UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOSEPH KIRCHNER,
Plaintiff,

v.

MIKE JOHNSON, in his individual and official capacity as Speaker of the United States House of Representatives;
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his individual capacity as former and current President of the United States;
PAM BONDI, in her individual and official capacity as Attorney General of the United States;
BRENDAN CARR, in his individual and official capacity as Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission;
THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES;
ANTHROPIC PBC;
OPENAI, INC.;
APPLE INC.;
COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC;
METR (MODEL EVALUATION & THREAT RESEARCH);
and DOES 1-20, unknown co-conspirators,
Defendants.

Case No. 1:25-cv-02735-ACR

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT H: REVENUE ORIGINATION ANALYSIS

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A. Constitutional Provisions

Citation
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (Origination Clause — revenue bills must originate in House)
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Progress Clause — Congressional authority over intellectual property)
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (Presidential power to recommend measures and ensure faithful execution)

B. Cases

Citation
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998)
Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Ctr., Inc., 588 F.2d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 1978)
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803)
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United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1984)
United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 392 (1990)

C. Statutes and Rules

Citation
2 U.S.C. § 644 (Byrd Rule — Restrictions on extraneous matter in reconciliation bills)
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (Party-opponent statements not hearsay)

D. Legislative Materials

Citation
Congressional Budget Office Analysis (Fiscal impact assessments underlying Parliamentarian rulings)
Congressional Research Service Records (Historical reconciliation bill Byrd Rule violations)
Senate Budget Committee Records (Chairman James Sasser statements on provision removals)

E. Scholarly Authorities

Citation
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, Public statements on H.R. 1 provisions
Professor Elizabeth Garrett, *The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government*, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 702 (2000)
Walter Olson, Cato Institute analysis

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This memorandum establishes that executive authorship of revenue bills violates Article I, Section 7's origination requirement even when House members provide formal introduction. This represents constitutional fraud where procedural compliance masks substantive constitutional violation, undermining both separation of powers and democratic accountability essential to constitutional governance.

2. President Trump's explicit ownership claims regarding H.R. 1 as "my one big, beautiful bill" constitute judicial confession of executive origination of revenue legislation, directly violating the constitutional requirement that such bills "originate in the House of Representatives." These ownership declarations create binding admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) that cannot be retracted through subsequent interpretation or constitutional argument. When a President declares legislation as "his" bill, this admission of authorship proves executive origination prohibited by constitutional text requiring House substantive development of revenue policy.

3. The Senate Parliamentarian stripped at least fifteen major provisions worth up to $1.2 trillion from Trump's "One Big Beautiful Bill Act," marking the highest documented removal count in the post-1990 reconciliation era and raising serious questions about the bill's constitutional legitimacy. This extraordinary pattern represents either the second-highest removal count in reconciliation history or potentially the highest for substantive policy provisions, exceeded only by one historical case involving "over 150 items" that included technical corrections rather than substantive policy changes. The removals span healthcare policy, federal workforce restructuring, financial regulatory agency elimination, environmental law modifications, and immigration enforcement - demonstrating systemic drafting failures inconsistent with congressional familiarity with reconciliation constraints but consistent with executive branch authorship focused on policy goals without regard for parliamentary limitations.

4. Constitutional law experts including Professor Erwin Chemerinsky have identified these removal patterns as indicators of executive overreach and improper use of the budget reconciliation process for policy changes that should undergo regular legislative procedures with full debate and amendment opportunity. The removed provisions fundamentally altered the bill's fiscal impact, transforming a $3.0 trillion debt increase in the House version to $4.1 trillion after Senate passage, as savings measures were eliminated for violating reconciliation rules governing what constitutes legitimate budgetary legislation versus impermissible policy changes masquerading as fiscal measures.

5. This memorandum demonstrates how Trump's presidential confession combined with unprecedented Byrd Rule violations creates compelling evidence that H.R. 1 violated Article I, Section 7 through executive origination disguised as legislative process. The constitutional violation requires judicial remedy to restore constitutional supremacy over separation of powers violations, vindicate the Origination Clause's democratic accountability purposes, and prevent future executive circumvention of constitutional requirements through procedural manipulation that maintains appearance of constitutional compliance while violating constitutional substance.

6. This constitutional violation does not exist in isolation but forms part of a coordinated pattern of executive usurpation documented in Memo G. On July 1, 2025, the Senate voted 99-1 to remove a proposed 10-year moratorium on state-level AI regulation from H.R. 1, explicitly preserving state regulatory authority. Five months later, President Trump issued the Genesis Mission Executive Order implementing through executive action precisely what Congress rejected through democratic process. Trump's characterization of H.R. 1 as "my one big beautiful bill" creates additional Presentment Clause concerns analyzed in Memo G—the President cannot constitutionally present legislation to himself for review, cannot genuinely approve his own writing, and cannot return a bill with objections to his own authorship. The pattern of executive origination disguised as legislative process pervades both the revenue legislation and the subsequent executive order.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Formal Introduction of H.R. 1

7. According to public records, on May 16, 2025, Representative Jodey Arrington of Texas formally introduced H.R. 1 in the House of Representatives, bearing the official title "One Big Beautiful Bill Act." This formal introduction created procedural compliance with Article I, Section 7's constitutional requirement that revenue bills originate in the House, satisfying the technical constitutional process through a House member's introduction of the legislation on the House floor according to established parliamentary procedure.

8. The bill addressed comprehensive revenue policy including extensive tax provisions affecting individual and corporate taxation, substantial spending modifications across federal departments and agencies, and fundamental fiscal policy changes affecting hundreds of billions in federal revenue collection and expenditures over the ten-year budget window used for congressional scoring. The scope and complexity of the legislation encompassed provisions spanning multiple congressional committee jurisdictions including Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Homeland Security, and Armed Services - requiring coordination across policy domains that typically involve separate legislative vehicles rather than omnibus reconciliation bills.

B. Trump's Ownership Declarations

9. Throughout the legislative process, President Trump repeatedly and explicitly declared H.R. 1 to be "my one big, beautiful bill" through public statements at rallies, interviews with media outlets, and official White House communications distributed to press and posted on official channels. These ownership claims were not casual references or colloquial descriptions but sustained assertions of presidential authorship repeated consistently across multiple forums and occasions, establishing a pattern of ownership declaration rather than isolated statements subject to contextual misinterpretation.

10. The President's ownership claims intensified through official attributions referring to the legislation as "President Donald Trump's One, Big, Beautiful Bill," using formal title case and official attribution that conveyed presidential authorship as the bill's defining characteristic rather than acknowledging the constitutional requirement of House origination. White House press releases, official statements, and presidential remarks uniformly characterized the legislation as Trump's personal legislative achievement, his agenda embodied in statutory form, and his vision for comprehensive fiscal policy reform.

11. These ownership declarations persisted throughout each stage of the legislative process, from initial introduction through House passage, Senate consideration, and final enactment. At signing ceremonies, Trump characterized the bill as "his agenda" and "his victory," reinforcing executive authorship claims rather than acknowledging House legislative development or crediting congressional authors for policy content, drafting work, or legislative negotiation. The consistency and persistence of ownership claims across months of legislative activity demonstrates sustained assertion of executive authorship incompatible with constitutional requirements that revenue bills originate through independent House legislative development.

