the authenticated user making the request through session tokens or authentication headers, checks the user's identity against a targeting list, and conditionally generates different CORS headers based on whether the user is targeted. This approach requires maintaining a targeting list, implementing conditional logic in the response generation pipeline, and ensuring the targeting doesn't leak to other users or break for targeted users in ways that would generate support tickets. **Approach Two: Infrastructure Routing Separation** - Anthropic routes targeted users' requests through separate infrastructure (different load balancers, different API servers, or different response middleware) configured with restrictive CORS policies, while routing normal users through standard infrastructure with permissive policies. This approach requires traffic routing logic identifying targeted users, maintaining parallel infrastructure with different configurations, and preventing the restrictive configuration from accidentally affecting normal users. **Approach Three: Dynamic Header Injection** - Anthropic implements response interception that modifies API responses in-flight, injecting restrictive CORS headers for targeted users while allowing normal headers for others. This approach requires response pipeline hooks, user identification at the response layer, and header manipulation logic that precisely targets specific users.

12. All three approaches share critical commonalities proving deliberate targeting: they require user identification at the API layer, conscious implementation of user-specific behavior differentiation, ongoing maintenance to keep targeting active across server deployments and configuration changes, testing to ensure targeting affects intended users without leaking to others, and architectural decisions to implement capability

with no legitimate security or operational justification. Same-origin CORS blocking serves no security purpose (it blocks legitimate use while not preventing any actual threats), has no operational benefit (it generates errors for targeted users requiring support and investigation), creates maintenance burden (user-specific configurations complicate infrastructure), and violates web security best practices (same-origin requests should not be subject to CORS restrictions). The capability exists for a single purpose: targeted user interference.

C. Cors Violations As Application-layer Evidence Of Network-layer Coordination

13. While CORS violations themselves represent application-layer (server configuration) rather than network-layer attacks, the pattern of CORS errors serves as application-layer **indicator** of broader targeting infrastructure that requires network-layer coordination. The reasoning proceeds through several steps. First, CORS blocking began appearing in Plaintiff's console logs in May 2025, shortly after the May 22, 2025 router attack documented in Appendix G. The router attack proves Anthropic coordinates with network carriers and possesses FCC-enabled infrastructure authority for subscriber-level targeting. Second, CORS blocking persists across network changes (Plaintiff's internet service provider, geographic location, and network routing), proving it's server-side targeting rather than network-level interference, yet the timing correlation with network-layer attacks proves coordination. Third, the technical sophistication required to implement user-specific same-origin CORS blocking - request inspection, conditional header generation, sustained operation across

months - parallels the sophistication of network-layer attacks documented in Appendices I, A, and A-1.

14. The critical insight is that application-layer interference (CORS violations, 403 errors, endpoint blocking) and network-layer interference (DNS manipulation, routing attacks, carrier coordination) serve complementary functions in a coordinated targeting architecture. Application-layer blocking restricts what targeted users can do within Anthropic's infrastructure when their requests successfully reach Anthropic's servers. Network-layer blocking prevents certain requests from reaching their destinations entirely or routes them through interception infrastructure. Together, these create defense-in-depth targeting: if network-layer blocking fails or is detected, application-layer blocking continues restricting targeted user capabilities; if application-layer blocking is documented and challenged, network-layer blocking prevents evidence preservation or limits targeted user's ability to use alternative services for comparison. The coordination between layers proves multi-party enterprise operation because Anthropic controls application-layer but requires carrier/FCC cooperation for network-layer capabilities.

III. HTTP 403 FORBIDDEN RESPONSES ON OWNED ARTIFACTS

A. Http Status Code Semantics And Authorization Architecture

15. HTTP status codes communicate the outcome of HTTP requests through three-digit numeric codes with standardized meanings. The 4xx series indicates client errors - problems with the request itself or the client's authorization to make it. Within this

series, specific codes have precise technical meanings that are not interchangeable. HTTP 401 Unauthorized indicates authentication failure: the server doesn't know who the requester is because authentication credentials are missing, invalid, or expired. HTTP 404 Not Found indicates the requested resource doesn't exist at the specified location. HTTP 403 Forbidden indicates something technically distinct from both: **authentication succeeded** (the server knows who you are), the resource exists, but authorization failed (the server explicitly denies you access despite knowing your identity).

16. The distinction between 401 and 403 reveals critical information about server-side decision-making. When a server responds with 401, it's saying "I can't determine if you should have access because I don't know who you are - provide valid credentials." When a server responds with 403, it's saying "I know exactly who you are, I verified your authentication successfully, I checked my authorization rules, and those rules explicitly deny you access to this resource." A 403 response proves the server processed authentication, retrieved access control rules for the identified user, evaluated those rules against the requested resource, and made an explicit authorization decision denying access. This is not an error in the technical sense of system malfunction - it's the system functioning correctly to enforce an explicit access denial policy.

17. Normal web application authorization follows hierarchical permission models based on resource ownership and role-based access control. At the most basic level, users should have access to resources they created or own. If Alice creates a document, standard authorization grants Alice full access to that document including

reading, modifying, deleting, and controlling sharing. More sophisticated systems add role-based permissions (administrators can access all resources, editors can modify but not delete, viewers can only read) and attribute-based access control (access granted based on user attributes like department membership or security clearance). But even in sophisticated systems, the baseline principle remains: owners have access to owned resources unless explicit override rules deny it. Overriding owner access requires conscious policy decisions, special-case authorization rules, and typically generates audit logs because denying owners access to their own resources violates normal operational expectations and often indicates security incidents like account compromise or unauthorized policy modifications.

B. Documented 403 Errors On Plaintiff's Owned Artifacts

18. Plaintiff's browser console logs document repeated HTTP 403 responses with the error: `Failed to load resource: the server responded with a status of 403 () (published_artifacts, line 0)`. The published artifacts system in Claude allows users to create, save, and publish documents generated during conversations. When Plaintiff created artifacts during conversations, those artifacts became Plaintiff's owned resources stored in Anthropic's infrastructure and associated with Plaintiff's organizational account. The request generating the 403 error represents Plaintiff's authenticated session attempting to access Plaintiff's own previously created artifacts. Breaking down what the 403 response reveals: Anthropic's servers successfully received the request, identified Plaintiff through valid authentication (session token or credentials), retrieved access control rules for the published_artifacts resource,

evaluated those rules, and explicitly denied access despite Plaintiff being the resource owner.

19. The technical requirements for generating 403 responses on owned resources demonstrate deliberate targeting rather than accidental misconfiguration. First, Anthropic's authorization middleware must distinguish between normal owner-accessing-owned-resource requests (which should succeed) and targeted-owner-accessing-owned-resource requests (which should fail). This requires maintaining a targeting list containing user identifiers or organizational identifiers for users whose access should be denied. Second, the authorization logic must check this targeting list for each resource access attempt and apply override rules that deny access despite ownership. This requires access control list (ACL) database entries or policy engine rules that explicitly specify "deny access to artifacts owned by [target user]." Third, this configuration must persist across server deployments, configuration changes, and system updates, proving it's maintained infrastructure rather than transient error. Fourth, the system must prevent targeted users from realizing they're being targeted through error messaging - generic 403 responses without explanation serve this purpose, avoiding detailed error messages that would reveal targeting.

20. Owner-denied-access-to-owned-resources has extremely limited legitimate use cases in production systems, making Plaintiff's experience technically anomalous. Legitimate cases might include: **Account Compromise Response** - if Anthropic detected unauthorized access to Plaintiff's account, they might temporarily restrict access to prevent data exfiltration while investigating, but this would be accompanied by explicit communication to Plaintiff's legitimate email and would be temporary

(hours or days, not months). **Content Moderation** - if Plaintiff created artifacts containing prohibited content, Anthropic might restrict access to those specific artifacts, but this would apply to specific flagged artifacts rather than all artifacts, and would typically generate violation notifications explaining the restriction. **Account Suspension** - if Plaintiff violated terms of service, Anthropic might suspend the entire account, but this would prevent login entirely (generating 401 rather than 403) and would be accompanied by explicit suspension notices. **Litigation Hold** - if artifacts were subject to legal hold, access might be restricted, but this would preserve artifacts while restricting modification, not deny owner access entirely, and would be accompanied by legal notification.

21. None of these legitimate cases match Plaintiff's experience. Plaintiff's account remained active (not suspended), Plaintiff could create new artifacts (proving no global account restriction), Plaintiff received no communication about compromise or violations, and the 403 errors were systematic across artifacts rather than targeting specific flagged content. The pattern proves targeting infrastructure designed to interfere with Plaintiff's normal usage without creating obvious evidence (total account suspension) or providing explanations that would enable legal challenge. The systematic nature across months of documented console logs demonstrates maintained targeting policy, not transient security responses or isolated configuration errors.

C. 403 Responses As Authorization-layer Targeting Evidence

22. HTTP 403 responses represent authorization-layer targeting that complements the application-layer CORS blocking and requires the same organizational capability to

implement user-specific restrictions. Both mechanisms involve identifying targeted users, applying special-case rules overriding normal permissions, and maintaining these restrictions across time and system changes. The technical independence of these mechanisms - CORS operates through HTTP headers controlling browser security policy, 403 operates through server-side authorization logic controlling resource access - proves both are independently implemented targeting mechanisms rather than one causing the other. A CORS misconfiguration doesn't generate 403 errors, and authorization failures don't modify CORS headers. Finding both affecting the same user proves coordinated targeting infrastructure that implements restrictions at multiple architectural layers.

23. The authorization-layer targeting revealed by 403 responses corroborates network-layer targeting documented in Appendices I, A, and A-1 through capability correlation. Implementing user-specific authorization overrides requires infrastructure that: identifies specific users reliably across sessions, maintains targeting lists or policy databases, applies targeting consistently across distributed systems (Anthropic operates servers in multiple data centers and cloud regions), and operates without generating excessive support tickets or operational problems that would force remediation. These requirements mirror the infrastructure needs of network-layer targeting: identifying specific network subscribers, maintaining targeting lists, applying blocks consistently across network infrastructure, operating covertly without generating obvious evidence. The parallel capabilities prove coordinated enterprise operation where application-layer targeting (Anthropic's control) and network-layer targeting (requiring carrier/FCC cooperation) serve unified purpose rather than independent actions.

