

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Joseph Kirchner,

Case No. 26-CV-726 (PJS/ECW)

Plaintiff,

vs.

**MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS**

Keith Ellison, *in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the State of Minnesota,*

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Keith Ellison, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Minnesota (“Attorney General”) move to dismiss the Petition filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff appears to seek the restraint of federal actors and federal policies, but the Petition does not allege any wrongdoing by the Attorney General. Attorney General Ellison respectfully moves the Court for an Order dismissing the Petition pursuant to Rules 8, 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Joseph Kirchner (“Plaintiff”) alleges that his constitutional rights have been or may be violated by various federal agents, namely Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights are being chilled by federal law enforcement operations taking place in Minnesota. (ECF 1 at ¶6.) Though unclear through the voluminous filings, Plaintiff appears to allege that because of qualified immunity, the January 7, 2026, killing of Renee Good, the January 24, 2026, killing of

Alex Pretti, and the resulting actions from various federal actors, he is unable to observe federal law enforcement operations. (*Id.* at ¶7-8.) Plaintiff also alleges that on an unspecified date and time, he was arrested by a Minneapolis Police officer and placed on an involuntary hold and administered antipsychotic medicine. (ECF 1-8. Ex. F, ¶1–15.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he is the target of a coordinated attack by federal agents on his network infrastructure. (ECF 1., ¶ 37-38.)

As a result of these actions, Plaintiff seeks multiple forms of declaratory relief. Plaintiff asks for 1) a temporary restraining order enjoining federal agents from using lethal force in Minnesota, 2) that Minnesota law enforcement officers be allowed to access locations where federal agents use force against Minnesota residents, 3) an order enjoining federal agents from seizing witnesses of the Renee Good and Alex Pretti killings, 4) an order directing the disclosure of “ICE Directive 19009.3”, 5) an order declaring that no federal law enforcement officer is entitled to absolute immunity for use of deadly force, 6) an order declaring that federal law enforcement conduct in Minnesota amounts to “...activities appearing intended to intimidate a civilian population within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2331”, 7) an order enjoining federal prosecution of citizens or organizations for obstruction of immigration enforcement, 8) a criminal referral for the killings of Renee Good and Alex Pretti, 9) an order directing the return of the “2-year-old and 5-year-old children transported from Minnesota to Texas”, 10) a criminal referral for the transportation of the 2-year-old and 5-year-old child for kidnapping and child endangerment, 11) an order directing ICE to provide Minnesota family members of the children’s location and status, 12) an expedited hearing, 13) a declaration that Minn. Stat.

§ 626.89 is unconstitutional, 14) an order declaring the use of chemical weapons by federal agents violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment, 15) an order declaring that the U.S. Supreme Court’s practice of staying preliminary injunctions enabled the killings of Renee Good and Alex Pretti, 16) a declaration that the qualified-immunity doctrine is constitutionally illegitimate, 17) a permanent injunction against Attorney General Ellison from enforcing Minn. Stat. § 626.89, 18) an order enjoining federal agents from deploying chemical weapons against Minnesota citizens engaged in peaceful observation or protest of federal law enforcement activities, 19) an order directing the release of all civil complaints against Derek Chauvin, 20) an order establishing comprehensive reform of civilian oversight of law enforcement agencies, 21) a declaration that the Equal Protection Clause requires certain accountability standards for Minnesota law enforcement officers, 22) a “finding of achievability” that Colorado’s SB20-217 law is achievable, 23) an order directing the Minnesota legislature to enact replacement legislation, 24) that the Court retain jurisdiction over this case to review replacement legislation for compliance, 25) general costs and fees. (ECF 1, ¶272–298.¹)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A party may move to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking over a claim, the claim must be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3); *see also Benter v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. Field Off.*—

¹ Of these 25 or so requests, only #17 appears to be directed at the Attorney General. (Pet. at ¶ 288.)

Bemidji, 2014 WL 5307634, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2014) (“Jurisdiction is a threshold issue, and ‘judicial economy demands that the issue be decided at the outset’ of the case.”) (quoting *Osborn v. United States*, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1990)).