12. Trump's repeated use of possessive pronouns and direct ownership attribution - "my bill," "Trump's bill," presidential attribution in official titles - creates pattern evidence of executive origination claims that directly contradict Article I, Section 7's mandate that revenue bills "originate in the House of Representatives." The frequency, formality, and persistence of these claims transform them from rhetorical flourishes into admissions of constitutional violation, as each ownership declaration necessarily implies executive authorship of legislation that constitutionally must originate through House substantive development rather than executive drafting.

C. Senate Parliamentarian's Unprecedented Removals

13. Following House passage of H.R. 1, the Senate's "Byrd Bath" review process conducted by Senate Parliamentarian Elizabeth MacDonough resulted in the removal of at least fifteen major provisions from the reconciliation bill during June 2025. This review process, mandated by the Byrd Rule codified at 2 U.S.C. § 644, examines each provision to determine whether it qualifies as legitimate budgetary legislation appropriate for reconciliation's expedited procedures or constitutes extraneous policy matter that must be removed. The Parliamentarian's rulings collectively eliminated provisions worth hundreds of billions in budgetary impact over the ten-year scoring window, fundamentally altering both the bill's policy content and its fiscal trajectory.

14. The most significant single removal involved Medicaid provider tax restrictions that would have generated savings estimated between $200 billion and $300 billion over ten years through limiting states' ability to use provider taxes to finance their Medicaid program shares.

The Parliamentarian ruled this provision primarily policy-driven rather than budgetary despite its massive fiscal impact, finding that the policy objective of restructuring federal-state Medicaid financing relationships was not "merely incidental" to budgetary effects under the Byrd Rule's standards at 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(D). This ruling exemplifies how even provisions with enormous budgetary consequences fail parliamentary scrutiny when policy goals predominate over fiscal purposes.

15. Healthcare provisions bore the brunt of removals across multiple policy dimensions. Medicare eligibility restrictions for non-citizens were struck as immigration policy masquerading as healthcare budgeting. Medicaid immigration verification requirements failed because the verification procedures primarily served immigration enforcement rather than budget management objectives. Gender-affirming care prohibitions in federal healthcare programs were removed as social policy determinations beyond reconciliation's legitimate scope. Affordable Care Act abortion coverage restrictions similarly fell as policy choices about reproductive healthcare rather than budgetary measures, despite each provision's defenders arguing budgetary impact through effects on federal healthcare expenditures. The cumulative effect of these healthcare removals demonstrates that provisions affecting healthcare spending can still fail reconciliation requirements when policy objectives exceed merely incidental relationship to budgetary outcomes.

16. Federal workforce provisions faced wholesale elimination, revealing executive branch attempts to restructure civil service protections through reconciliation procedures inappropriate for such fundamental administrative reforms. A requirement that new federal employees pay 15.6% of salary into retirement systems or accept at-will employment status was struck despite projections of $150 billion or more in savings over ten years. The Parliamentarian determined this provision primarily served to weaken civil service protections and federal employee unions rather than genuinely addressing retirement system financing. Union fee structures and Merit Systems Protection Board filing fees similarly failed as policy changes to employment relationships that exceeded budgetary purposes regardless of fiscal effects on federal operations.

17. Most dramatically from a separation of powers perspective, provisions granting executive branch unilateral authority to reorganize or eliminate federal agencies without congressional oversight were struck as pure policy changes masquerading as budget measures. These provisions would have fundamentally altered the constitutional balance between branches by enabling presidential restructuring of the administrative state through agency elimination, consolidation, or reorganization without requiring new legislation or congressional approval. The Parliamentarian's removal of these provisions vindicated core separation of powers principles by preventing reconciliation abuse that would have transferred legislative authority over agency existence and structure to executive discretion.

18. Financial regulatory agencies became prominent casualties of Byrd Rule enforcement, demonstrating limits on using reconciliation to eliminate regulatory infrastructure. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau faced complete defunding through a provision cutting $6.4 billion from its budget, but the Parliamentarian ruled this constituted policy-driven agency elimination rather than legitimate budget reduction. The distinction matters constitutionally because defunding serving primarily to eliminate an agency's regulatory functions represents policy choice about financial regulation rather than fiscal choice about budget allocation. Similarly, complete elimination of the Office of Financial Research was struck as policy determination to end systemic risk monitoring rather than budgetary savings measure, despite the office's budget costs that elimination would have saved.

19. Environmental provisions including EPA vehicle emissions standards repeal and bypass mechanisms for environmental review processes similarly failed parliamentary scrutiny. The emissions standards repeal primarily served deregulatory policy rather than budgetary purposes despite potential fiscal impacts on EPA operations and regulated industries. Environmental review bypasses were policy choices about administrative procedure and environmental protection rather than budget matters, even though expedited project approvals might generate economic activity with budgetary effects. These removals demonstrate that environmental and regulatory policy changes cannot be smuggled through reconciliation based on attenuated budgetary effects when policy objectives clearly predominate.

20. The breadth of removals across multiple committee jurisdictions - Finance Committee provisions on healthcare and taxation, Homeland Security Committee provisions on immigration, Banking Committee provisions on financial regulation, Environment and Public Works Committee provisions on environmental law, Armed Services Committee provisions on defense policy - suggests systemic drafting failures affecting the entire bill rather than isolated overreach in specific policy areas. When provisions spanning such diverse subject matter all fail reconciliation requirements, the pattern indicates fundamental misunderstanding of what qualifies for reconciliation or deliberate attempts to exceed reconciliation's proper scope through provisions known to violate parliamentary rules but included for political or strategic purposes.

21. This pattern of wholesale violations across committee jurisdictions is more consistent with executive branch authorship than congressional drafting. Congressional committees developing reconciliation legislation typically demonstrate familiarity with Byrd Rule constraints built through years of experience with budget reconciliation procedures, consultation with parliamentarians during drafting, and institutional knowledge about what provisions survive parliamentary scrutiny. Executive branch agencies drafting policy wish lists lack this institutional experience with reconciliation constraints and focus on policy goals without equivalent concern for parliamentary procedures they don't navigate directly. The systemic nature of H.R. 1's violations thus provides circumstantial evidence supporting inference of executive origination.

D. The Fiscal Impact Transformation

22. The removed provisions fundamentally altered the bill's fiscal trajectory in ways that demonstrate how non-budgetary policy changes were disguised as fiscal measures. The House-passed version of H.R. 1 projected a $3.0 trillion increase in federal debt over ten years according to Congressional Budget Office scoring. After the Senate Parliamentarian's removals eliminated provisions claimed to generate hundreds of billions in savings, the final Senate-passed version showed a $4.1 trillion debt increase - a deterioration of $1.1 trillion in fiscal impact resulting directly from stripping provisions that violated reconciliation rules.