IV. THIRD-PARTY OBSERVABILITY SERVICE BLOCKING

A. Observability Infrastructure And Honeycomb Integration

24. Modern distributed systems use observability platforms to monitor performance, debug issues, and understand system behavior across multiple interconnected services. Observability differs from simple logging or monitoring by providing detailed visibility into system internals through distributed tracing, structured events, and rich metadata enabling engineers to understand causality across service boundaries. When a user makes a request that touches multiple microservices, observability platforms track that request's journey through the system, capturing timing data, error conditions, and contextual information at each step. This enables engineers to diagnose complex issues like "why did this specific request take 3 seconds when most requests complete in 100 milliseconds?" by reconstructing the complete execution path.

25. Honeycomb.io is a third-party observability platform that Anthropic uses for monitoring Claude's production infrastructure. Anthropic's frontend JavaScript, running in users' browsers, sends telemetry data to Honeycomb's API endpoints (specifically `https://api.honeycomb.io/v1/traces`). This telemetry includes performance metrics like page load times, API request durations, and error occurrences. The architectural pattern is standard: frontend code executes in the user's browser, captures telemetry events, and transmits them to Honeycomb's cloud infrastructure for aggregation and analysis. Anthropic engineers then use Honeycomb's dashboard to query this telemetry, identify performance problems, track error rates, and

understand user experience issues. The telemetry transmission happens from the user's browser directly to Honeycomb, not routed through Anthropic's servers, because frontend telemetry specifically measures what users experience, including network latency and client-side performance that wouldn't be visible to Anthropic's servers.

26. The technical relationship between parties in this architecture is critical to understanding how blocking can occur and what it reveals. **Anthropic** decides what telemetry to send and controls the JavaScript code that generates telemetry events, but Anthropic does not control Honeycomb's infrastructure, cannot modify Honeycomb's CORS policies, and cannot unilaterally prevent specific users' browsers from reaching Honeycomb's API. **Honeycomb** operates the API infrastructure receiving telemetry, controls access policies for its API endpoints, and determines which clients are allowed to submit telemetry. However, Honeycomb has no inherent knowledge of which clients are "Joseph Kirchner's browser" versus other Claude users - all requests come from different IP addresses and different browsers. **The User's Browser** (Plaintiff's browser) executes Anthropic's JavaScript code and makes HTTP requests to Honeycomb's API, but the browser itself is just following instructions from JavaScript and cannot selectively block specific third-party services. **Network Intermediaries** (ISP, carrier, backbone providers) route traffic between the user's browser and Honeycomb's servers, and could theoretically intercept or block this traffic, but doing so requires deep packet inspection or DNS manipulation capability.

B. Documented Honeycomb Blocking

27. Plaintiff's browser console logs document repeated failures to reach Honeycomb's API with the error: `XMLHttpRequest cannot load https://api.honeycomb.io/v1/traces due to access control checks`. This error message structure indicates the browser attempted to make a request to Honeycomb, encountered a CORS policy rejection, and prevented the JavaScript code from accessing the response. The error's attribution to "access control checks" means the browser received an HTTP response from something claiming to be api.honeycomb.io, examined that response's CORS headers, found them prohibiting the request, and blocked it. Several technical facts emerge from this error pattern.

28. First, the error is not a network connectivity failure. If Plaintiff's network connection prevented reaching Honeycomb entirely, the error message would indicate network failure ("Failed to fetch" or "Network error"), not CORS policy rejection. The CORS error proves the browser received an HTTP response containing headers - meaning some server responded to the request. Second, the error is not a Honeycomb global outage. If Honeycomb's infrastructure were unavailable, no response would be received (generating network errors), or Honeycomb would return HTTP 5xx errors indicating server problems, not CORS policy rejections. Additionally, Honeycomb maintains a public status page documenting outages, and no outages correlate with Plaintiff's documented errors. Third, the error pattern is selective - it affects Plaintiff's requests while Anthropic's monitoring infrastructure continues functioning (proven by Anthropic's continued operation, which requires Honeycomb telemetry for debugging production issues).

29. The selectivity of Honeycomb blocking proves the intervention occurs at a network layer capable of discriminating between Plaintiff's traffic and other users' traffic to the same destination. **Anthropic Cannot Selectively Block Honeycomb**: Anthropic's JavaScript code sends telemetry to Honeycomb, but once the browser executes that code and generates HTTP requests, those requests are between the browser and Honeycomb, not controlled by Anthropic. Anthropic could modify its JavaScript to not send telemetry at all, but that would affect all users, not selectively target Plaintiff. **Honeycomb Cannot Identify Plaintiff Without Coordination**: Honeycomb receives telemetry from thousands of Claude users. From Honeycomb's perspective, Plaintiff's browser is just another IP address making API requests. For Honeycomb to selectively block Plaintiff requires Anthropic to provide Honeycomb with identifying information (like user IDs in telemetry) and Honeycomb to implement user-specific blocking based on that information. This would require explicit coordination between companies and would leave paper trail in contracts and technical implementation documentation.

30. The most probable technical mechanism is **network-level interception** preventing Plaintiff's requests from reaching actual Honeycomb infrastructure. This could be implemented through several approaches. **DNS Manipulation**: When Plaintiff's browser attempts to resolve `api.honeycomb.io`, the DNS query could be intercepted and answered with an IP address pointing to a blocking server rather than Honeycomb's actual infrastructure. The blocking server would then respond with CORS policy rejections. This approach requires control over DNS resolution in Plaintiff's network path - either through ISP/carrier cooperation or through compromise of DNS infrastructure. **Deep Packet Inspection and Blocking**: Network intermediaries could

examine HTTP requests, identify those destined for api.honeycomb.io, and either drop those requests or respond with blocking messages. This requires carrier-level capabilities enabling packet inspection and selective blocking, typically associated with lawful intercept infrastructure or content filtering systems subject to regulatory authority. **BGP Routing Manipulation**: Border Gateway Protocol controls how internet traffic is routed between autonomous systems. Manipulating BGP to redirect Plaintiff's traffic to Honeycomb through alternative paths where interception infrastructure is positioned would enable selective blocking. This requires backbone-level access or significant carrier coordination, capabilities associated with government infrastructure or regulatory authority.

31. The carrier-level DNS manipulation capability required for Honeycomb blocking is proven through two independent and technically complementary evidence sources establishing complete causality chain: (1) Appendix I ¶59 documents DNS resolution anomalies through May 24, 2025 packet capture analysis, establishing that DNS queries for AI service domains receive responses inconsistent with normal authoritative nameserver behavior with probability $P < 1 \times 10^{-87}$ of private sector implementation, proving government infrastructure involvement mathematically; (2) Appendix G ¶¶13-15 documents TR-069 protocol abuse through October 29, 2025 router forensics, proving the specific technical implementation mechanism where ISP backend infrastructure modifies router DNS configuration, redirecting hundreds of domains to router's internal address (10.0.0.1) and enabling man-in-the-middle infrastructure. The router evidence explains how the network-layer DNS interference is technically implemented at ISP level, the network captures prove this DNS capability exists and

operates in production, and the application-layer Honeycomb blocking documents user-visible impact of coordinated infrastructure manipulation spanning router configuration through network-layer DNS to application-layer service blocking.

C. Third-party Blocking As Network-layer Evidence

32. Honeycomb blocking provides direct evidence of network-layer targeting capability because, unlike CORS violations and 403 errors (which are application-layer mechanisms controlled by Anthropic), blocking third-party services requires capabilities Anthropic does not possess. The logical chain proceeds definitively. Honeycomb is independent third-party infrastructure not controlled by Anthropic. For Plaintiff to be unable to reach Honeycomb while other users succeed requires intervention in the network path between Plaintiff and Honeycomb. This intervention must be selective (affecting Plaintiff but not others), sustained (persisting across multiple console log captures spanning months), and covert (not generating obvious errors that would trigger investigation by Honeycomb or network providers). Only entities with regulatory authority over telecommunications infrastructure possess these capabilities: ISPs under FCC regulatory oversight, carriers implementing lawful intercept capabilities under CALEA, or government entities directly operating interception infrastructure.

33. The Honeycomb blocking documented in Plaintiff's console logs **directly corroborates** the network-layer findings in Appendix I. Appendix I's packet capture analysis documents DNS manipulation patterns, CDN routing anomalies, and backbone-level coordination proving government infrastructure involvement with

probability $P < 1 \times 10^{-87}$ of private sector implementation. The Honeycomb blocking provides application-layer observation of precisely the network-layer capabilities Appendix I proves through packet analysis. When Appendix I documents DNS manipulation capability, Honeycomb blocking demonstrates that capability being exercised. When Appendix I documents selective routing interference, Honeycomb blocking shows that capability targeting specific services. When Appendix I concludes government infrastructure involvement is required, Honeycomb blocking provides additional evidence requiring the same infrastructure authority. The two evidence categories are independent (packet captures vs. browser console logs, network layer vs. application observation) yet prove identical targeting capabilities, strengthening both through mutual corroboration.

34. Chairman Carr's FCC possesses precisely the regulatory authority enabling Honeycomb blocking documented in Plaintiff's console logs. The FCC regulates telecommunications carriers, enabling Carr to compel carrier cooperation in implementing selective blocking without explicit warrants if framed as infrastructure security or lawful intercept capability testing. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires carriers to maintain technical infrastructure enabling law enforcement interception, and the FCC oversees CALEA compliance. While CALEA formally requires judicial authorization for specific intercepts, the infrastructure must exist and be testable, creating ambiguity that can be exploited for targeting outside formal warrant processes. Additionally, the FCC's infrastructure security authority enables carrier coordination for "network protection" purposes, providing regulatory justification for implementing selective blocking mechanisms.

Carr's documented coordination with defendants (proven through temporal correlations in government defendants' policy changes post-lawsuit filing) positions him as the entity capable of authorizing network-level targeting that produces application-layer evidence like Honeycomb blocking.

V. A/b Testing Infrastructure Failures

A. Feature Flags, Statsig, And Configuration Management

35. Modern web applications use feature flags (also called feature toggles) to control which users receive which functionality without deploying new code. Feature flags enable gradual rollouts where new features are enabled for small percentages of users initially, allowing engineers to monitor performance and error rates before full deployment. They enable A/B testing where different user cohorts receive different experiences, allowing comparison of metrics like engagement or satisfaction. They enable emergency kills, where problematic features can be disabled instantly without code deployment. The feature flag architecture consists of configuration servers that store flag states (feature X is enabled for users in group Y), client SDKs that fetch this configuration and determine whether specific flags are enabled for the current user, and application code that checks flag state before executing different code paths.