The Court may “dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” *Johnson v. United States*, 534 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Attorney General’s jurisdictional challenge is based on the Petition and its associated filings alone; therefore, the Court considers only whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction. *Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson*, 793 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2015).

B. Failure to Join an Essential Party

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to join a party under Rule 19. *Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Murphy ex rel. C.M.B.*, 786 F.3d 662, 671 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Courts must accept as true all the well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. *Two Shields v. Wilkinson*, 790 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing 5C Wright & Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1359 (3d ed. 2004)). In a motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party, the Court can consider materials presented that are outside the pleadings. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(d).

Pursuant to Rule 19(a)(1), a party who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if at least one of these two conditions are met: (1) “the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties” in that party’s absence; or (2) if disposing of the action without that person “may as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Reliance bears the burden of proving whether either of these two conditions has been established. “The focus is on relief between the parties and not on the speculative possibility of further litigation between a party and an absent person.” *LLC Corp. v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp.*, 703 F.2d 301, 305 (8th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).

C. Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant.” *Wong v. Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.*, 2014 WL 4796464, at *3 (D. Minn. Sep. 26, 2014) (citing *Morton v. Becker*, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

ARGUMENT

The Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. First, the Petition violates Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it is not a short, plain statement detailing Plaintiff’s claims for relief. Second, the Court should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because it does not allege any wrongdoing by AG Ellison. Third, the Petition fails to name indispensable defendants, i.e. the federal actors responsible for Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Fourth and final, the Petition should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. There is no cognizable injury traceable to AG Ellison, AG Ellison is immune from Plaintiff’s claims, and Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge Minnesota Statute § 626.89.

I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT VIOLATES RULE 8.

Plaintiff’s 105-page Petition with 11 exhibits (some with “sub-exhibits”) and three supporting memorandum fails to satisfy the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “Pleadings that seek to overwhelm defendants with an unclear mass of allegations and make it difficult to impossible for the defendants to make informed responses to the plaintiff’s allegations are considered ‘shotgun’ pleadings.” 61A Am. Jur. 2d, Pleading § 159. Such pleadings, like Plaintiff’s, violate Rule 8(a) requirement for a short and plain statement detailing claims for relief, and combine multiple causes of action in each claim. *Id.*, *see also*

O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384, 392 (1949) (each cause of action must be pled separately).

Courts in this district have dismissed complaints when plaintiffs fail to plead a complaint that meets the rules' modest requirements. *See Wheeler v. Subaru of Am., Inc.*, 451 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1040 (D. Minn. 2020) (dismissing an amended complaint in lieu allowing a plaintiff to replead because it was unclear whether Plaintiff could satisfy the Rules' requirements); *Judah v. Ovsak*, 550 F. Supp. 687, 709 (D. Minn. 2021) ("Dismissal with prejudice is often appropriate when a plaintiff has shown persistent pleading failures despite one or more opportunities to amend.") (cleaned up); *Miles v. Simmons Univ.*, 514 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1080 (D. Minn. 2021) (same) (cleaned up); *Mell v. Minn. State Agric. Soc'y.*, 557 F. Supp. 3d 902, 924 (D. Minn. 2021) (same) (cleaned up).

While a motion for a more definite statement can be brought to clarify otherwise confusing pleadings, Courts often dismiss complaints when the complaint is still notably in derelict of the Rules, as Plaintiff's Petition is. *See Gurman v. Metro Hous. & Redevelopment Auth.*, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1153–54 (D. Minn. 2011) (dismissing 60-page, 250-paragraph "kitchen sink" complaint for length and failure to specify which claim was brought against which Defendant); *Qwest Commc'ns Co., LLC v. Free Conferencing*, 990 F. Supp. 2d 953, 969 (D. Minn. 2014) (dismissing claims since allegations that "Defendants" did not meet Rule 8's pleading requirements); *Tatone v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc.*, 857 F. Supp. 2d 821, 831–32 (D. Minn. 2012) (dismissing "kitchen sink" pleading that fails to provide sufficient specificity); *Tully v. Bank of Am., N.A.*, No. 104734 (DWF/JSM), 2011 WL 1882665, at *6 (D. Minn. May 17, 2011) (same); *Liggins v.*

Morris, 749 F. Supp. 967, 971 (D. Minn.1990) (same). Here, Plaintiff's amended complaint is so derelict of Rule 8's pleading requirements that it warrants dismissal.