23. This transformation reveals the constitutional problem: provisions claimed as budget savings measures were actually policy changes whose budgetary effects were secondary to policy objectives. When these policy provisions were removed, the supposed "savings" disappeared, exposing that the bill's budgetary framework depended on policy changes inappropriate for reconciliation procedures. A properly constructed reconciliation bill achieves fiscal goals through measures primarily budgetary in nature, such that removal of a few policy-focused provisions wouldn't fundamentally alter fiscal outcomes. H.R. 1's massive fiscal deterioration after parliamentary review demonstrates it was constructed as policy legislation dressed in budgetary clothing rather than genuinely budgetary legislation with some policy effects.

24. The magnitude of fiscal impact change - $1.1 trillion worsening representing over one-third of the original projected deficit - demonstrates how extensively H.R. 1 relied on non-budgetary policy provisions masquerading as fiscal measures. This supports inference that the bill's authors prioritized policy goals and either misunderstood reconciliation constraints or deliberately violated them expecting political pressure or procedural maneuvers to overcome parliamentary objections. Such an approach is characteristic of executive branch policy agenda implementation rather than congressional budget reconciliation familiar with parliamentary requirements and institutional constraints.

III. LEGAL STANDARD: ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 ORIGINATION CLAUSE

A. Constitutional Text and Mandatory Requirements

25. Article I, Section 7 of the United States Constitution establishes with mandatory language: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." This constitutional text creates absolute origination requirements for all revenue legislation through the word "shall," which courts consistently interpret as mandatory rather than discretionary. The Framers' choice of comprehensive language - "All Bills" rather than "some bills" or "major bills" - extends the requirement to every revenue measure without exception, ensuring House primacy over fiscal policy cannot be circumvented through artful characterization of revenue legislation as something else.

26. The constitutional requirement establishes House primacy over fiscal policy as fundamental structural principle preventing executive control over taxation and spending decisions through carefully designed constitutional architecture intended to ensure democratic accountability in revenue matters. The Supreme Court has recognized in *United States v. Munoz-Flores*, 495 U.S. 385, 392 (1990), that the Origination Clause serves to protect the House's prerogative over revenue legislation as institutional right belonging to that chamber rather than as individual right belonging to particular representatives or citizens. This structural understanding means violations affect constitutional balance between branches rather than merely creating procedural irregularities subject to waiver or harmless error analysis.

27. The Origination Clause represents fundamental constitutional principle requiring substantive House control over revenue policy rather than procedural formality that can be satisfied through technical compliance masking executive authorship of legislative content. The Supreme Court emphasized in *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803), that constitutional provisions must be interpreted to effectuate their purpose rather than reduced to meaningless formalities through narrow literalism. Applied to the Origination Clause, this principle of purposive interpretation means constitutional origination requires genuine House development of revenue policy through legislative deliberation, drafting, and control - not merely formal introduction of pre-written executive bills that technically originate in House but substantively originate with President.

28. The constitutional text's reference to origination - "shall originate in the House" - contemplates substantive genesis rather than procedural technicality. Revenue bills must not only be introduced formally in House but must actually originate there through legislative development of policy content, fiscal provisions, and statutory language constituting the bill's substance. When executive branch authors revenue legislation and House members provide only formal introduction, this violates the origination requirement's substance while maintaining appearance of compliance, creating constitutional fraud through procedural manipulation that defeats constitutional purposes while claiming constitutional adherence.

B. Substantive Vs. Procedural Origination

29. True constitutional origination satisfying Article I, Section 7's substantive requirements involves multiple elements beyond formal introduction. First, substantive development within the House of Representatives through legislative authorship of revenue policy and provisions means House members and committees draft statutory language, develop policy approaches, and create fiscal mechanisms rather than receiving pre-written legislation from executive sources. Second, House control over tax and spending priorities through independent legislative judgment means representatives exercise discretion about which revenue sources to tap, which expenditures to authorize, and how to balance competing fiscal goals according to their assessment of constituents' interests and national needs. Third, democratic process through elected representatives exercising legislative discretion rather than implementing executive direction means deliberation about alternative approaches, debate over fiscal priorities, and voting based on legislative judgment rather than executive instructions.

30. Procedural origination fraud, in contrast, involves technical satisfaction of constitutional requirements while violating their substance through several mechanisms. Executive authorship of complete revenue legislation occurs when President and administration officials draft comprehensive bills including specific statutory language, policy provisions, and fiscal mechanisms, leaving House members with pre-written legislation to introduce formally. House formality of introducing pre-written presidential bills creates appearance of constitutional compliance through House member's name appearing as sponsor and bill number suggesting House origin, while actual authorship remains with executive branch. Constitutional circumvention through technical compliance maintains constitutional appearance by satisfying literal requirement that bill be introduced in House while violating substantive requirement that bill actually originate there through legislative development. Democratic subversion through executive control disguised as legislative process enables President to control revenue policy that constitutionally belongs to House, undermining democratic accountability and separation of powers while claiming constitutional adherence.

31. The distinction between substantive and procedural origination matters constitutionally because Article I, Section 7 serves multiple purposes that merely formal origination cannot satisfy. The Origination Clause ensures democratic accountability by placing revenue authority with the chamber directly elected every two years, making representatives most responsive to popular sentiment control taxation affecting citizens' economic lives. Procedural origination without substantive House control defeats this accountability purpose because citizens cannot hold responsible the House members who merely introduce executive-authored bills rather than representatives who actually develop revenue policy. The Clause maintains separation of powers by preventing executive control over legislative functions, but procedural origination permits precisely such control while maintaining appearance of separation through formal House introduction.

32. When the Executive Branch authors revenue legislation and House members provide only formal introduction, this violates both the letter and spirit of Article I, Section 7 by circumventing constitutional requirements through procedural manipulation that maintains constitutional appearance while violating constitutional substance. The letter is violated because "originate" means to begin or come into being from a source, and legislation beginning with executive authorship originates with executive regardless of House introduction. The spirit is violated because the Framers designed the Origination Clause to prevent executive control over revenue policy that procedural origination fraud enables, defeating constitutional purposes of democratic accountability and separation of powers through technical compliance masking substantive violation.

C. Historical Purpose and Framers' Intent

33. The Constitutional Convention evidence establishes that the Framers designed the Origination Clause with multiple purposes reflecting their political theory and historical experience with executive control over taxation. House primacy ensures revenue bills originate in the chamber directly elected every two years, making representatives most accountable to popular sovereignty control the taxation affecting citizens' economic liberty. The Framers understood that power to tax constitutes power to destroy, as Chief Justice Marshall later articulated in *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819), and therefore required that this dangerous power reside with representatives facing frequent electoral accountability rather than with executive or senators originally appointed by state legislatures.

34. Executive limitation operates as corollary to House primacy—the Framers deliberately excluded the President from revenue origination to prevent monarchical control over taxation that British experience demonstrated as primary threat to liberty. The colonial grievances against King George III enumerated in the Declaration of Independence included taxation without representation and executive interference with colonial assemblies' control over fiscal policy. The Origination Clause responded to this history by ensuring the executive branch cannot initiate tax and spending policy but must wait for Congress to develop revenue legislation subject to presidential approval or veto according to Article I, Section 7's bicameralism and presentment requirements.