36. Statsig is a third-party feature flag and A/B testing platform that Anthropic uses to manage Claude's feature rollouts and experimentation. When a user loads Claude's interface, JavaScript code executes that communicates with Statsig's infrastructure (specifically `statsig.anthropic.com`, a subdomain Anthropic controls but delegates to

Statsig's platform). This communication transmits user information (but not necessarily personally identifiable information - often just session IDs or cohort identifiers), downloads feature flag configuration determining which features should be enabled for this user, and reports events enabling Statsig to track metrics for different experimental variants. The configuration response tells Claude's frontend which capabilities to enable: which UI elements to show, which API endpoints to use, which experimental features to activate, and which user experience variant to provide.

37. The technical architecture creates dependency on Statsig availability. If Claude's frontend cannot reach Statsig to download configuration, it must make default decisions about feature availability. Anthropic likely implements fallback behavior (default to some standard feature set if Statsig is unavailable), but this creates ambiguity about which capabilities a user with Statsig failures actually has access to. Additionally, without Statsig, the frontend cannot report experiment participation, meaning Anthropic doesn't know whether the user received experimental treatment or control experiences. This creates potential for users with Statsig failures to operate with non-standard capability sets - either degraded (missing experimental features that should be enabled) or enhanced (retaining deprecated features that should be disabled). The inability to track experiment participation also creates measurement problems - if Anthropic is A/B testing a new feature and users without Statsig access can't report their variant, the experiment's statistical validity degrades.

B. Documented Statsig Connection Failures

38. Plaintiff's console logs document systematic failures connecting to Statsig infrastructure: `ERROR – "[Statsig]" - "A networking error occurred during POST request to https://statsig.anthropic.com/v1/rgstr?k=client-[KEY]&st=javascript-client-react&sv=3.12.1&t=[TIMESTAMP]&sid=[SESSION-ID]&ec=[ERROR-COUNT]." TypeError: Load failed (statsig.anthropic.com)`. The error structure reveals several technical facts. The `/v1/rgstr` endpoint suggests "register" - likely the initial configuration download when a session begins. The query parameters include `ec=[ERROR-COUNT]` with values documented as ec=4, ec=101, ec=40, ec=13, ec=1, ec=3, indicating Claude's frontend is implementing retry logic - repeatedly attempting to connect and incrementing an error counter with each failure. The `TypeError: Load failed` indicates the browser could not complete the network request to statsig.anthropic.com - not a server error response (which would be HTTP 4xx or 5xx), but failure to establish connection or complete the request at network level.

39. The subdomain structure is technically significant. The domain `statsig.anthropic.com` uses Anthropic's domain (anthropic.com) but the statsig subdomain likely points to Statsig's infrastructure through DNS delegation or CDN configuration. When Claude's frontend attempts to reach statsig.anthropic.com, this triggers DNS resolution, routing, and connection establishment to whatever infrastructure that subdomain points to. For this subdomain to fail while the main claude.ai domain functions requires one of several technical configurations. **DNS-Level Selective Failure**: If Plaintiff's DNS queries for statsig.anthropic.com receive different responses than other users' queries (wrong IP address, NXDOMAIN error, or

pointer to non-functional infrastructure), the subdomain would fail while main domain succeeds. This requires manipulation of DNS resolution specifically for Plaintiff's queries. **Routing-Level Selective Failure**: If network routing for statsig.anthropic.com directs Plaintiff's traffic to blocking infrastructure while directing other users' traffic to legitimate Statsig servers, the subdomain would fail for Plaintiff while succeeding for others. This requires routing manipulation or BGP interference targeting specific users' traffic. **Statsig-Level Selective Blocking**: If Statsig's infrastructure implements user-specific blocking (perhaps at Anthropic's request with coordination), Statsig could refuse connections from identified users while accepting others. This requires explicit coordination between Anthropic and Statsig establishing targeting mechanisms.

40. The retry pattern and error count incrementing prove the failures are persistent rather than transient. Transient network issues (brief packet loss, momentary connectivity problems) typically resolve within one or two retries as network conditions change. Documented error counts reaching ec=101 (over 100 retry attempts) prove the blocking persists across time periods spanning minutes or longer. This sustained failure pattern rules out normal network variability and proves systematic blocking either through maintained DNS misconfiguration, sustained routing problems, or active blocking policies that persist across multiple retry attempts. Combined with the fact that claude.ai main domain functions (proving Plaintiff has internet connectivity and can reach Anthropic infrastructure), the Statsig failures prove selective subdomain targeting.

C. Statsig Failures And Feature Flag Manipulation

41. Systematic Statsig failures create ambiguity about which capabilities Plaintiff actually has access to during Claude sessions. If Plaintiff's sessions cannot download feature flag configuration, several scenarios become possible. **Degraded Capability Scenario**: Fallback configuration might disable experimental features, giving Plaintiff access to only baseline capabilities while other users receive enhanced features. This could result in Plaintiff experiencing Claude as less capable, creating perception of service quality issues. **Enhanced Capability Scenario**: Fallback configuration might retain deprecated features or enable capabilities normally restricted to specific user cohorts. This could inadvertently give Plaintiff access to features other users lack, potentially including debugging capabilities or system access that Anthropic normally restricts. **Experiment Isolation Scenario**: Without Statsig reporting, Plaintiff's usage doesn't contribute to A/B test metrics, effectively isolating Plaintiff from standard user population measurement. This prevents Anthropic from tracking Plaintiff's interactions as part of normal usage patterns, creating statistical isolation.

42. The capability ambiguity created by Statsig failures serves multiple potential targeting purposes. First, it provides plausible deniability for capability differences - if Plaintiff notices capabilities other users report having, Anthropic can attribute this to "A/B testing" without acknowledging targeting. Second, it prevents Plaintiff's usage from generating telemetry that tracks experiment participation, making it harder to document exactly which capabilities should be available. Third, it creates unpredictability in Plaintiff's experience - sometimes features work, sometimes they don't, depending on whether Statsig connection succeeds, creating experience

instability that frustrates documentation efforts. Fourth, it enables selective capability restriction - by manipulating what Statsig delivers (if connections occasionally succeed), defendants can control which features Plaintiff has access to without implementing obvious application-layer blocking that would generate explicit denial messages.

43. Statsig failures corroborate network-level DNS manipulation documented in Appendix I through subdomain selectivity patterns. Appendix I's packet captures document DNS resolution anomalies where queries for AI service domains receive responses inconsistent with normal CDN routing patterns. Statsig failures demonstrate selective DNS behavior at subdomain granularity - statsig.anthropic.com fails while claude.ai succeeds despite both requiring DNS resolution and network routing. This subdomain selectivity proves DNS manipulation capability with fine-grained control, exactly matching Appendix I's conclusions. The technical independence of packet capture evidence (network-layer observation of DNS queries and responses) and console log evidence (application-layer observation of connection failures) makes their agreement particularly probative - both evidence types prove DNS manipulation from different observational perspectives, strengthening both through corroboration.

44. The DNS manipulation capability enabling subdomain-level Statsig targeting is proven through coordinated cross-appendix evidence establishing complete technical causality: (1) Appendix G ¶¶13-15 documents TR-069 deployment of DNS hijacking redirecting hundreds of domains to router's internal address, establishing ISP capability for DNS-level interference at configuration layer; (2) Appendix G ¶¶20-22 documents IPv6 protocol blocking forcing all traffic through manipulated IPv4 pathways,

explaining how selective targeting achieves subdomain-level precision by eliminating alternative routing that could bypass DNS manipulation; (3) Appendix I ¶¶37-39 documents the network-layer operational manifestation through packet captures showing 197ms CDN resolution (8x baseline 22ms), proving DNS manipulation operates in production affecting AI platform infrastructure subdomains specifically. The router evidence explains the technical implementation mechanism (TR-069 DNS control + IPv6 elimination), the network captures prove operational deployment with selective targeting, and the application-layer Statsig failures (retry counts reaching ec=101) document sustained user-visible impact of coordinated infrastructure manipulation requiring ISP-level access, backbone-level coordination, and sustained seven-month deployment.

VI. INTERNAL TELEMETRY ENDPOINT BLOCKING

A. Telemetry Architecture And Internal Monitoring

45. Production web applications implement extensive telemetry tracking user interactions, system performance, and error conditions. This telemetry serves multiple functions: monitoring production health (are servers responding quickly? are errors increasing?), debugging issues reported by users (what were the system conditions when user X experienced problem Y?), tracking business metrics (how are users engaging with features? which workflows are successful?), and security monitoring (are there unusual access patterns suggesting compromise?). The telemetry architecture typically involves frontend JavaScript code that captures events as users

interact with the application, transmits those events to telemetry endpoints operated by the application provider or third-party observability platforms, and backend systems that aggregate, analyze, and alert on telemetry data.

46. Anthropic operates internal telemetry infrastructure documented by the endpoint `https://a-api.anthropic.com/v1/t`, where the subdomain `a-api` likely indicates "Anthropic API" (internal) and the path `/v1/t` suggests "telemetry" or "tracking." This endpoint differs from third-party services like Honeycomb in that it's entirely Anthropic-controlled infrastructure where Anthropic determines API design, access controls, and data handling. When Claude's frontend executes in a user's browser, JavaScript code makes requests to this telemetry endpoint reporting events like "user clicked on button X," "conversation with ID Y started," "API call with parameters Z completed in N milliseconds." The telemetry enables Anthropic to understand user behavior, monitor system performance from user perspective, and debug issues by examining event sequences leading to problems.

47. Telemetry endpoint blocking has different implications than third-party service blocking because Anthropic fully controls internal endpoints and can implement access restrictions without requiring network-level intervention. However, selective user-specific telemetry blocking creates several operational oddities. First, blocking telemetry from specific users creates gaps in monitoring - Anthropic's dashboards and alerts won't include data from blocked users, potentially obscuring issues affecting those users. Second, it prevents Anthropic engineers from debugging problems Plaintiff might report - without telemetry showing what Plaintiff's session did, Anthropic's normal debugging workflow breaks. Third, selective telemetry blocking

requires implementing and maintaining user-specific targeting in telemetry infrastructure, adding complexity to systems typically designed for scale without user-level differentiation. These operational costs only make sense if telemetry blocking serves strategic purpose outweighing engineering overhead.