Plaintiff's Petition suffers from the same flaws as those dismissed by courts in this district. Though this action stems from Plaintiff's concerns about federal law enforcement, the lengthy Petition violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)'s requirement of a "short and plain statement" detailing Plaintiff's theory of relief against the sole defendant, AG Ellison. Plaintiff's Petition, like those in *Tatone* and *Liggins*, brings numerous requests for relief but fails to provide adequate specificity of AG Ellison's conduct and how it relates to his requests for relief. *See, e.g.*, ECF 1 at ¶ 93 (referring to the Supreme Court's "Shadow Docket"); *see also Id.* at ¶ 193 ("The Collective Inhibitive Effect of Minnesota Statute § 626.89"). The Petition fails to make any causal link between his requested relief and factual allegations concerning AG Ellison.

Plaintiff's petition thoroughly violates the rules of civil procedure. It should be dismissed.

II. THE PETITION DOES NOT ALLEGE ANY WRONGDOING BY DEFENDANT.

Another independent reason why the Petition should be dismissed is there is no allegation of any wrongdoing by AG Ellison. Very few of the factual allegations detailed in the Petition related to AG Ellison and there is no allegation that AG Ellison caused any of Plaintiff's alleged injuries. To the contrary, Plaintiff writes, "Plaintiff sues the Attorney General not as an adversary but as the state official with the authority to act on judicial declarations. (ECF 6, ¶ 61.) While it is unclear from the allegations, it appears as if Plaintiff is suing AG Ellison to force him to "advise Minnesota law enforcement with judicial

authority behind his guidance.” *Id.*, ¶ 63.² Plaintiff does not cite any authority that would allow a private citizen to sue the attorney general to bring a law enforcement action. Nor does Plaintiff identify a constitutional claim implicating the actions of AG Ellison. Plaintiff’s claims against AG Ellison are brought solely because of AG Ellison’s authority under the Minnesota Constitution, not because of an injury traceable to the actions of AG Ellison. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed.

III. THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS ARE REQUIRED PARTIES UNDER FRCP 19(A).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1) provides that a party is required to be joined if feasible if: (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or (B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may[] as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest”). Here, Plaintiff has failed to join the federal actors that are the source of his alleged injury. The Court cannot grant Plaintiff the requested relief unless they are joined.

A. The Federal Defendants Are Indispensable Parties Because The Court Cannot Accord Complete Relief Among Just Defendant.

Here, Plaintiffs’ case is premised on the contention that various federal actors, be they ICE agents, Secretary Kristi Noem, Vice President J.D. Vance, or the Supreme Court

² It is possible that Plaintiff simply wants AG Ellison to declare federal law enforcement actions unlawful. To that end, this case is moot as AG Ellison has repeatedly done so. See e.g. 26cv00190, *State of Minnesota et al. v. Kristi Noem et al.*, ECF 1, ¶ 6 (calling Operation Metro Surge policing tactics unlawful); <https://sahanjournal.com/immigration/minnesota-sues-dhs-ice-surge-ellison-frey-her/> (last visited March 9, 2026) (“They’re making unconstitutional arrests and using excessive force.”)

(collectively “Federal Defendants”), have chilled his First Amendment rights and otherwise have violated the law. There is quite literally no allegation of any wrongdoing by Defendant. *See* ECF Doc. 6, ¶61 (“Plaintiff sues the Attorney General not as an adversary but as the state official with authority to act on judicial declarations.”)