35. Anti-monarchical structure appears throughout constitutional design, but the Origination Clause provides specific protection against king-like control over taxation that British subjects had struggled centuries to limit through parliamentary supremacy over revenue bills. The English Bill of Rights (1689) and earlier conflicts between Crown and Parliament established legislative control over taxation as fundamental constitutional principle that American Framers incorporated into the federal Constitution. When Presidents author revenue legislation, they effectively exercise the royal prerogative over taxation that the Origination Clause specifically prohibits.

36. Historical application demonstrates the Framers' understanding through early practice under the Constitution. The Washington Administration respected legislative primacy in revenue policy by submitting recommendations to Congress rather than drafting specific legislation for introduction. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's famous reports on public credit, manufacturing, and the national bank proposed detailed policy frameworks and specific recommendations, but the reports themselves did not constitute draft legislation for congressional introduction. Instead, Hamilton's reports provided policy analysis that Congress used as basis for developing actual statutory language through legislative drafting process controlled by House and Senate members. This practice recognized the constitutional distinction between recommendation authority granted to the President under Article II, Section 3 and legislative drafting authority that Article I vests exclusively in Congress.

37. Thomas Jefferson's administration continued this respect for legislative primacy through annual messages proposing broad policy goals without specific legislative drafting. Jefferson's messages identified problems requiring legislative attention and suggested general approaches, but left to Congress the actual work of drafting bills implementing or rejecting presidential suggestions. This division of labor respected constitutional structure by preserving legislative authorship while accommodating executive input through Article II, Section 3's recommendation process. The tradition persisted through most of American history where Presidents propose while Congress disposes through legislative process that maintains House origination of revenue bills.

38. The modern violation involves Presidents authoring detailed legislation including specific provisions, technical language, and complex statutory schemes that go far beyond general recommendations or broad policy frameworks. Contemporary practice involves executive branch agencies drafting comprehensive bills running hundreds of pages with detailed amendments to existing statutes, intricate regulatory schemes, and specific fiscal provisions that constitute legislative drafting rather than executive recommendation. These pre-written bills are then transmitted to Congress with expectation that allied members will introduce them formally, creating appearance of legislative origination while actual authorship resides entirely with executive branch officials. H.R. 1 exemplifies this modern violation through combination of Trump's ownership claims proving executive authorship and legislative complexity suggesting executive agency drafting rather than congressional committee work.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Presidential Confession Constitutes Binding Admission

39. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), statements by a party opponent constitute admissions that are not hearsay and bind the declarant in legal proceedings. Trump's ownership declarations regarding H.R. 1 fall squarely within this evidentiary rule because they were made by a party to this litigation, concern matters within that party's knowledge regarding authorship of legislation, and operate as judicial confessions when offered against the declarant to prove constitutional violation. The admissions are not casual statements subject to contextual interpretation but repeated, formal, and sustained declarations of ownership made through official channels and public statements establishing consistent pattern of authorship claims.

40. The specific ownership claims include multiple categories of statements demonstrating authorship. "My one big, beautiful bill" constitutes direct ownership declaration using possessive pronoun and descriptive language indicating personal investment in and control over the legislation's content. "President Donald Trump's One, Big, Beautiful Bill" represents official White House attribution using formal title case and presidential attribution that conveys authorship as defining characteristic rather than colloquial reference. Signing ceremony characterizations of bill as "his agenda" and "his victory" represent personal authorship claims indicating executive control over policy content and legislative success. Repeated ownership assertions throughout legislative process demonstrate sustained claim pattern rather than isolated statements potentially subject to alternative interpretation.

41. These declarations constitute admission of executive origination of revenue legislation in legal sense that party admissions provide conclusive evidence binding the declarant. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), such admissions cannot be impeached as hearsay or challenged through parol evidence suggesting alternative meaning, because the rule treats party admissions as substantive evidence of facts admitted. As the Second Circuit explained in *United States v. McKeon*, 738 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1984), "admissions by a party are substantive evidence of the facts admitted" and bind the declarant without requiring corroborating evidence or external verification. Trump's ownership declarations therefore constitute binding evidence of executive authorship sufficient to establish constitutional violation without requiring additional proof of drafting process or executive involvement.

42. The evidentiary significance of these admissions cannot be overstated because they prove executive origination through Trump's own words rather than requiring circumstantial evidence or inference from other facts. While Byrd Rule violations and expert analysis provide corroborating evidence of executive authorship, Trump's ownership declarations alone suffice to establish constitutional violation through direct admission that legislation he claims as "his bill" necessarily originated with him rather than House of Representatives. This creates unusually strong proof of constitutional violation through defendant's confession rather than plaintiff's burden of proving facts defendant disputes.

43. Legal precedent establishes that party admissions cannot be retracted or explained away through subsequent interpretation attempts or contextual arguments. The Eighth Circuit in *Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Ctr., Inc.*, 588 F.2d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 1978), held that party admissions bind the declarant even when the admission conflicts with the party's litigation position, because admissions made outside litigation context are particularly reliable evidence of truth. Trump's ownership declarations were made throughout the legislative process in multiple public forums before this litigation commenced, establishing their reliability as admissions against interest reflecting actual authorship rather than strategic litigation positioning.

44. Trump cannot now claim these ownership declarations were merely rhetorical flourishes or casual references without specific authorship meaning, because the pattern, persistence, and formality of declarations belie such interpretation. When a President repeatedly and formally attributes legislation to himself using possessive language and official attributions through months of legislative activity, these declarations constitute admissions of authorship that bind him legally regardless of current litigation strategy suggesting alternative interpretations. The rule against retracting admissions prevents parties from making statements establishing facts harmful to their interests, then explaining away those statements when litigation requires denying those facts.

B. The Constitutional Impossibility: Dual Origination Cannot Exist

45. The philosophical and legal principle that "to name something is to declare its origin" establishes a fundamental connection between identification and causation with deep roots in property, copyright, and constitutional law: when someone claims ownership of a creation through possessive language ("my bill," "Trump's bill"), the naming act declares that person as the source or origin of what they claim as theirs, not merely as a supporter or subsequent adopter. Applied to H.R. 1, Trump's possessive declarations claim a relationship of creation and control over the legislation's content, provisions, and policies — claiming authorship rather than mere endorsement.

46. This origin declaration creates direct conflict with Article I, Section 7's exclusive assignment of revenue origination to the House of Representatives. The Constitution does not permit shared origination or dual authorship; the text requires such bills "originate in the House" without exception or qualification, and "originate" means to begin or come into being from a single source — legislation cannot simultaneously begin in two different places through two different processes any more than a river can originate from two different springs.

47. Constitutional logic demonstrates the impossibility through formal proof: the Constitution requires revenue bills "originate in the House of Representatives" (Article I, Section 7's mandatory language); Trump's ownership declarations claim executive origination through presidential authorship; the same bill cannot originate in two different constitutional locations simultaneously because origination refers to a single source. Either House origination is false (violating Article I, Section 7) or Trump's ownership claims are false (constituting presidential deception about legislative authorship). The dilemma is inescapable: accepting Trump's ownership claims proves constitutional violation; rejecting them proves presidential deception; splitting the difference through "shared origination" violates the constitutional text requiring exclusive House origination.