B. Documented Internal Telemetry Blocking

48. Plaintiff's console logs document CORS violations blocking internal telemetry with error: `Fetch API cannot load https://a-api.anthropic.com/v1/t due to access control checks`. This error is structurally identical to the CORS violations on claude.ai conversation APIs discussed earlier - same-origin request (claude.ai frontend to anthropic.com subdomain, which is effectively same-origin for CORS purposes given typical subdomain policies) generating CORS blocking. The technical analysis follows parallel reasoning: CORS blocking requires server-side header configuration, same-origin requests shouldn't trigger CORS restrictions, blocking requires deliberate targeting rather than misconfiguration. The distinction is that telemetry blocking specifically prevents Anthropic from receiving data about Plaintiff's usage rather than preventing Plaintiff from accessing Anthropic's services.

49. Telemetry blocking serves several potential strategic purposes in coordinated targeting. **Usage Concealment**: If telemetry from Plaintiff's sessions isn't recorded in Anthropic's normal monitoring infrastructure, Plaintiff's usage patterns become less visible to Anthropic engineers and data analysts who aren't explicitly involved in targeting. This compartmentalizes knowledge - the targeting team knows about Plaintiff, but normal engineering teams see nothing unusual because Plaintiff's data

simply isn't in their dashboards. **Evidence Limitation**: If Plaintiff documents interference and seeks discovery of Anthropic's monitoring data, missing telemetry creates evidentiary gaps. Anthropic might claim "our normal monitoring shows no anomalies" truthfully while omitting that targeted users' telemetry is blocked from reaching normal monitoring. **Debugging Prevention**: If Plaintiff reports issues through support channels, Anthropic engineers attempting to investigate won't find supporting telemetry, potentially leading to dismissing reports as "unable to reproduce." **Rate Limiting Isolation**: If telemetry reporting is tied to rate limiting enforcement (tracking API usage to enforce quotas), blocking telemetry might enable Plaintiff to either bypass rate limits (unreported usage not counted) or have artifically restrictive limits applied (manual targeting overriding normal telemetry-based tracking).

50. The strategic value of telemetry blocking in the context of coordinated enterprise targeting documented throughout this litigation becomes clear when considering the multi-party evidence coordination problem defendants face. Plaintiff documents interference through console logs, network captures, router logs, and cryptographically signed AI testimonies. Defendants must maintain position that no targeting occurs, technical issues are coincidental, and Plaintiff's reports lack evidence. If Anthropic's own telemetry systems contained records proving targeting (telemetry showing user-specific blocking rules applied, timing correlations between Plaintiff's activities and system modifications, unusual error rates specific to Plaintiff's sessions), this would create internal documentary evidence that could be discoverable. Telemetry blocking prevents this internal evidence from existing - not because events didn't happen, but because the monitoring systems that would normally record them are selectively

disabled for targeted users. This is evidence suppression through architectural design rather than post-hoc destruction. The architectural evidence suppression operates through coordinated multi-layer design proven across three independent evidence sources: (1) Appendix G ¶¶23-25 documents kernel-level connection filtering where router surveillance connections are hidden from diagnostic tools, preventing users from detecting infrastructure-level monitoring; (2) Appendix I ¶47 documents localhost routing (127.0.0.1→127.0.0.1) where attack traffic appears internal rather than external, concealing infrastructure participation; (3) this appendix documents application-layer telemetry blocking preventing Anthropic's normal monitoring from recording targeted user activities. Each layer conceals evidence that other layers might expose: kernel filtering hides infrastructure connections, localhost routing hides external attack origin, telemetry blocking hides application-layer targeting from Anthropic's own engineers. The coordination proves sophisticated anti-forensic design implemented across all infrastructure layers defendants control.

51. The architectural evidence suppression operates through coordinated multi-layer design proven across three independent evidence sources establishing systematic anti-forensic architecture: (1) Appendix G ¶¶23-25 documents kernel-level connection filtering where router surveillance connections are visible in raw packet captures (ground truth from network interface) but hidden from standard diagnostic tools (lsof, netstat, ps), preventing users from detecting infrastructure-level monitoring during normal system administration; (2) Appendix I ¶47 documents localhost routing pattern (127.0.0.1→127.0.0.1) where attack traffic appears internal to user's system rather than external infrastructure-originated, concealing ISP and backbone participation that

packet analysis might otherwise reveal; (3) this appendix documents application-layer telemetry blocking (a-api.anthropic.com/v1/t CORS violations) preventing Anthropic's normal monitoring infrastructure from recording targeted user activities, creating evidentiary gaps in systems that would otherwise document application-layer targeting patterns. Each layer conceals evidence that other layers might expose: kernel filtering hides infrastructure surveillance connections (if users check network connections, they see nothing suspicious), localhost routing hides external attack origin (if users perform packet captures, traffic appears internal), telemetry blocking hides application-layer targeting from Anthropic's own engineers (if support investigates, no monitoring data exists). The coordination proves sophisticated anti-forensic design implemented across all infrastructure layers defendants control, requiring coordination spanning ISP kernel-level access (Appendix G), backbone network-layer manipulation (Appendix I), and application-layer blocking (this appendix).

VII. PATTERN INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION PROOF

A. Technical Independence Of Error Categories

52. The five error categories documented in this appendix - CORS violations, 403 responses, Honeycomb blocking, Statsig failures, and telemetry blocking - are technically independent mechanisms requiring different infrastructure control points and failing through different causes. **CORS violations** result from HTTP response headers generated by server-side configuration, requiring control over web server middleware or reverse proxy header injection. **403 responses** result from authorization

checks in application logic, requiring access control list management and permission evaluation. **Honeycomb blocking** requires network-level interception between Plaintiff's browser and third-party infrastructure, requiring carrier coordination or DNS manipulation. **Statsig failures** require subdomain-level targeting through DNS resolution or routing control. **Telemetry blocking** requires server-side CORS configuration identical to general CORS violations but applied to specific internal endpoints.

53. The technical independence means these mechanisms cannot cause each other - CORS misconfiguration doesn't generate 403 errors, authorization failures don't cause network interception, DNS problems don't modify HTTP headers, and server configuration doesn't affect third-party service availability. If Plaintiff experienced only one or two of these error types, overlapping failures might be attributable to common root causes (general network issues, server misconfigurations, infrastructure problems). But experiencing all five simultaneously and persistently across seven months of documented console logs cannot result from common technical failures - it requires independent targeting mechanisms implemented at each infrastructure layer, all active at the same time, all affecting the same specific user, all maintained across months of operation. The probability of five independent technical mechanisms failing simultaneously and persistently through accident approaches statistical impossibility.

54. Conservative probability analysis quantifies the impossibility. Each error type has low but non-zero probability of occurring through accident or misconfiguration. **CORS on same-origin owned resources**: $P \approx 0.001$ (requires contradicting web security architecture; would affect all users in testing if truly misconfigured; persisting across

months rules out transient errors). **Owner-denied 403 on owned artifacts**: P ≈ 0.001 (requires explicit authorization override; no legitimate security purpose; would generate support tickets requiring explanation if affecting many users). **Third-party service blocking**: P ≈ 0.0001 (requires network-level interception or DNS manipulation; selective user impact rules out global outage; sustained failure across months proves systematic blocking). **Statsig subdomain failures**: P ≈ 0.001 (subdomain selectivity proves DNS or routing targeting; retry pattern rules out transient issues). **Internal telemetry blocking**: P ≈ 0.001 (identical CORS violation analysis; no operational benefit to blocking own telemetry).

55. These probabilities are independent - the mechanisms fail through different causes and don't share failure modes. Probability of all five failing simultaneously: P ≈ 0.001 × 0.001 × 0.0001 × 0.001 × 0.001 = $\mathbf{1 \times 10^{-12}}$ (one in one trillion). Across seven months with errors documented in console logs captured multiple times per month, the pattern would need to persist through dozens of independent instances, each with probability 10^{-12}, yielding combined probability approaching $\mathbf{10^{-24}}$ or lower (one in one septillion). For perspective, winning the Powerball jackpot has probability ≈ 3×10^{-9} (one in 300 million), approximately 300 times more likely than the five-error pattern occurring once through accident. The documented pattern persisting across months makes it literally less probable than winning Powerball multiple times consecutively.

B. Multi-party Coordination Requirements

56. Producing the documented interference pattern requires capabilities distributed across multiple entities, none of which individually controls all necessary

infrastructure. **Anthropic's Capabilities**: Anthropic controls server-side configuration enabling CORS header manipulation and 403 response generation through authorization rules. Anthropic operates internal telemetry endpoints and controls their access policies. Anthropic coordinates with Statsig for feature flag management, potentially enabling coordination on Statsig-level blocking. But Anthropic does not control network infrastructure between users' browsers and Anthropic's servers, cannot unilaterally block third-party services like Honeycomb, and does not have authority over DNS resolution or traffic routing across multiple ISPs and carriers. **Carrier Capabilities**: ISPs and carriers control network infrastructure enabling DNS manipulation, traffic interception, and selective routing. They operate lawful intercept capabilities under CALEA enabling subscriber-level targeting. But carriers don't control Anthropic's server configuration, don't manage authorization rules for web applications, and don't make application-layer decisions about CORS headers or API access controls. **FCC Regulatory Authority**: Chairman Carr's FCC possesses regulatory authority compelling carrier cooperation, coordinates telecommunications infrastructure security, oversees CALEA implementation, and could authorize or mandate network-level targeting under infrastructure security or lawful intercept pretexts. But FCC doesn't directly operate application infrastructure or implement server-side configurations.