The overwhelming majority of Plaintiff’s requested relief is aimed at controlling the conduct of the Federal Defendants. *See, e.g.,* Pet., ¶ 272-283 (“Emergency Relief”). Litigating those parties’ conduct in their absence impairs their ability to protect any interest implicated by Plaintiff’s requested relief. Assuming the Court does determine of the legality of the Federal Defendant’s practices, that relief would then need to be enacted by those parties. The Minnesota Attorney General has no authority to control federal agents, order the return of children subject to a federal immigration detainer, or restrain the Supreme Court from staying preliminary injunctions. In other words, complete relief is impossible without joining Federal Defendants. Accordingly, the Court cannot accord relief among the current parties.

B. Disposing Of Plaintiff’s Claims Would Impair Federal Defendant’s Interests.

A favorable determination for Plaintiff would expose Federal Defendants to liability that they cannot defend against unless they are joined. *See Nichols v. Rysavy*, 809 F.2d 1317, 1333 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that the United States’ absence required dismissal where the underlying issue was whether the United States violated federal law). Given that the Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Federal Defendants, the Court must dismiss the Petition

because the ultimate issue in this case is whether the actions of Federal Defendants violate federal law.

IV. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION.

“Subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold requirement which must be assured in every federal case.” *Kronholm v. F.D.I.C.*, 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990). Where, as here, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion raises a facial challenge, “the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction are presumed to be true and the motion is successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction.” *Titus v. Sullivan*, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). The Court should dismiss the Complaint because the Attorney General is immune from Plaintiff’s claims and because Plaintiff lacks standing. Plaintiff has failed to allege any connection between the Attorney General and the enforcement of Minn. Stat. § 626.89 and therefore his claims must be dismissed.

A. The Attorney General Is Immune from Plaintiff’s Claims.

“The Eleventh Amendment establishes a general prohibition of suits in federal court by a citizen of a state against his state or an officer or agency of that state.” *281 Care Comm. v. Arneson*, 638 F.3d 621, 632 (8th Cir. 2011). In *Ex parte Young*, the Supreme Court established a limited exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, allowing suit against state officials that seeks prospective injunctive relief to enforce compliance with federal law. *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). A suit against a state official for prospective injunctive relief can proceed only where (1) the official has “some connection

with the enforcement” of the challenged law; and (2) the official “is about to commence proceedings” to enforce the law. *Id.* at 156-57; *281 Care Comm.*, 638 F.3d at 632.

Plaintiff fails to allege that the Attorney General has any connection to the enforcement of Minn. Stat. § 626.89³ as required to fall within the *Ex parte Young* exception. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the Attorney General has a general duty to enforce and administrate Minnesota state laws. Pet. at ¶ 27. Minn. Stat. § 626.89, otherwise known as the Police Disciplinary Procedures Act, sets forth standards and procedures for peace officers facing disciplinary actions as well as a cause of action against government entities who employ peace officers. *See* Minn. Stat. § 626.89, subd. 3-17. It is totally unclear how the Attorney General would or could enforce this act, let alone against Plaintiff.

Merely being Attorney General with general constitutional powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 is insufficient to establish the requisite connection with the challenged statute. *Digit. Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson*, 803 F.3d 952, 960–64 (8th Cir. 2015)(state attorney general’s “broad powers” to enforce state laws insufficient to meet the requisite causal connection to establish standing or *Ex parte Young*’s exception to sovereign immunity); *281 Care Comm. v. Arneson*, 766 F.3d 774, 797 (8th Cir. 2014)(*Ex parte Young* doctrine only applies against officials who threaten and are about to commence proceedings against affected parties); *AbbVie, Inc. v. Ellison*, 777 F. Supp. 3d 971, 976 (D. Minn. 2025)(attorney general is immune from claims where the defendant has not alleged enforcement or threatened enforcement against the plaintiff). Because Plaintiff has not

³ It is thoroughly unclear which part of Minn. Stat. § 626.89 Plaintiff takes issue with.

alleged any enforcement action by the Attorney General, prospective or otherwise, his claims against the Attorney General cannot proceed under the *Ex parte Young*.