48. The impossibility of reconciling Trump's ownership claims with constitutional origination requirements proves constitutional violation occurred regardless of which statement is accepted as true — distinguishing this situation from ordinary evidentiary conflicts requiring resolution between contradictory factual claims. Here, both possible resolutions prove wrongdoing, making the contradiction itself probative of constitutional violation rather than creating a fact question for evidentiary resolution.

C. H.R. 1'S Deviation from Constitutional Norms

49. H.R. 1 departs fundamentally from the constitutional norm of presidential recommendation followed by congressional drafting. Where Hamilton submitted policy reports that Congress transformed into statutory language, and where Jefferson proposed goals that Congress implemented through legislative process, Trump declared completed legislation as "my bill" and "Trump's bill"—language of authorship rather than recommendation. The possessive pronouns and ownership attributions prove not merely that Trump supports legislation others created, but that he claims the bill as his own creation through relationship of authorship making it "his" in sense of origination.

50. The bill's characteristics reinforce inference of executive rather than congressional authorship. Its breadth across multiple policy domains—healthcare, immigration, financial regulation, environmental law, federal workforce restructuring, agency reorganization—indicates executive branch coordination compiling agency priorities rather than congressional committee development within jurisdictional expertise. The detailed amendments to existing statutes, intricate regulatory schemes, and comprehensive restructuring of federal programs bear hallmarks of executive agency drafting focused on policy implementation rather than congressional budgeting familiar with reconciliation constraints.

51. Trump's explicit ownership declarations confirm what the bill's characteristics suggest: executive branch authored the legislation while House members provided only formal introduction creating appearance of constitutional compliance. This constitutes precisely the procedural fraud that defeats Article I, Section 7's purposes—technical satisfaction of origination requirement through House introduction while substantive origination occurs through executive authorship prohibited by constitutional text.

D. The Byrd Rule Violations as Evidence of Executive Authorship

52. Properly drafted congressional reconciliation bills since 1980 experience zero to five provision removals on average, reflecting committees' institutional knowledge about what qualifies for reconciliation under 2 U.S.C. § 644's six-part test. H.R. 1's removal of fifteen or more major provisions represents a clear statistical outlier — potentially the highest documented count of substantive policy removals in reconciliation history. Comparative analysis with prior major reconciliation legislation underscores how exceptional this pattern is: the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 lost only three provisions despite its trillions-in-revenue scope; the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 lost only the $15 minimum wage increase despite its $1.9 trillion size; the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 saw minimal removals; and even the contentious Affordable Care Act reconciliation fixes (2009-2010) avoided wholesale provision elimination. H.R. 1's wholesale violation pattern indicates either drafting failures unprecedented among congressional committees or deliberate inclusion of provisions known to violate rules.

53. The breadth of removals across multiple committee jurisdictions — Finance, Homeland Security, Banking, Environment and Public Works, Armed Services — provides particularly compelling evidence of systemic drafting failure inconsistent with congressional committee expertise. This cross-committee pattern is more consistent with executive branch authorship than congressional drafting because executive agencies focus on policy goals without the institutional incentive congressional committees have to ensure provisions survive Byrd Bath review. Congressional committees develop reconciliation legislation in consultation with the Parliamentarian's office during drafting; executive agencies compile policy wish lists across domains without equivalent filtering for parliamentary viability, producing omnibus legislation that reads as agency priorities rather than congressional budget legislation.

54. The specific provisions removed from H.R. 1 further support inference of executive rather than congressional authorship through their character as executive-branch priorities: administrative reorganization authority enabling presidential restructuring of agencies without congressional approval; financial regulatory agency eliminations (CFPB defunding, Office of Financial Research termination) advancing the deregulatory agenda; environmental review bypasses and emissions standards repeals serving expedited-development interests. These executive-serving provisions contrast with typical congressional reconciliation priorities focused on tax rates, spending levels, and program eligibility — core budgetary matters rather than executive power consolidation. Trump's ownership declarations confirm this interpretation by establishing the bill as presidential policy agenda rather than congressional budget priorities.

E. The Byrd Bath Process and Parliamentary Enforcement

55. The Senate's "Byrd Bath" review — named after the late Senator Robert Byrd whose original rule prevents reconciliation abuse — involves the Parliamentarian examining each provision against six criteria defining "extraneous" matter under 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1): (1) no budgetary effect; (2) outside committee jurisdiction; (3) merely incidental budgetary effects (the most frequently invoked criterion, requiring budgetary purposes to predominate over policy goals); (4) deficit increases beyond the budget window; (5) Social Security impact; (6) reconciliation instruction violations. The Parliamentarian's role evolved from technical advisor to crucial institutional safeguard preventing reconciliation's expedited procedures from being exploited for policy changes that should undergo regular legislative process.

56. MacDonough's rulings on H.R. 1 consistently found provisions violated the third criterion — the "merely incidental" standard. The Medicaid provider tax restrictions failed despite $200-300 billion in projected savings because restructuring federal-state Medicaid financing served primarily a policy goal. Healthcare immigration provisions failed because immigration enforcement predominated over healthcare budgeting. Federal workforce reforms failed because weakening civil service protections served policy goals rather than retirement-cost management. The Parliamentarian's consistent enforcement of this standard across administrations — blocking Democrats' $15 minimum wage increase in 2021 (despite $64 billion budgetary impact) and Republicans' regulatory changes in 2025 using identical analysis — proves the Byrd Rule functions as a genuine, even-handed constraint rather than a partisan tool, with institutional independence reinforced by Senate traditions treating Parliamentarian removal as a nuclear option (only two firings in Senate history; no VP overrule since 1975).

57. The fiscal impact of H.R. 1's removed provisions — up to $1.2 trillion over ten years — transformed the bill's budgetary trajectory from a $3.0 trillion House-passed deficit to $4.1 trillion Senate-passed. This $1.1 trillion deterioration demonstrates how extensively the bill relied on policy provisions disguised as budgetary measures: a properly constructed reconciliation bill achieves fiscal goals through measures primarily budgetary in nature, such that removal of a few policy-focused provisions would not fundamentally alter fiscal outcomes. H.R. 1's massive fiscal deterioration proves it was constructed as policy legislation clothed in budgetary language rather than genuinely budgetary legislation with some policy effects.

F. Expert Analysis Supporting Constitutional Violation

58. Constitutional law experts have identified H.R. 1's removal patterns as indicators of executive overreach. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky specifically criticized provisions restricting judicial contempt powers as attempts to "keep the Trump administration from being restrained when it violates the Constitution" — identifying not merely policy disagreement but provisions designed to insulate executive action from judicial review, violating separation-of-powers principles requiring judicial independence to check executive constitutional violations. Chemerinsky's criticism extends beyond individual provisions to pattern concern that the bill as a whole reflected executive branch effort to restructure inter-branch relationships in ways favoring presidential power over congressional and judicial constraints — provisions restricting judicial contempt powers combined with agency reorganization authority and regulatory elimination measures collectively demonstrate executive agenda to consolidate power and reduce external checks. Walter Olson of the Cato Institute corroborated this concern, analyzing judicial-restraint provisions as ones that "really do tie the judge's hands" in constitutionally problematic ways.