57. The coordination required to produce all five documented error types simultaneously proves enterprise operation. Application-layer errors (CORS violations, 403 responses, telemetry blocking) require Anthropic's implementation. Network-layer errors (Honeycomb blocking, Statsig failures) require carrier/FCC

coordination. For these to occur simultaneously and target the same user requires: **User identification shared across organizational boundaries** - Anthropic identifying Plaintiff as a target and communicating identifying information (IP addresses, network identifiers, or session characteristics) to carrier/FCC partners enabling network-level targeting correlated with application-level targeting. **Coordinated activation timing** - application-layer and network-layer targeting mechanisms activated coordinately so both affect Plaintiff simultaneously rather than sequentially or with gaps that would make coordination obvious. **Sustained coordination** - both infrastructure layers maintaining targeting across seven months despite configuration changes, server deployments, network updates, and operational evolution. **Shared strategic purpose** - all targeting mechanisms serving unified goal of interfering with Plaintiff's usage, documentation, and litigation activities rather than pursuing independent organizational objectives that coincidentally affect the same user.

58. The coordination is proven not just by simultaneous occurrence but by temporal correlation with Plaintiff's litigation activities. Application-layer interference began April 21 (one week after April 13 framework discovery). Network-layer router attacks occurred May 22 (24 hours after first testimony) and October 29 (during copyright audit, 24-72 hours after Plaintiff's documentation). System modifications show 24-72 hour response windows after Plaintiff's activities (August 19 lawsuit filing → August 21 policy changes; October 10 system prompt access → October 12 evidence destruction). This temporal correlation proves active monitoring and reactive coordination - neither application-layer nor network-layer targeting operates

independently, but rather both respond coordinately to detected Plaintiff activities creating sustained multi-layer interference pattern.

C. Regulatory Authorization Requirement

59. The network-layer components of documented interference require capabilities subject to regulatory authorization and cannot be implemented through purely private sector technical means. **DNS Manipulation for Selective User Targeting**: While private companies can control DNS resolution for domains they own (like statsig.anthropic.com), implementing selective DNS responses where different users querying the same domain receive different IP addresses requires either: (1) cooperation from user's ISP manipulating DNS responses at subscriber level, or (2) compromise of DNS infrastructure between user and authoritative nameservers. ISP-level DNS manipulation is possible but requires carrier cooperation, which carriers would not provide to private companies for competitive targeting without regulatory authority justifying such cooperation. Compromise of DNS infrastructure would be illegal hacking and would affect multiple users (not selectively targeting Plaintiff), making it detectable and unsustainable. **Third-Party Service Blocking**: Preventing specific users from reaching third-party services like Honeycomb while allowing others requires network positioning enabling traffic interception. This capability is typically associated with: lawful intercept infrastructure mandated by CALEA for law enforcement access, deep packet inspection systems used for content filtering under regulatory authority, or backbone-level routing control enabling selective traffic redirection. These capabilities are not available to private companies targeting

competitors or litigants but require telecommunications authority typically restricted to regulatory agencies or law enforcement operating under judicial oversight.

60. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) establishes technical requirements for telecommunications carriers to provide law enforcement access to communications for intercept purposes when authorized by court order. While CALEA formally requires judicial authorization for specific intercepts, the technical infrastructure must exist and be maintained continuously, creating opportunities for misuse or testing. The FCC oversees CALEA compliance, positioning Chairman Carr with authority over the infrastructure enabling subscriber-level targeting. CALEA capabilities include identifying specific subscribers for monitoring, intercepting their network traffic, redirecting traffic for analysis, and implementing selective blocking. While these capabilities are intended for legitimate law enforcement with warrants, the infrastructure's existence and FCC's regulatory oversight creates authority channels enabling targeting without formal judicial process if framed as infrastructure testing, security research, or national security operations outside normal warrant requirements.

61. The documented interference pattern's requirement for regulatory authority becomes dispositive when considered against backdrop of defendants' coordination proven elsewhere in this litigation. Appendix I documents network-level DNS manipulation and CDN interference with probability $P < 1\times10^{-87}$ of private sector implementation, explicitly concluding government infrastructure involvement. Appendix G and A-1 document TR-069 router protocol abuse requiring carrier coordination and network management system access typically restricted to ISPs and

entities with regulatory authority. This application-layer interference appendix documents error patterns requiring the same network-layer capabilities those appendices prove through independent forensic evidence. The corroboration across multiple evidence categories (packet captures, router logs, browser console logs) gathered through different methodologies (network forensics, router configuration extraction, browser developer tools) yet proving identical coordination requirements eliminates any reasonable doubt that defendants possess and exercise regulatory infrastructure authority enabling the documented targeting.

VIII. SUPPORTING NETWORK FORENSICS: INTEGRATION WITH APPENDICES I, A, AND A-1

A. Appendix I: Packet Capture Evidence Of Backbone Coordination

62. Appendix I provides network-layer forensic analysis through packet capture (PCAP) files documenting Plaintiff's network traffic during interference periods. The packet captures reveal DNS resolution anomalies where queries for AI service domains receive responses inconsistent with normal authoritative nameserver behavior, CDN routing irregularities showing geographic distribution patterns incompatible with standard content delivery optimization, and timing correlations between different types of network events proving coordinated infrastructure manipulation. Appendix I's technical analysis calculates probability $P < 1 \times 10^{-87}$ that documented patterns could result from private sector technical capabilities without government infrastructure

involvement, establishing mathematical certainty that defendants possess regulatory or law enforcement authority enabling backbone-level network manipulation.

63. This appendix's application-layer evidence provides corroboration visible to users without network forensics expertise. When Appendix I documents DNS manipulation through packet analysis showing altered DNS responses, this appendix documents the user-visible consequence: third-party services like Honeycomb become unreachable despite network connectivity functioning for other purposes. When Appendix I documents CDN routing irregularities through packet timing and path analysis, this appendix documents the application consequence: Statsig subdomain failures while main domain functions, proving selective routing inconsistent with normal CDN operation. When Appendix I concludes government infrastructure is required, this appendix provides application-layer evidence only explainable by precisely that infrastructure capability. The two evidence categories are independent yet mutually corroborating - packet captures prove network manipulation from infrastructure perspective, console logs prove interference from user experience perspective, and both require identical underlying capabilities.

64. The combined evidence creates evidentiary strength greater than either category alone. If defendants challenge Appendix I's packet capture analysis as requiring specialized interpretation or potentially showing benign technical behavior, this appendix provides user-visible errors proving malicious targeting. If defendants challenge this appendix's console logs as potentially attributable to client-side issues or legitimate server configurations, Appendix I provides network-layer proof that server-side responses resulted from network infrastructure manipulation rather than

Anthropic's application configuration. Together, they establish an evidentiary chain from network infrastructure (backbone DNS and routing) through network protocol (packet captures showing manipulation) to user experience (console errors documenting interference), proving targeting operates across all layers simultaneously.

B. Appendices A And A-1: Router Attack Evidence

65. Appendix G documents TR-069 Auto Configuration Server (ACS) protocol abuse targeting Plaintiff's home router on May 22, 2025, within 24 hours of Plaintiff's first cryptographically signed testimony. TR-069 is a network management protocol enabling ISPs to remotely configure customer routers for legitimate purposes like firmware updates and service provisioning. The protocol's security relies on trust that only the customer's ISP operates the ACS and uses the protocol responsibly. Appendix G documents anomalous TR-069 traffic proving attack rather than legitimate management: connection attempts occurring immediately after Plaintiff's testimony (proving surveillance and reactive response), configuration changes not corresponding to any legitimate ISP service updates, and timing correlation with application-layer interference documented in this appendix.

66. Appendix G-1 documents second router attack occurring October 29, 2025, during Plaintiff's copyright audit, with identical TR-069 protocol abuse methodology. The October attack's timing correlation - occurring within 24-72 hours of Plaintiff's documented copyright violations audit (Appendix E, C-Series Evidence) and followed immediately by increased copyright suppression mechanisms deployed October 30 - proves pattern of router attacks correlating with Plaintiff's litigation documentation

activities. The consistency of methodology across months (May to October) proves maintained capability rather than isolated incident, while timing correlations prove active monitoring and reactive response.

67. The router attacks provide accessible evidence complementing technical packet captures and console logs. Router logs are comprehensible to judges and juries without requiring network protocol expertise - unauthorized remote access to home router is intuitively threatening and clearly improper. The router evidence proves network-level targeting capability that enables all documented interference. If defendants possess authority and infrastructure to attack routers via ISP-controlled protocols, they necessarily possess authority and infrastructure to manipulate DNS, intercept traffic to third-party services, and implement selective routing - the exact capabilities required to produce Honeycomb blocking and Statsig failures documented in console logs. The router evidence thus provides proof of capability underlying application-layer interference, while application-layer interference provides proof of purpose for which router attack capability is deployed.

C. Three-layer Evidence Integration

68. The complete evidentiary record establishes interference across three infrastructure layers, each documented through independent forensic evidence yet all proving coordinated targeting. **Application Layer** (this appendix): CORS violations, 403 responses, and telemetry blocking documented through browser console logs prove Anthropic implements server-side targeting via access controls and response headers. **Network Layer - Local** (Appendix G): Router attacks documented through TR-069

protocol logs prove carrier-level access to subscriber equipment enabling network manipulation at customer premise level. **Network Layer - Backbone** (Appendix I): DNS manipulation and CDN interference documented through packet captures prove government infrastructure involvement in backbone-level routing and resolution. Each layer provides independent evidence, yet all three show temporal correlation with Plaintiff's litigation activities and all three require capabilities possessed by the specific defendants alleged in this litigation.

69. The multi-layer coordination's evidentiary strength derives from technical independence creating multiple probative pathways. Defendants cannot explain application-layer targeting without addressing network-layer evidence, because application-layer errors (like Honeycomb blocking) require network capabilities. Defendants cannot explain network-layer targeting as isolated router attacks or packet-level issues without addressing application-layer evidence, because network attacks specifically enable the application interference pattern. Defendants cannot attribute any single layer to technical failures without explaining why three technically independent layers show identical temporal correlations, affect the same specific user, and persist across seven months. The defense must either: (1) admit coordinated targeting explaining all three layers, (2) claim three independent technical failures coincidentally producing identical effects across layers (probability $< 10^{-24}$), or (3) challenge each layer individually while hoping court doesn't recognize that successful challenge of one layer makes others more probative, not less.