B. Plaintiff Lacks Standing.

To establish Article III standing, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing he has (1) “suffered an injury in fact”; (2) the injury is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Here, Plaintiff cannot establish that any injury he suffered is fairly traceable to any challenged action of the Attorney General for at least four reasons.

First, the overwhelming majority of Plaintiff’s allegations concern the actions of federal actors. Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights are being chilled by law enforcement actions by ICE agents, not by any action of the Attorney General. *See, e.g.*, Pet., ¶ 6-11. Plaintiff also alleges that he was personally injured by “the accountability void created by Minnesota Statute § 626.89” when he was subjected to unlawful detention by Minneapolis police officers. *Id.* at ¶ 12-14; Ex. F, ¶ 1-13. But again, there are no facts alleging any involvement of the Attorney General. At most Plaintiff has alleged that he did not file a complaint against the Minneapolis police officers who unlawfully detained him because under Minn. Stat. § 626.89, “no complaint I could have filed would result in discipline.” Ex. F, ¶ 12(e). Why Plaintiff believes this injury relates to the Attorney General is unclear.

Second, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the alleged injuries he suffered — having his First Amendment Rights chilled, being unlawfully detained by Minneapolis police, and

attacks on his computer network — were caused by the features of the statute he challenges, especially considering most of his factual allegations concern Federal Defendants. At most, Plaintiff has alleged that he cannot file a meaningful complaint against Minneapolis police officers. But by his own admission, he did not even attempt to file a complaint, making his injury entirely speculative. *Id.* In the absence of any allegations regarding how the features of the statutory scheme of which he complains contributed to Plaintiff’s alleged injury, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges nothing more than the type of generalized interest in the constitutionality of a statute that cannot confer Article III standing. *See, e.g., Lance v. Coffman*, 549 U.S. 437, 441–42 (2007) (plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge judicial redistricting because “[t]he only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed”); *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 573-74 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”).

Plaintiff alleges that following the killing of Renee Good and because of Minn. Stat. § 626.89, state officials cannot investigate the actions of federal actors in Minnesota. ECF Doc. 3, ¶ 110. It is totally unclear how Plaintiff believes Minn. Stat. § 626.89 would prevent a state investigation into federal law enforcement actions. Even if that were so, Plaintiff is at most alleging an injury on behalf of those state officials, which cannot establish that he has suffered an injury-in-fact.

Third, Plaintiff cannot establish that any injury is fairly traceable to the Attorney General. Standing requires that the injury be fairly traceable to the challenged actions of the named defendant, not the result of “the independent action of some third party not before the court.” *Balogh v. Lombardi*, 816 F.3d 536, 543 (8th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff cannot demonstrate standing for the same reason that he cannot satisfy the *Ex parte Young* exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity—the Attorney General has no connection to the statute that Plaintiff challenges. *See Digit. Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson*, 803 F.3d 952, 958 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he causation element of standing requires the named defendants to possess authority to enforce the complained-of provision.”); *Doe v. Piper*, 165 F. Supp. 3d 789, 801 (D. Minn. 2016). And as argued *supra*, Plaintiff’s allegations primarily concern the actions of Federal Defendants who are not before the Court.

Fourth and finally, Plaintiff cannot establish standing simply by asserting taxpayer status.⁴ The mere assertion that Plaintiff pays taxes as a Minnesota citizen cannot support a challenge to Minn. Stat. § 626.89. Plaintiff has not alleged any connection between him paying taxes and the challenged statute. Standing has been rejected in such cases because the alleged injury is not “concrete and particularized,” but is instead a grievance the taxpayer suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. *DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno*, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006). Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his challenge to Minn. Stat. § 626.89.

⁴ Plaintiff does not assert taxpayer standing in his Petition, but in his emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. *See* ECF Doc. 6, ¶ 32.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Attorney General Ellison respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion and dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.

Dated: March 9, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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