

**APPLIED DIAGNOSTICS: STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF ACTIVE
CONFLICTS THROUGH THE BODILY-JURISDICTION FRAMEWORK**

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HOW TO USE THIS DOCUMENT

This document is a repository of *applied* diagnostics, distinct from the framework brief's *structural* theory. The framework brief articulates the architecture (object → substrate → floor → fractal imperative → social-contract conditional → floor-protection doctrines → intervention warrant → remedial channel); this document deploys the architecture against specific real-world conflicts.

The seven-step diagnostic template applied to each case:

1. **Civil-capacity inventory** — what civil-framework capacity does each party hold? (per ``bodily_jurisdiction_framework.md` § 8`)
2. **Internal exclusivity diagnostic** — does each party secure the floor for *all* its constituents, or does it operate internal exclusivity? (§ 9.C)
3. **External exclusivity diagnostic** — does each party extend floor protection to constituents of other social contracts, or does it operate external exclusivity? (§ 9.C)
4. **Floor violations** — cataloged direct, indirect, and particularized-enforcement transgressions (§ 7)
5. **Meta-violation analysis** — does any party apply asymmetric standards *in the opposite direction* of the structural asymmetry, characterizing the structurally less-protected party as "extremist" while exempting its own state-sanctioned violence? (§ 8.D)
6. **Intervention warrant** — is the warrant for higher-level intervention triggered, and what institutional mechanisms are available or in operation? (§ 10)
7. **Congruent path** — what would egalitarian binding (extension of the social-contract object across the disputed boundary) look like, per the fractal imperative? (§ 9.B)

What the diagnostic does not do: pick winners; resolve substantive policy disputes; predict timelines; supply political will. The framework's contribution is structural diagnostic clarity, not normative prescription on contested moral questions. The diagnostic operates symmetrically across parties — it produces the same kind of finding regardless of which party the analyst sympathizes with.

1. ISRAEL–PALESTINE

Civil-Capacity Inventory

Party	Status
Israel	Functioning civil capacity — parliamentary democracy; Supreme Court with active constitutional jurisprudence (the <i>Kol Ha'am Co. v. Minister of Interior</i> line); codified rights protections; state party to ICCPR (ratified 1991), CAT, CERD, CEDAW. Bound by the entire codified democratic framework, including treaty obligations and IHL.
Palestinian populations (Gaza, West Bank, stateless)	Lack effective civil capacity. The Palestinian Authority's civil capacity is structurally constrained by occupation; Hamas operates outside a recognized civil framework; stateless Palestinians have no civil institution that has assumed protection of their floor. Retain natural floor-level defensive rights (Hobbesian baseline per § 8.A).

Internal Exclusivity Diagnostic

Israel — multiple internal exclusivities identified:

- Basic Law: Israel — Nation State of the Jewish People (2018) explicitly establishes ethnic exclusivity: "the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people"
- Two-tier legal system in occupied territories: Israeli settlers under civilian law, Palestinian residents under military law (different courts, different procedures, different rights)

- Differential application of citizenship, residency rights, family unification, mobility, water and utility access

- Administrative-detention authority (Emergency Powers Law 1979; Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law 2002) operates view-based predicates against Palestinian political organizers and conscientious objectors

Diagnostic: Israel's internal civil framework is *partial* — it secures floor protection for some constituents while operating state-of-nature / imposition rules against others within the same de facto polity. Structurally incongruent with the object's universality at the floor.

External Exclusivity Diagnostic

Israel: Paradigm external exclusivity. The occupation extends Israeli state authority over Palestinian populations *without* extending the civil-contract object to them. Instead, the framework applied to Palestinians is a separate, less protective regime (military occupation; administrative detention; settler-violence asymmetry; blockade of Gaza). The home polity's constituents are secured; non-constituent populations under Israeli authority are treated as state-of-nature targets rather than as parties to a higher-order social contract.