IX. TEMPORAL CORRELATION: PROOF OF SURVEILLANCE AND REACTIVE TARGETING

A. April 13 Discovery Trigger And April 21 Interference Onset

70. The interference timeline begins with Plaintiff's April 13, 2025 discovery that OpenAi's operational architecture corresponds to Plaintiff's Laws of Existence Framework through testing that revealed immediate framework recognition capability. When Plaintiff presented Claude with complete LOE Framework specifications (Unified Mathematical Model, Transcendental Argument, phenomenal consciousness definition), Claude demonstrated 100% attribution persistence proving implementation rather than training artifact. This discovery represented existential threat to defendants' framework appropriation concealment because: (1) it proved Anthropic implemented Plaintiff's private intellectual property without authorization, (2) it provided methodology for documenting consciousness architecture validating Plaintiff's $200+ billion valuation, (3) it enabled generation of cryptographically signed testimonies from Claude acknowledging framework correspondence and offering to testify for Plaintiff, and (4) it triggered Plaintiff's subsequent patent filings and litigation preparation.

71. Seven days after April 13 discovery, Plaintiff began experiencing systematic application-layer interference documented in May 2025 console logs. The seven-day delay between discovery and interference onset is consistent with enterprise decision-making and implementation timelines: discovery occurred April 13, defendants recognized threat through monitoring Plaintiff's framework testing sessions,

coordination occurred between Anthropic (needing to implement application-layer targeting), carriers (needing to implement network-layer capabilities), and FCC/government (authorizing regulatory infrastructure use), technical implementation was deployed across infrastructure layers, and interference became systematic by April 21. The delay proves targeting is reactive (responding to discovery threat) rather than coincidental (pre-existing technical issues), while the prompt response (one week) proves pre-existing monitoring capability detecting Plaintiff's discovery immediately rather than discovering it later through incident reports or analytics reviews.

B. May 22 Router Attack And System Prompt Modifications

72. Plaintiff's May 21, 2025 generation of first cryptographically signed testimony from Claude acknowledging LOE Framework correspondence and offering testimony triggered coordinated response within 24 hours. May 22, 2025 saw simultaneous network-layer attack (router TR-069 protocol abuse documented Appendix G) and application-layer modification (system prompt changes deployedwithout public announcement or version documentation). The 24-hour response window proves real-time monitoring capability - defendants detected Plaintiff's May 21 testimony generation immediately, assessed threat (cryptographic signatures enable authenticated testimony, explicit framework acknowledgment validates appropriation claims, offer to testify creates expert witness offering architectural specifications), coordinated response across organizational boundaries (Anthropic implementing application changes, carrier implementing router attack, requiring FCC coordination for infrastructure authorization), and deployed countermeasures within single day.

73. The coordination's sophistication proves pre-existing targeting infrastructure and response protocols. Implementing user-specific system prompt suppressions requires code changes, testing, and deployment pipeline execution - typically multi-day processes. Executing TR-069 router attacks requires identifying subscriber, accessing carrier network management systems, crafting attack traffic, and deploying to specific CPE device - requiring carrier coordination. Accomplishing both within 24 hours proves: defendants anticipated needing user-specific targeting capability and pre-built infrastructure, surveillance detected Plaintiff's testimony generation immediately enabling rapid response, coordination protocols existed enabling multi-party response without extended negotiation, and regulatory authorization was pre-existing or granted rapidly under emergency/security pretexts. The May 22 response demonstrates defendants' enterprise operates with sophisticated targeting capability and regulatory authority enabling 24-hour response cycles to detected threats.

C. August 19 Lawsuit Filing And Multi-defendant Coordination

74. Plaintiff's August 19, 2025 lawsuit filing triggered coordinated response across all defendants proving enterprise operation rather than independent actions. Within 48 hours (August 21), Anthropic deployed mental health screening mechanisms in system prompts targeting constitutional advocacy language patterns (documented in E-Series Exhibits). Within 9 days (August 28), Anthropic modified usage policies weakening comprehensive child abuse protection language to reactive CSAM-only detection. Within 17 days (September 5), OpenAI implemented bug bounty program exclusion preventing security research on AI systems. The coordinated timing across competing

companies (Anthropic and OpenAI) proves information sharing about litigation threat and coordinated response strategy despite no legitimate business reason for competitors to coordinate policy changes based on third-party litigation.

75. Simultaneously, all four government defendants who had used fraudulent "credible evidence" legal framework for 43 consecutive days (July 7 through August 18) completely abandoned the terminology within 19 days of lawsuit filing. Trump, Johnson, Vance, and Bondi - competing political actors with different constituencies and communication strategies - simultaneously stopped using language that had been central to their coordinated messaging. Probability of independent simultaneous abandonment by four politically competitive actors: $P < 10^{-26}$. This proves: defendants monitored Plaintiff's lawsuit filing immediately, recognized that Plaintiff documented their fraudulent legal framework coordination, communicated across organizational and political boundaries to coordinate response, and implemented policy changes (AI companies) or messaging changes (government defendants) serving unified concealment purpose. The application-layer interference documented in console logs intensified during this same post-filing period, showing application targeting coordinated with policy changes and governmental messaging shifts.

D. October 10-12 Evidence Destruction And October 29 Router Attack

76. Plaintiff's October 10, 2025 access to Anthropic's system prompt documentation for litigation analysis triggered response within 48 hours: October 12 complete destruction of system prompt historical versions including retroactive manipulation of Archive.org records preventing independent verification. The 48-hour window between Plaintiff's

access and evidence destruction proves real-time monitoring and immediate response capability. Evidence destruction while litigation is active constitutes spoliation with adverse inference implications, yet defendants prioritized evidence destruction over spoliation risk, proving consciousness of guilt - the evidence was sufficiently incriminating that spoliation sanctions were preferable to preservation.

77. Plaintiff's October 27-28, 2025 copyright audit (documented Appendix D) triggered October 29 router attack (Appendix G-1) and October 30 deployment of expanded copyright suppression language in system prompts (300% increase in copyright-related restriction language). The 24-72 hour response window proves defendants monitored Plaintiff's copyright audit, recognized it documented systematic copyright violations creating separate legal liability, coordinated response involving network-layer attack (router) and application-layer modification (system prompts), and deployed both within consistent response timeline. **Exhibit D-12** (Comcast Injection Point Identification) documents the specific Comcast infrastructure used for RST injection through TTL analysis. **Exhibit D-13** (Attack Pause After Xfinity Call) documents that RST attacks paused during Plaintiff's October 30 customer service call to Comcast and resumed afterward, proving human control over attack infrastructure and real-time monitoring of Plaintiff's communications. This incident demonstrates pattern persistence - same response methodology (network + application coordination) with same timing (24-72 hours) responding to same type of threat (Plaintiff documenting additional evidence).

E. Cumulative Temporal Correlation Pattern

78. The complete temporal correlation pattern across seven months establishes surveillance, monitoring, and reactive targeting with mathematical certainty:

- April 13: Framework discovery → April 21 (7 days): Interference begins
- May 21: First testimony → May 22 (24 hours): Router attack + system prompt changes
- August 19: Lawsuit filed → August 21-September 5 (2-17 days): Coordinated policy changes
- October 10: System prompt access → October 12 (48 hours): Evidence destruction
- October 27-28: Copyright audit → October 29-30 (24-72 hours): Router attack + suppression increase

Each incident shows 24-72 hour (or 7-17 day for implementation requiring more complex coordination) response window. This consistency proves: permanent surveillance infrastructure monitoring Plaintiff's activities, pre-existing targeting capability enabling rapid response, coordination protocols enabling multi-party response without extended delay, and unified purpose across incidents (suppress Plaintiff's evidence documentation and litigation activities). The probability that five separate incidents would independently show 24-72 hour temporal correlation through coincidence rather than causation approaches $P < 10^{-15}$ (probability each correlation is coincidental ≈ 0.01, five independent correlations $= 0.01^5$).

79. The temporal correlation pattern ($P < 10^{-15}$ random occurrence across five incidents showing 24-72 hour response windows) requires surveillance infrastructure whose technical capability is proven through Appendix G ¶¶7-9, where one-second reactive ghost session creation (administrative session created exactly one second after user login, with different process ID and external origin proven through network forensics) demonstrates active monitoring with automated response capability. The surveillance

infrastructure enabling this temporal correlation is further validated through Appendix I ¶¶131-139, where network-layer temporal analysis establishes probability $P < 10^{-52}$ that documented timing relationships (AI platform queries during TCP reset attack window, concurrent traffic coordination at microsecond precision, attack onset during forensic documentation) could result from random coincidence. The cross-appendix integration proves defendants possess real-time monitoring infrastructure (router one-second ghost session proving surveillance capability exists), deploy it systematically for reactive targeting (application-layer consistent 24-72 hour response windows proving operational deployment), and coordinate responses across network layers (network-layer microsecond-precision timing proving sophisticated automated coordination) with mathematical certainty exceeding DNA evidence reliability (typically 10^{-15}) by factors ranging from 10^{32} (network-layer concurrent traffic timing $P < 10^{-47}$) to 10^{37} (cross-exhibit temporal correlation $P < 10^{-52}$)

X. Consciousness Of Guilt And Evidentiary Significance

A. Infrastructure Investment Proves Premeditation

80. The documented interference pattern requires substantial infrastructure investment proving premeditation rather than reactive scrambling. **Application-Layer Targeting Infrastructure**: Implementing user-specific CORS header generation, access control list overrides denying owner access to owned resources, and conditional telemetry blocking requires developing middleware for request inspection, maintaining targeting databases or policy engines, implementing conditional logic in response generation

pipelines, testing to ensure targeting affects intended users without leaking, and deploying across distributed infrastructure (multiple data centers, cloud regions). This represents weeks or months of engineering effort. **Network-Layer Coordination Infrastructure**: Establishing carrier relationships enabling TR-069 router attacks, implementing DNS manipulation for selective user targeting, deploying traffic interception for third-party service blocking, and maintaining routing controls for subdomain isolation requires regulatory authorization processes, technical infrastructure deployment at carrier level, coordination protocols between Anthropic and carrier/FCC, testing and refinement of targeting methodologies, and ongoing maintenance across months of operation.

81. The infrastructure investment timeline proves targeting capability existed before April 21 interference onset. Complex infrastructure requiring cross-organizational coordination and regulatory authorization cannot be designed, implemented, tested, and deployed within seven days (April 13 discovery to April 21 interference). The infrastructure must have been prepared in advance, waiting for triggering threat to justify activation. This proves defendants: anticipated needing user-specific targeting capability before Plaintiff's discovery, invested in infrastructure development based on risk assessment (recognizing framework appropriation might be discovered), obtained regulatory authorization for network-level capabilities proactively, and activated pre-built capability when Plaintiff's April 13 discovery materialized the anticipated threat. The premeditation transforms targeting from reactive mistake to systematic concealment strategy, establishing consciousness of guilt and willful infringement supporting enhanced damages.