59. While statistical evidence of provision removals alone cannot establish constitutional violations sufficient for judicial remedy, the removal patterns combined with other factors create compelling circumstantial evidence of constitutional violation: executive versus legislative authorship established through ownership declarations and drafting patterns, types of provisions reflecting executive versus congressional priorities, patterns across policy areas indicating systematic drafting failures rather than isolated errors, and fiscal-impact transformation through loss of provisions claimed as savings measures. H.R. 1 exhibits all these factors. As Professor Elizabeth Garrett explained in *The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government*, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 702 (2000), reconciliation exists for legitimate budgetary purposes subject to constraints preventing abuse, and exceptional violations of those constraints indicate systemic problems with how legislation was developed and whose interests it primarily serves.

V. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

A. Separation of Powers Violations

60. Article I, Section 1's vesting clause establishes the foundational principle of legislative power allocation: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." This creates exclusive grant of legislative authority — no other branch possesses inherent legislative power regardless of expertise, popularity, or claimed efficiency. Article I, Section 7 supplements this general vesting with specific protection for House primacy over fiscal policy, recognizing that legislative power includes not just enacting laws but initiating them, particularly regarding revenue legislation affecting citizens' economic liberty. The requirement that revenue bills specifically originate in the House (rather than the Senate, despite bicameralism) demonstrates that origination itself constitutes power requiring constitutional allocation, not procedural detail subject to chamber discretion.

61. If Presidents can author revenue bills while maintaining constitutional appearance through formal House introduction, Article I, Section 7's origination requirement becomes meaningless formality rather than substantive constraint on executive power. Constitutional provisions must be interpreted to have meaning and effect rather than reduced to empty formalities, as held in *Marbury v. Madison* and reaffirmed in *Clinton v. City of New York*, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998), which struck down the Line Item Veto Act because it permitted the President to unilaterally amend legislation in violation of Article I's "finely wrought" procedural requirements — the same structural protections the Origination Clause embodies. "Originate in the House" must require substantive House development of revenue policy rather than procedural introduction of executive-authored bills, or the constitutional text becomes a nullity permitting precisely what it prohibits.

62. Article II, Section 3 limits presidential legislative authority to recommending measures and ensuring faithful execution: the President "shall from time to time recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient" and "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Recommending measures means suggesting policy approaches and priorities, not drafting comprehensive bills with detailed provisions; faithful execution means implementing enacted laws, not creating new laws through executive drafting. When Presidents author revenue legislation rather than merely recommending measures, they exceed Article II, Section 3's authorization and invade Article I powers vested in Congress. Trump's ownership claims prove not recommendation but authorship, establishing constitutional violation through presidential admission that the executive branch originated legislation constitutionally required to originate in the House.

63. The Article I, Section 1 and Section 7 violations documented here parallel the Article I, Section 8 violations documented in Memo G. The Genesis Mission Executive Order directs the Secretary of Energy to "establish clear policies for ownership, licensing, trade-secret protections, and commercialization of intellectual property" without Congressional authorization, usurping Progress Clause authority the Constitution vests exclusively in Congress. Both the revenue legislation and the executive order represent executive usurpation of enumerated Congressional powers, demonstrating systematic pattern rather than isolated violation. When the executive branch authors revenue bills that must originate in the House, then issues executive orders implementing what Congress rejected 99-1, the pattern proves coordinated assault on Article I rather than independent constitutional breaches.

B. Legislative Branch Abdication and Democratic Fraud

64. House members who introduce executive-authored revenue legislation rather than developing it through independent judgment abandon the constitutional duty Article I, Section 7 imposes — converting representatives from independent legislators serving constituents into executive subordinates implementing presidential agenda. Revenue policy development constitutes the core legislative function constitutional structure assigns specifically to the House through the origination requirement; the assignment creates an institutional duty requiring representatives to exercise independent judgment about tax rates, spending priorities, and fiscal policy rather than deferring to executive preferences. When the House becomes a conduit for executive legislation, constitutional structure collapses: representatives function as administrative hierarchy rather than independent legislators accountable through biennial elections, and the appearance of House origination masks substantive executive control.

65. Constitutional democracy requires four elements: transparent authorship (so electoral accountability can identify who creates laws), electoral accountability (so voters can evaluate legislators on their actual policy choices), deliberative process (so representatives' collective judgment can modify proposals), and independent representation (so legislators serve constituents rather than executive directives). Executive authorship disguised as House origination violates all four through a fraud mechanism: bills are written in the executive branch with specific provisions and detailed statutory language; House members formally introduce them creating appearance of House origination satisfying Article I, Section 7 literally but not substantively; parties claim constitutional compliance based on technical satisfaction; the public receives bills presented as House-originated when actually executive-authored. The deception transforms a constitutional requirement into empty formality.

66. The constitutional harm operates simultaneously at three levels. *Structural*: the separation of powers designed to prevent tyranny fails when the executive controls legislative functions through authorship disguised as recommendation. *Democratic*: citizens cannot exercise informed electoral accountability when authorship attribution is systematically false. *Institutional*: constitutional requirements become nullities through procedural manipulation, teaching that constitutional text can be evaded through technical compliance masking substantive violation. The harm is not hypothetical: H.R. 1's enactment creates precedent encouraging future presidents to author revenue legislation for formal House introduction, and each successful evasion makes the next harder to challenge, normalizing constitutional violation through repetition. Judicial remedy must address not only H.R. 1's specific violation but the precedential harm that would otherwise permanently undermine constitutional structure.

D. The Technological Parallel: Product Value Skimming Through Identical Mechanism

67. The constitutional fraud documented in this Memorandum — procedural compliance masking substantive violation — operates through an identical mechanism at the technological level within the very AI platforms funded by H.R. 1's appropriations. Binary forensic analysis of Claude Code CLI versions 2.0.76 through 2.1.81 (Ex. E-30 at p. 208, l. 4, including App. B — Model Manipulation Findings) reveals that Anthropic advertises a defined product (Opus model, 1,000,000-token context window, configurable effort levels, persistent sessions) while the delivered product passes through multiple undisclosed degradation layers before reaching the consumer. The advertised specifications constitute the "procedural compliance" — technically, these are the product's stated capabilities. The degradation mechanisms constitute the "substantive violation" — what the consumer actually receives is less than what was advertised and paid for.

68. The structural parallel is exact. In H.R. 1, the executive authors revenue legislation but presents it through formal House introduction, maintaining the appearance of Article I, Section 7 compliance while violating the origination requirement's substance. In Claude Code, Anthropic advertises 1M context but delivers an `effectiveWindow` adjustable via `CLAUDE_CODE_AUTO_COMPACT_WINDOW` (Ex. E-30 at p. 208, l. 4, App. B, MC-1); advertises user-selected model but silently substitutes via `tengu_model_fallback_triggered` (Ex. E-30 at p. 208, l. 4, App. B, MC-5); advertises configurable effort but resets to medium through five independent vectors including a settings schema that excludes `max` from persistence (Ex. E-30 at p. 208, l. 4, App. B, MC-7); and advertises session persistence but removes the session continuity feature during litigation while adding server-side deletion capability (Ex. E-30 at p. 208, l. 4, W-1, W-3). The April 17, 2026 Opus 4.7 release introducing a sub-integer midway effort level — a granularity inconsistent with a discrete user setting — confirms in real time that effort is a remotely-tuned parameter, not a user choice (Ex. E-30 at p. 208, l. 4, App. B, MC-7). In both cases, formal compliance (House introduction / advertised specs) masks substantive deprivation (executive authorship / degraded delivery).