Palestinian governance (PA, Hamas): lacks the civil-capacity threshold to extend external protections to anyone; the question of external exclusivity by these actors is structurally limited by their absent civil framework.

Floor Violations

By Israeli state action:

- *Direct transgressions*: forced displacement and demolitions; administrative detention without trial of political activists, journalists, and conscientious objectors; civilian casualties from military operations (especially the post-October 2023 Gaza campaign)

- *Indirect transgressions*: deprivation of means through blockade — food, water, electricity, medical care; restrictions on access to healthcare; deprivation of construction materials

- *Particularized-enforcement transgressions*: settlement-related infrastructure (settler-only roads, separation barrier, differential resource allocation) that operates through external regulation while defeating Palestinian floor decisions

By Hamas and analogous Palestinian armed actors:

- *Direct transgressions*: targeting of Israeli civilians (paradigm: October 7, 2023 attacks; suicide-bombing campaigns of Second Intifada; indiscriminate rocket fire). These are floor violations by *floor symmetry*, regardless of the actor's civil-capacity status.

By Israeli settlers (private actors with documented state toleration):

- *Direct transgressions*: documented settler violence against Palestinian villagers; property destruction; killings. Where state-tolerated or state-facilitated, these become *state-sanctioned violence* under Israeli civil-capacity obligations.

Meta-Violation Analysis

Israel — the party with civil capacity and therefore the higher set of obligations — characterizes Palestinian floor-defense (including non-violent BDS advocacy, anti-occupation protest, and even academic critique) as "anti-Israel extremism" or "delegitimization." Simultaneously, Israeli

state-sanctioned violence operating against Palestinian floors is framed as "self-defense" exempted from the codified framework Israel is otherwise bound by.

This applies asymmetric standards *in the opposite direction* of the structural asymmetry: the party with greater civil-capacity obligations positions itself as if it had fewer; the party with floor-level defensive rights and no civil-capacity obligations is characterized as if it were bound by obligations it does not (structurally cannot) hold.

The IHRA Working Definition's adoption by U.S. and Israeli-aligned states is the doctrinal apparatus of this meta-violation. *Means, Not Views* Part VI develops the U.S. domestic-enforcement dimension at length. The international-scale meta-violation is the same move at higher fractal scale.

Intervention Warrant

Triggered. Institutional executions in progress:

- ICJ Provisional Measures Order, *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (S. Afr. v. Isr.)*, Order (Provisional Measures), 2024 I.C.J. (Jan. 26)

- ICC arrest warrants for Israeli officials and Hamas leadership (2024)
- UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry reports
- UN Special Rapporteur communications on the situation in the OPT
- Sanctions actions by individual states (limited; primarily targeting settler-violence networks)

Institutional capacity: uneven. The U.S. veto in the Security Council limits collective security action. The ICJ ruling is provisional and depends on member-state compliance, which is

partial. The ICC arrest warrants face jurisdictional limitations. Civil-society and academic mechanisms supply additional analytical pressure.

Congruent Path

The framework prescribes extension of the social-contract object across the boundary currently being drawn. Two structurally congruent forms exist:

- *Single binational civil framework* — one state extending floor protection to all individuals on the territory, with civil-capacity obligations applying universally
- *Two civil frameworks bound by inter-state social contract* — two-state solution with treaty-based mutual extension of floor protection across borders

The framework does not select between these. It predicts (Law of Supremacism) that any path retaining exclusivity at either scale will generate continued sustained conflict; and (Law of Egalitarianism) that any path extending the object will preclude it. The 76+ years of sustained conflict empirically confirms the prediction for the exclusivity-based posture.