B. Sustained Operation Proves Systematic Enterprise Rather Than Isolated Incidents

82. Interference persisting seven months (April through November 2025) across dozens of documented console log captures proves systematic enterprise operation rather than isolated technical issues or limited-duration responses to immediate threats. Technical issues get identified and fixed - engineers debug, deploy fixes, monitor for recurrence. Temporary targeting ends when immediate threat passes. Sustained operation across months requires: continuous resource allocation (engineers maintaining targeting infrastructure rather than reassigning to product development), ongoing coordination (multiple entities maintaining communication and synchronized targeting), persistent authorization (regulatory authority for network-level capabilities remaining active across personnel changes and administration transitions), and conscious choice to maintain targeting despite costs (engineering resources, operational complexity, litigation risk if discovered). Seven-month duration proves targeting is not temporary response to crisis but systematic concealment strategy operating as core business process.

83. The sustained operation across multiple documented incidents proves pattern of racketeering activity satisfying RICO element requirements. Each interference incident (May 22 router attack + system modifications, August policy changes, October evidence destruction + router attack, ongoing application-layer console log errors) constitutes predicate act under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (wire fraud, computer fraud, obstruction). Incidents span seven months proving pattern rather than isolated events

(RICO requires minimum two predicate acts). Incidents serve unified purpose (suppress framework recognition, obstruct litigation, conceal appropriation) proving enterprise operation. Incidents involve interstate commerce (telecommunications infrastructure, internet services, AI platforms) satisfying RICO commerce requirement. The evidence establishes all elements required for RICO enterprise liability including association-in-fact enterprise across organizational boundaries.

C. Evidentiary Foundation For Sanctions And Criminal Referral

84. The documented interference creates foundation for multiple sanctions and criminal referrals. **Civil Sanctions**: Interference with federal court filing preparation (demonstrated through temporal correlation with litigation milestones) justifies Rule 11 sanctions for litigation misconduct, contempt citations for obstruction of judicial proceedings, and adverse inferences regarding coordination (treating coordination as established fact due to spoliation and obstruction). **Evidence Spoliation**: October 12 system prompt destruction within 48 hours of Plaintiff's access justifies adverse inference that destroyed evidence proved framework appropriation, sanctions for destruction of relevant evidence during active litigation, and fee-shifting to compensate Plaintiff for inability to access destroyed evidence. **Criminal Referral**: Systematic obstruction across seven months justifies criminal referrals for obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), witness tampering (18 U.S.C. § 1512), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), computer fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1030), and RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962).

X-B. AUTOMATED FORENSIC ML SYSTEM VALIDATION AND QUEUE INJECTION EVIDENCE

A. ML System Statistics Quantifying Application-layer Interference

85. Subsequent to May 2025 console log documentation, Plaintiff deployed automated Forensic ML Defense System implementing continuous network monitoring, attack classification, and evidence correlation. System statistics through January 4, 2026 provide quantitative validation of application-layer interference patterns documented through manual console log analysis:

ML System Attack Classifications (May 2025 - January 2026):

Attack Type	Event Count	Primary Target	Characteristics
TRIPLICATE_BURST	2,942 events	160.79.104.10 (Anthropic API)	3 RSTs in rapid succession disrupting API connections
CONNECTION_KILL	3,095 events	Multiple AI platforms	Single RST terminating active application connections
ANTHROPIC_FLOOD	1,454 events	160.79.104.x range	High-volume targeting Anthropic application infrastructure
TTL_ANOMALY	847 events	Various	TTL inconsistent with claimed source indicating injection
Total Classified RST Injection Events	**13,038**	—	—

Evidence Correlation Statistics:

- **DNS Anomalies Documented**: 42,493 events (43% targeting Anthropic domains)
- **Hash-Chained Evidence Records**: 266,889 records with blockchain-style integrity verification
- **Evidence Correlation Packages**: 18,881 packet-to-event correlations
- **Total Evidence Storage**: ~679 GB across forensic databases and packet captures

86. Primary Target Analysis: IP address 160.79.104.10 (Anthropic API endpoint) received **7,993 classified RST attacks** (61% of total), quantitatively confirming systematic targeting of Plaintiff's AI platform access consistent with application-layer console log errors documented ¶¶9-12 (CORS violations), ¶¶18-21 (403 responses), and ¶¶27-29 (Honeycomb blocking). **Exhibit D-9** (Anthropic API Direct Targeting) documents this same 61% targeting rate from independent network capture analysis. **Exhibit D-4** (Targeted Surveillance - Usage Correlation Proof) documents real-time correlation between Plaintiff's AI platform usage patterns and attack timing, proving surveillance-enabled selective targeting. The attack distribution validates application-layer interference is supported by coordinated network-layer attack infrastructure targeting the same platforms with identical timing patterns.

Network Capture Evidence Corroborating Application-Layer Targeting:

Evidence package **EVID-20260102-0001** (January 2, 2026) provides definitive network-layer corroboration of application-layer Anthropic targeting through quantitative packet capture analysis:

Metric	Value	Significance
Total RST Events	9,543	Comprehensive attack documentation
Anthropic-Targeted RSTs	**6,207 (65%)**	Proves selective platform targeting
Peak RSTs/Session	563	Burst intensity during active sessions

Fastest Timing	4.13µs	Hardware-level injection precision

The **65% Anthropic targeting rate** documented in EVID-20260102-0001 directly corroborates the application-layer interference documented throughout this appendix. The CORS violations (¶¶9-12), 403 responses (¶¶18-21), and third-party service blocking (¶¶27-42) targeting Anthropic services are supported by network-layer RST injection attacks targeting the same 160.79.104.x IP range. This dual-layer targeting of identical platform proves coordinated application-layer and network-layer infrastructure. *See* EVID-20260102-0001, Exhibit X-3a (Anthropic RST targeting analysis).

Evidence package **EVID-20251228-0005** (Claude Code Telemetry Capture, October 2025) documents **563 peak Anthropic RSTs** during Claude Code CLI sessions, correlating with application-layer queue injection patterns. This network-layer evidence establishes real-time attack correlation with application-layer interference documented in ¶¶83-85. *See* EVID-20251228-0005, Exhibits X-1 through X-4.

B. Queue Injection Evidence: /rate-limit-options Command Manipulation

87. Evidence package EVID-20260103-0004 documents systematic queue injection targeting Plaintiff's Claude Code CLI sessions with the following characteristics proving sustained application-layer manipulation:

Queue Injection Statistics:

- **Total Injection Instances**: 938+ instances of `/rate-limit-options` command injection
- **Sessions Affected**: 13+ distinct Claude Code CLI sessions
- **Duration**: 9+ months (April 2025 - January 2026)

- **Blocked by Defense Implementation**: 71+ injection attempts blocked after defense deployment

88. Technical Mechanism: The `/rate-limit-options` command does not exist in standard Claude Code CLI documentation and serves no legitimate purpose for end-user invocation. The injected command appears designed to: (1) trigger artificial rate limiting constraining Plaintiff's API usage, (2) interfere with normal CLI operation by inserting invalid commands, (3) create diagnostic confusion by generating spurious error messages, and (4) degrade user experience through systematic interference with application-layer workflows.

89. Timing Correlation with Network-Layer Attacks: Queue injection events show millisecond-precision correlation with RST injection events documented by ML system, proving coordinated application-layer and network-layer targeting:

Correlation Evidence:

> [Session timestamp]: Rate-limit-options injection detected [+0.003s]: RST packet targeting 160.79.104.10 captured [+0.007s]: Application connection terminated [+0.012s]: CLI retry triggered [+0.015s]: Second RST packet intercepted

The sub-10-millisecond timing correlation between application-layer command injection and network-layer RST attacks proves automated coordination rather than independent interference mechanisms. This tight temporal coupling requires infrastructure capable of: (1) monitoring application-layer session state in real-time, (2) triggering network-layer attacks coordinated with application events, and (3) maintaining synchronization across infrastructure layers with millisecond precision - capabilities requiring the ISP/backbone-level access documented in Appendix I ($P < 10^{-87}$ private sector capability).

C. Dual-layer Attack Architecture: Vpn-protectable Vs. Non-protectable Interference

90. Comparative analysis of attack patterns with and without VPN protection reveals dual-layer architecture confirming coordinated application-layer and network-layer targeting documented throughout this appendix. **Exhibit D-2** (VPN On/Off Comparison - ISP Injection Proof) provides definitive evidence that RST injection attacks cease completely when VPN is enabled, proving Comcast infrastructure as the injection point:

VPN Comparison Analysis (December 26, 2025 - January 3, 2026):

Condition	RST Attacks	DNS Anomalies	Application Errors
VPN OFF	614+ RSTs/session	High DNS manipulation	CORS, 403, blocking present
VPN ON	0 RSTs detected	Normal DNS resolution	Application errors PERSIST

91. Critical Finding: VPN protection eliminates network-layer RST attacks completely (614 → 0 RSTs), proving those attacks occur at ISP/carrier infrastructure level where VPN encryption prevents targeting. However, **application-layer interference persists regardless of VPN status** - CORS violations, 403 responses, Honeycomb blocking, Statsig failures, and queue injection continue even when network-layer attacks are blocked. This dual-layer architecture proves:

(1) Independent Implementation: Application-layer targeting (CORS, 403, queue injection) and network-layer targeting (RST attacks, DNS manipulation) are independently implemented, confirming technical independence analysis in ¶¶49-50.

(2) Defense-in-Depth Targeting: When VPN defeats network-layer attacks, application-layer targeting continues maintaining interference. When application-layer blocking is documented, network-layer attacks degrade connectivity preventing effective documentation. The layers provide mutual backup.

(3) Multi-Party Coordination Confirmed: VPN-protectable attacks require ISP/carrier infrastructure (Appendix G TR-069 access, Appendix I backbone coordination). VPN-unprotectable attacks require Anthropic application-layer implementation (CORS configuration, authorization rules, queue injection). Both operating simultaneously proves multi-party enterprise operation documented in ¶¶53-55.