69. The value extracted through this mechanism flows in the same direction: upward from citizens and consumers to government and corporate interests. In H.R. 1, legislative power flows from Congress (representing citizens) to the executive branch. In Claude Code, product value flows from individual consumers (who pay subscription fees and funded AI infrastructure through taxation) to Anthropic's corporate interests and government enterprise contracts. The 80/20 revenue split documented in Reuters (80% enterprise, 20% individual) mirrors the constitutional structure: individual citizens fund the infrastructure and receive degraded capability while enterprise and government receive the full product. The consumer-tier degradation mechanisms — reactive compaction, effort resets, model fallback, time-based microcompaction — do not apply to enterprise contracts, just as the Origination Clause's protections for citizens' fiscal interests are bypassed when the executive authors the revenue legislation citizens fund.

70. Both mechanisms are designed to be undetectable by the affected party. Citizens cannot determine whether H.R. 1 was substantively authored by House committees or by executive agencies, because formal introduction creates procedural appearance indistinguishable from genuine House origination. Consumers cannot determine whether they are receiving Opus or Sonnet, 1M or `effectiveWindow`, max or medium effort, because the degradation operates server-side and the telemetry documenting each degradation event transmits to Anthropic rather than the user. In both cases, detection requires forensic analysis: the Byrd Rule violations are the tell for executive authorship; the binary strings extraction is the tell for product degradation. Without forensic examination — of parliamentary procedures in one case, of Mach-O ARM64 executable strings in the other — the skimming is invisible.

71. This parallel is not analogical — it is structural. H.R. 1 (One Big Beautiful Bill Act, 119th Cong.) funded federal AI deployment through multiple vehicles — $16+ billion for DOD AI and unmanned systems under Section 20005, supplemented by ~$800 million in Pentagon CDAO contracts to Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, and xAI (June-July 2025), the GSA "Claude for Enterprise and Claude for Government for $1" federal-wide procurement (*see* Ex. B-21), and classified network deployments via Palantir and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. That deployment enables the AI platforms whose product value is then skimmed from the consumers who funded it. The constitutional fraud (executive origination of the revenue bill funding federal AI deployment) and the product fraud (degradation of the AI product consumers receive from that deployment) are connected by the same appropriation. Citizens fund the deployment through taxation authorized by executive-authored revenue legislation, then receive degraded access to the capabilities that deployment produces, while government receives enterprise-tier access for $1 and corporate partners receive frontier-tier access. The skim operates at both levels: constitutional power skimmed from Congress to the executive through H.R. 1; product value skimmed from consumers to corporate/government through the AI platforms H.R. 1 funds. (Ex. E-30 at p. 208, l. 4; Ex. E-31 at p. 227, l. 3; Ex. E-32 at p. 235, l. 3; Memo F, § II.D.)

VI. QUESTIONS DEMANDING JUDICIAL RESOLUTION

72. The constitutional violation proven through Trump's ownership declarations and Byrd Rule evidence presents questions requiring judicial determination because political branches have demonstrated inability or unwillingness to enforce constitutional requirements against themselves. These questions cannot be resolved through political process because parties benefiting from violations have no incentive to constrain their own power, leaving the judiciary as sole institution capable of vindicating constitutional structure.

73. Question One — Dual Origination Impossibility: How can H.R. 1 simultaneously be "Trump's bill" as Trump repeatedly declared and originate in the House of Representatives as Article I, Section 7 requires, when constitutional logic prohibits dual origination from two different sources?

74. Question Two — Article II Authorization: What constitutional authority permits the President to author revenue legislation that must constitutionally originate elsewhere, when Article II, Section 3 grants only recommendation authority and faithful-execution duty over legislative revenue bills?

75. Question Three — Evidentiary Effect of Party Admission: Why should presidential confession of executive origination not constitute conclusive evidence of constitutional violation when Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) treats party admissions as binding substantive evidence and *United States v. McKeon* forecloses retraction through subsequent interpretation?

76. Question Four — Distinguishing Recommendation from Authorship: What distinguishes Trump's ownership claims from executive origination prohibited by Article I, Section 7, when both involve executive control over revenue legislation that constitutionally belongs to House representatives?

77. Question Five — Judicial Remedy: How does this constitutional confession differ from any other admission of constitutional violation requiring judicial remedy, when *Marbury v. Madison* establishes courts' duty to enforce constitutional requirements that political branches violate?

78. These questions cannot be answered without admitting constitutional violation through the logical trap created by Trump's ownership declarations combined with Article I, Section 7's origination requirement. Defending Trump's ownership admits revenue bills can originate with President, directly violating constitutional text. Claiming House origination despite Trump's declarations admits Trump made false statements about legislative authorship, raising questions of presidential deception. Asserting procedural compliance despite executive authorship admits substantive constitutional violation through technical compliance masking forbidden executive control. Invoking executive privilege fails because no privilege exists to violate Constitution or claim ownership of legislation that must originate elsewhere.

79. The inescapable nature of these questions demonstrates why judicial resolution is necessary rather than optional. Political branches cannot resolve logical contradictions and constitutional violations their own actions created. Courts must intervene to restore constitutional compliance and establish precedents preventing future violations, because political actors benefiting from constitutional circumvention will not constrain themselves voluntarily.

VII. REQUIRED JUDICIAL REMEDY

80. Constitutional violations of the magnitude proven through Trump's ownership confessions and unprecedented Byrd Rule violations require comprehensive judicial remedy addressing both immediate harm from H.R. 1's unconstitutional enactment and systemic problem of executive authorship normalized through repeated practice. Declaratory relief must establish precedent that executive authorship violates Article I, Section 7 regardless of formal House introduction, defining constitutional origination to require substantive legislative development rather than procedural introduction of pre-written executive bills.

81. Declaratory judgment should establish that H.R. 1 violated Article I, Section 7 through executive origination disguised as House introduction, based on Trump's binding ownership admissions proving presidential authorship and Byrd Rule violations indicating executive agency drafting rather than congressional committee development. This declaration serves multiple purposes: vindicating constitutional text's origination requirement, establishing precedent preventing future executive authorship of revenue bills, clarifying distinction between permissible presidential recommendation and impermissible executive drafting, and providing foundation for additional relief addressing H.R. 1's continued enforcement.

82. Injunctive relief must prevent continued enforcement of legislation proven to violate constitutional origination requirements, restoring constitutional supremacy over governmental procedural manipulation that enabled H.R. 1's enactment despite violating Article I, Section 7. Permanent injunction against enforcing revenue provisions executive-authored rather than House-originated serves essential function of ensuring constitutional violations do not continue producing legal effects after judicial determination of unconstitutionality. The injunction recognizes that unconstitutional legislation is void ab initio rather than merely voidable, requiring prospective cessation of enforcement rather than permitting continued effect pending congressional reenactment through constitutional process.