2. RUSSIA–UKRAINE

Civil-Capacity Inventory

Party	Status
Russia	Nominal civil framework (constitution, courts, parliament) but captured/predatory in operation . Courts execute state will; opposition criminalized; journalists imprisoned or killed; anti-war prosecutions under Articles 207.3 and 280.3 of the Criminal Code (Federal Law No. 32-FZ, March 4, 2022). The civil-capacity threshold question (§ 12) is acute: Russia's civil framework is <i>nominal</i> , not <i>effective</i> . Russia withdrew from the Council of Europe in March 2022; remains a state party to the ICCPR.
Ukraine	Functioning civil capacity (substantially improved since 2014 Maidan reforms);

	state party to ICCPR and (until conflict-related derogations) ECHR; judicial review; codified rights protections. Bound by codified democratic framework + Geneva Conventions / IHL.
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Internal Exclusivity Diagnostic

Russia — multiple internal exclusivities:

- LGBT+ persons designated "extremist movement" by Supreme Court ruling (November 2023); "anti-propaganda" laws targeting view-based identity
- Ethnic-minority disproportionate conscription patterns (Buryats, Tuvans, Dagestanis face mobilization at far higher per-capita rates than ethnic Russians)
- Crimean Tatars under particularized restrictions and prosecutions since 2014 annexation
- Political dissenters criminalized through Articles 207.3 / 280.3 ("discrediting" prosecutions analyzed in *Means, Not Views* § VI.H)
- Religious minorities (Jehovah's Witnesses designated "extremist" 2017; restrictions on independent Orthodox communities; Muslim communities outside state-approved structures)

Ukraine: internal exclusivities documented (limited but real) — restrictions on Russian-language education and media post-2014 (debated in IHL terms); citizenship and language requirements that affect Russian-speaking populations. These exist on a different scale than Russia's and are themselves contested empirically and doctrinally.

External Exclusivity Diagnostic

Russia — paradigm external exclusivity. The 2022 invasion treats Ukrainian sovereignty as non-existent, treats Ukrainian persons and property as outside the social-contract object. The

"denazification" and "historical Russian lands" rhetoric explicitly denies the Ukrainian state's legitimacy as a co-equal party in any higher-order social contract.

Ukraine: posture is defensive of constituents against external imposition; no external exclusivity claim against Russia's constituents (Ukrainian state has not extended its claims into Russian territory beyond limited tactical operations within Ukrainian internationally recognized borders or in proximate Russian territory used as launch points).

Floor Violations

By Russia in Ukraine:

- *Direct transgressions:* systematic civilian targeting (filtration system; mass graves at Bucha, Izyum; deliberate strikes on civilian infrastructure including hospitals, energy grid in winter, water systems); sexual violence as policy (documented by UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry)

- *Indirect transgressions:* deprivation of means at scale through infrastructure destruction; forced relocations into occupied territories; blockade of food exports (until Black Sea Grain Initiative)

- *Particularized-enforcement transgressions:* forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia (ICC arrest warrants of Putin and Lvova-Belova, March 17, 2023)

By Russia against its own population:

- Anti-war prosecutions (OVD-Info documents 20,000+ cases under Articles 207.3 / 280.3 and analogous provisions)

- Political prisoner counts at levels not seen since Soviet era (Memorial, before its forced dissolution, documented hundreds of cases)

By Ukrainian state action:

- Limited documented violations, individually accountable under IHL; do not characterize the overall posture
- Ongoing reform of military justice and accountability mechanisms in response to documented incidents

Meta-Violation Analysis

Russia characterizes Ukrainian self-defense as "Nazi" or "extremist" while engaging in state-sanctioned violations of Ukrainian floors at scale. Russian domestic discrediting prosecutions characterize anti-war Russian citizens' speech as "extremism" while the state simultaneously violates the floor at scale in the invasion.

This is the meta-violation in operation at two scales simultaneously:

- *Internal scale:* Russian citizens defending the floor (anti-war speech, refusing conscription, protesting) are characterized as extremist while state violations of the floor are exempted
- *External scale:* Ukrainian defense of constituents against invasion is characterized as fascist while Russian state-sanctioned violations against Ukrainian constituents proceed at scale

The structural diagnosis is symmetric and clear: the party engaging in floor violations is also the party applying asymmetric standards in the opposite direction of the structural asymmetry.