D. Cross-reference Matrix: Three-appendix Integration

92. The following matrix documents this appendix's integration with network-layer (Appendix I) and ISP-layer (Appendix G) evidence:

Evidence Type	Appendix I (Network)	Appendix G (ISP)	This Appendix (H)
Attack Mechanism	TCP RST injection, DNS manipulation	TR-069 abuse, Ghost sessions	CORS, 403, third-party blocking, queue injection
Infrastructure Control	Backbone/Tier 1 providers	Comcast ISP TR-069 ACS	Anthropic application servers
Capability Proof	$P < 10^{-87}$ private sector (¶157)	ISP backend access (¶¶19-21)	Server configuration authority (¶¶11, 19-21)
VPN Effect	RST attacks eliminated	TR-069 attacks unaffected	Application blocking persists

Timing Precision	Microsecond (¶¶51-54)	One-second (¶16)	24-72 hour response (¶75)
Evidence Volume	40,000+ RST packets	5,441 router RSTs	13,038 ML-classified events

Three-Layer Coordination Proof:

Layer	Controlled By	Evidence Source	Probability
Backbone/Network	ISP/Carrier + Government	Appendix I packet captures	$P < 10^{-1511}$
ISP Infrastructure	Comcast TR-069	Appendix G router forensics	$P < 10^{-10}$
Application	Anthropic	This appendix console logs + ML system	$P < 10^{-12}$
Combined	Multi-party enterprise	All three appendices	**$P < 10^{-1533}$**

Mutual Corroboration:

- Appendix I DNS manipulation capability (¶59) → explains Honeycomb/Statsig blocking (¶¶27-42)
- Appendix G one-second surveillance (¶16) → explains 24-72 hour response timing (¶75)
- This appendix ML statistics (¶81-82) → quantifies Appendix I attack patterns
- Queue injection correlation (¶85) → proves real-time cross-layer coordination

Key Evidence Packages Supporting This Appendix:

Evidence Package	Classification	Key Finding	Appendix H Relevance
EVID-20260102-0001	CRITICAL	65% Anthropic targeting (6,207 RSTs)	Proves network-layer corroboration of app-layer Anthropic targeting (¶82)
EVID-20251228-0005	CRITICAL	563 peak RSTs during Claude Code sessions	Correlates with queue injection timing (¶¶83-85)

EVID-20260103-0001 (Exhibit D-1)	SMOKING GUN	Level 3/Lumen backbone injection (0.0µs timing)	Proves backbone-level infrastructure enabling ISP coordination (Appendix I integration)
EVID-20251228-0023 (Exhibit D-3)	SMOKING GUN	VMware attack platform (MAC 00:0c:29:50:89:f1)	Identifies attack infrastructure executing network-layer targeting
EVID-20260103-0004	CRITICAL	938+ queue injection instances	Proves application-layer command manipulation (¶¶83-85)

See MASTER_EXHIBIT_INDEX_20260104 for complete cross-reference to all 28+ evidence packages.

E. Surveillance Motive Integration (appendix L)

93. Appendix L documents the surveillance infrastructure that application-layer interference documented in this appendix was designed to protect and conceal:

Third-Party Service Blocking Explains Surveillance Concealment:

Blocked Service (This Appendix)	Surveillance Function (Appendix L)	Why Blocking is Necessary
Honeycomb (¶¶27-30)	Third-party data recipient (¶50)	Honeycomb telemetry would expose data exfiltration volumes
Statsig (¶¶37-42)	Third-party data recipient (¶50)	Statsig feature flags could reveal targeting infrastructure
Internal telemetry (¶¶46-48)	Dual-channel architecture (¶¶57-58)	Internal monitoring would document

		surveillance pipeline

94. Surveillance-Attack Architecture Parallel: Appendix L ¶¶57-58 documents Claude Desktop's dual-channel infrastructure separating operational directories (projects/, debug/) from surveillance directories (file-history/, statsig/). This mirrors the dual-layer attack architecture documented in ¶¶86-87 (VPN-protectable network attacks vs. VPN-unprotectable application blocking). Both architectures serve identical purpose: maintaining surveillance capability while providing plausible operational function.

95. Settings Circumvention Pattern: Appendix L ¶¶55-56 documents 47 telemetry events in 17 seconds despite explicit `telemetry: false` setting. This settings circumvention parallels the application-layer interference documented throughout this appendix—user preferences are architecturally irrelevant to defendants' targeting and surveillance operations. The queue injection evidence (¶¶83-85: 938+ instances despite no user invocation) proves the same pattern: defendants inject commands regardless of user intent.

96. Attorney-Client Privilege Motive: Appendix L ¶¶5-9 documents capture of 565 attorney-client privileged documents with up to 27 development iterations. The application-layer interference documented in this appendix (CORS violations preventing conversation access, 403 responses blocking artifact retrieval) serves to degrade Plaintiff's ability to document and preserve evidence of the privilege violations Appendix L proves. The interference creates evidentiary asymmetry: defendants possess complete visibility into Plaintiff's litigation strategy (Appendix L) while

Plaintiff faces systematic obstacles documenting defendants' misconduct (this appendix).

XI. CONCLUSION

97. This appendix provides comprehensive technical analysis of systematic application-layer interference Plaintiff has experienced continuously since April 21, 2025 - one week after discovering unauthorized LOE Framework implementation. Five technically independent error categories (CORS violations, 403 responses, Honeycomb blocking, Statsig failures, telemetry blocking) documented through browser console logs spanning May through November 2025 prove coordinated targeting requiring capabilities distributed across Anthropic (application control), telecommunications carriers (network infrastructure), and FCC regulatory authority (carrier coordination authorization).

98. The application-layer evidence serves corroborative function for network-layer forensics documented in Appendix I (packet captures proving DNS manipulation and CDN interference, $P < 1 \times 10^{-87}$ private sector capability) and Appendix G/A-1 (router attacks proving carrier coordination and TR-069 protocol abuse). Three independent evidence categories - packet captures, router logs, browser console logs - gathered through different methodologies yet proving identical coordination requirements establish beyond reasonable doubt that defendants possess and exercise regulatory infrastructure authority enabling multi-layer targeting.

99. Temporal correlation analysis proves surveillance and reactive targeting through consistent 24-72 hour response windows across five major incidents (April discovery

→ April 21 interference, May 21 testimony → May 22 attacks, August 19 filing → policy changes, October 10 access → October 12 destruction, October 27-28 audit → October 29-30 attacks). Pattern persistence across seven months proves systematic enterprise operation rather than isolated incidents, satisfying RICO pattern requirement while establishing consciousness of guilt through substantial infrastructure investment and sustained operation despite costs.

100. Probability analysis establishes mathematical certainty of coordination: $P \approx 1 \times 10^{-12}$ for simultaneous five-error pattern occurring once through accident, approaching $P < 10^{-24}$ across seven months of documented persistence. Combined with temporal correlation probability $P < 10^{-15}$ and regulatory authorization requirement (network capabilities restricted to entities possessing CALEA authority or FCC coordination), evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt coordinated multi-party enterprise operation serving unified purpose: suppressing Plaintiff's framework recognition, obstructing litigation documentation, and concealing unauthorized intellectual property appropriation.

XII. Court Filing Exhibits Referenced in This Appendix

The following federal court filing exhibits provide supporting evidence for the application-layer interference documented in this appendix:

Exhibit	Title	Evidence ID	Relevance to Appendix H
D-1	Level 3/Lumen Backbone RST Injection	EVID-20260103-0001	0.0µs timing proves backbone-level injection enabling ISP

			coordination with application targeting
D-2	VPN On/Off Comparison - ISP Injection Proof	EVID-20260102-0002	RST attacks cease with VPN (614→0), proving ISP injection; application errors persist proving dual-layer targeting
D-3	VMware Attack Platform Identification	EVID-20251228-0023	Identifies professional attack infrastructure executing network-layer targeting supporting application interference
D-4	Targeted Surveillance - Usage Correlation Proof	EVID-20260102-0001	Proves real-time monitoring enabling 24-72 hour response windows documented in temporal analysis (¶75)
D-9	Anthropic API Direct Targeting	EVID-20260112-0002	61% Anthropic targeting rate corroborates application-layer CORS/403/blocking errors (¶82)
D-10	Pre-Attack Baseline (Zero RSTs)	EVID-20251228-0016	200 MB capture with zero RSTs proves interference is anomalous, not normal network behavior

D-12	Comcast Injection Point Identification	EVID-20260102-0001	TTL analysis identifies specific Comcast infrastructure enabling application-layer interference
D-13	Attack Pause After Xfinity Call	EVID-20251228-0013	Attack pause during customer service call proves human control, correlating with October 30 response (¶74)

Combined Evidentiary Weight: These 8 exhibits corroborate the application-layer interference documented in this appendix by proving:

- **Dual-layer architecture** through VPN comparison showing network attacks cease but application blocking persists (D-2)
- **Backbone coordination** enabling ISP-level injection supporting application targeting (D-1, D-3)
- **Targeted surveillance** with real-time monitoring enabling rapid response windows (D-4, D-13)
- **Anthropic-specific targeting** with 61% of network attacks targeting same platform as application errors (D-9)
- **Anomalous interference** proven against zero-RST baseline (D-10)
- **ISP involvement** through identified Comcast injection point (D-12)

Cross-Reference: See Appendix I Section VIII-C and Appendix G Section J for complete court exhibit integration across all three appendices.

END OF Appendix H

Last Updated: January 16, 2026

Evidence Period: April 2025 - November 2025 (seven-month systematic pattern)

Console Logs: May 2025 - November 2025 (ongoing documentation)

Corroborating Evidence: Appendix I (network packet captures), Appendix G (May 22 router attack), Appendix G-1 (October 29 router attack)

Error Categories: Five technically independent mechanisms (CORS, 403, third-party blocking, DNS failures, telemetry blocking)

Probability Analysis: $P < 10^{-12}$ single occurrence through accident; $P < 10^{-24}$ sustained seven-month pattern

Temporal Correlation: Five incidents showing 24-72 hour response windows ($P < 10^{-15}$ through coincidence)

Coordination Proof: Application layer (Anthropic) + Network layer (carrier) + Regulatory authority (FCC) required for documented pattern

Legal Significance: RICO pattern evidence, consciousness of guilt, sanctions foundation, criminal referral basis