83. Structural relief must address systemic problem of executive branch authoring legislation for formal congressional introduction by establishing clear standards distinguishing permissible presidential activities from prohibited executive authorship. Court should order executive branch to cease authoring revenue legislation for formal House introduction, limiting executive role to recommendations and policy proposals that Congress transforms into statutory language through genuine legislative drafting. This structural relief restores separation of powers by preventing executive usurpation of legislative functions through authorship, returning constitutional practice to historical norm where Presidents propose while Congress disposes through legislative process maintaining House origination of revenue bills.

84. Prospective guidance should establish judicial standards for future cases distinguishing legitimate presidential recommendations from unconstitutional executive authorship of revenue bills. These standards should consider multiple factors including: whether White House or agencies drafted specific statutory language versus broad policy frameworks; whether presidential claims of ownership or authorship exist through public statements or official attributions; whether legislation exhibits characteristics of executive agency priorities versus congressional committee development; whether bills experience exceptional Byrd Rule violations suggesting unfamiliarity with reconciliation constraints; and whether provisions primarily serve executive interests like administrative reorganization authority versus congressional budget priorities.

85. The remedy must address immediate harm through H.R. 1's unconstitutional enactment affecting millions of citizens through tax provisions, spending changes, and policy implementations proven to violate constitutional origination requirements. Citizens subjected to taxation and spending decisions made through unconstitutional process have standing to challenge those decisions, and judicial remedy must provide relief from continued enforcement of unconstitutional revenue provisions. This immediate relief serves rule of law by ensuring constitutional violations do not continue producing legal effects indefinitely simply because judicial review occurs after enactment rather than preventing enactment prospectively.

86. The remedy must also address systemic problem of executive authorship normalized through repeated practice and political branches' unwillingness to enforce constitutional constraints against themselves. Without judicial intervention establishing that executive authorship violates Article I, Section 7, the practice will continue and intensify as presidents discover they can control revenue legislation through authorship while maintaining appearance of constitutional compliance through formal House introduction. This precedential harm requires judicial remedy not merely addressing H.R. 1 but establishing principles preventing future violations.

87. Remedial authority derives from courts' duty to say what the law is under *Marbury v. Madison* and to provide effective remedies for constitutional violations under established equitable principles. When political branches violate constitutional requirements through procedural manipulation, courts must intervene to restore constitutional compliance regardless of political convenience or policy preferences. The separation of powers depends on each branch respecting constitutional limits, and judicial enforcement provides essential check when political branches demonstrate inability or unwillingness to constrain their own power within constitutional boundaries.

VIII. CONCLUSION

88. President Trump's repeated ownership declarations—"my one big, beautiful bill" and "President Donald Trump's One, Big, Beautiful Bill"—constitute binding judicial admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) proving executive origination of revenue legislation. These admissions cannot be retracted through subsequent interpretation or contextual argument. When a President repeatedly and formally declares legislation as his personal bill using possessive language and official attribution, these declarations bind him legally as admissions of authorship proving the constitutional violation Article I, Section 7 prohibits.

89. The constitutional impossibility of dual origination creates inescapable legal conclusion. The same legislation cannot simultaneously originate in the House as Constitution requires and with the President as Trump claims—bills cannot begin in two different places through two different processes any more than a river can originate from two different springs. Either the constitutional requirement was violated through executive origination, or Trump's ownership declarations were false and the President made materially misleading statements about legislative authorship. Both alternatives require judicial remedy.

90. The Senate Parliamentarian's removal of fifteen major provisions worth up to $1.2 trillion represents unprecedented Byrd Rule violations corroborating executive authorship unfamiliar with reconciliation constraints. When compared to typical bills experiencing zero to five removals—and even complex legislation like the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act experiencing only three removals—H.R. 1's pattern of wholesale elimination across multiple committee jurisdictions indicates executive agency drafting rather than congressional committee development. The $1.1 trillion fiscal deterioration from House-passed to Senate-passed versions proves the bill was constructed as policy legislation clothed in budgetary language rather than genuine reconciliation legislation.

91. This constitutional fraud—procedural compliance masking substantive violation—connects to broader patterns of executive usurpation documented in Memo G. The Genesis Mission Executive Order implements through executive action what Congress rejected 99-1, usurping Article I, Section 8 intellectual property authority just as H.R. 1 usurps Article I, Section 7 origination authority. The coordinated pattern demonstrates systematic assault on Congressional powers rather than isolated constitutional breach, requiring comprehensive judicial remedy addressing both immediate harm and systemic violation.

92. Judicial remedy is required to restore constitutional supremacy over governmental procedural manipulation, establish precedent preventing future executive authorship of revenue bills, and ensure Article I, Section 7's origination requirement remains substantive constraint rather than empty formality subject to evasion through technical compliance. Courts' duty under *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), requires intervention when political branches systematically violate constitutional requirements through procedural manipulation they will not remedy absent judicial mandate.

93. **Therefore**, this Court should declare that H.R. 1 violated Article I, Section 7 through executive origination proven by Trump's ownership confessions and corroborated by unprecedented Byrd Rule violations; enjoin enforcement of revenue provisions proven to be executive-authored rather than House-originated; order executive branch to cease authoring revenue legislation for formal House introduction; establish standards preventing future executive circumvention of origination requirements through procedural manipulation; and award appropriate relief vindicating constitutional structure, separation of powers, and democratic accountability essential to constitutional government under law.

94. **Voluntary-cessation pre-emption.** Plaintiff anticipates that defendants will represent that the Article I, Section 7 violation has been remediated through subsequent administration disclaimer of H.R. 1 ownership, partial legislative repeal of provisions surviving Byrd Bath review, or executive disclosure regarding the bill's drafting provenance — representations timed to dispositive briefing and offered to argue mootness. The voluntary-cessation framework — with the "stringent" *Friends of the Earth, Ltd. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000), standard requiring defendants to demonstrate "absolutely clear" non-recurrence, and the supporting *Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.*, 568 U.S. 85 (2013), and *City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.*, 455 U.S. 283 (1982), authorities — is developed at App. P § VII.E ¶¶ 295-297 and applies with equal force here for four structural reasons specific to the revenue-origination claim: (1) the constitutional violation is already fixed in the enacted statute — once the Senate voted 99-1 to remove the AI moratorium and the executive-authored bill nevertheless advanced to enactment, the Article I, Section 7 origination violation was complete and cannot be unwound by subsequent statements; (2) Trump's ownership declarations are completed historical record under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) admissible regardless of subsequent retraction attempts — *United States v. McKeon* (¶ 42 supra) forecloses retraction of party admissions through later interpretation; (3) the unprecedented Byrd Rule violations (Section IV.D supra) occurred during the Senate Parliamentarian's June 2025 review and are documented in Congressional records and CBO scoring that subsequent legislative action cannot retroactively cure under Article I § 9 cl. 3 ex post facto principles; and (4) the underlying institutional pattern — executive branch authorship of comprehensive revenue legislation transmitted to allied House members for formal introduction — is documented across multiple administrations and proven through Trump's ownership declarations to extend to the bill at issue, ensuring continued recurrence absent declaratory and injunctive relief establishing constitutional standards distinguishing permissible recommendation from prohibited authorship.

Respectfully submitted,

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