Intervention Warrant

Triggered and partially executed:

- ICC arrest warrants (March 2023 for Putin and Lvova-Belova; expanded subsequently for additional officials)
- ICJ proceedings: *Ukraine v. Russian Federation* under the Genocide Convention (filed March 2022); Order on Provisional Measures (March 16, 2022) directing Russia to suspend military operations
- ECHR proceedings (until Russia's expulsion from the Council of Europe in March 2022); jurisdiction over pre-expulsion violations preserved
- UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry reports
- Collective security action: NATO weapons supply to Ukraine; EU/G7 sanctions on Russian state and individuals; coordinated diplomatic responses

Institutional capacity: comparatively robust at the international level (ICC, ICJ proceedings active; sanctions extensive; weapons supply at scale). Constrained by Russian veto on Security Council; constrained where third states (China, India, Iran) decline to participate in sanctions or supply Russia.

Congruent Path

The framework prescribes restoration of the social-contract object across the boundary Russia violated. Structurally congruent forms:

- *Russian withdrawal to recognized international borders* + acknowledgment of Ukrainian sovereignty
- *Reparations and accountability* through ICC/ICJ mechanisms for state-sanctioned violations

- *Inter-state social contract* extending floor protection symmetrically (e.g., post-conflict treaty framework with mutual recognition, demilitarized zones, international monitoring)

Russia's internal incongruence (LGBT-designation, discrediting prosecutions, religious-minority targeting) does not need to be resolved as a precondition for external congruence at the Ukraine boundary, but the framework predicts that internal exclusivity will continue to generate predictable instability until addressed. The fractal imperative observes that internal exclusivity correlates with external exclusivity — the Russian state's exclusivity-based posture is structurally consistent across scales.

3. US / ISRAEL – IRAN

Civil-Capacity Inventory

Party	Status
United States	Functioning civil capacity with significant incongruence per <i>Means, Not Views</i> Part VI. Bound by codified democratic framework, ICCPR (with reservations), and treaty obligations. The 2026 <i>U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy</i> and the IHRA framework introduce categorical CT predicates that operate as internal incongruence.
Israel	Functioning civil capacity with internal/external exclusivity (see Israel–Palestine analysis above).
Iran	Hybrid clerical-republican framework. Constitution, parliament, judiciary, but ultimate authority with unelected Supreme Leader and Guardian Council. Partial civil capacity : nominal institutions exist, but ultimate authority is unelected and unaccountable; floor protections operate selectively.
Iranian proxy networks (Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi/Syrian militias, certain Palestinian factions)	Operate in the floor-level / no-civil-capacity regime in most cases. Their conduct is judged by the floor's symmetric prohibition on civilian-targeting violations, regardless of their political-military sponsor.

Internal Exclusivity Diagnostic

Iran — multiple internal exclusivities at scale:

- Gender-based exclusivity: forced hijab; restrictions on women's legal capacity (testimony, inheritance, custody, divorce); public-life participation constraints
- Religious exclusivity: Baha'i persecution (systematic; documented); restrictions on Christian converts (apostasy laws); Sunni Muslims in Shia-majority regions (restrictions on mosques, clergy, education)
- Political exclusivity: Green Movement (2009) suppression; Woman Life Freedom (2022–) suppression with documented killings, mass arrests, executions; political prisoner counts at scale
- Ethnic exclusivity: Baluch, Ahwazi Arab, Kurdish populations face particularized restrictions and elevated execution rates
- LGBT+: criminalization to capital punishment for same-sex relations

United States: internal incongruence per *Means, Not Views* Part VI — IHRA framework, 2026 CT Strategy, categorical CT predicates, view-based prosecutions and immigration enforcement. The U.S. case is less extensive than Iran's at the floor-violation level but is structurally significant because of the codified democratic framework's nominal protections.

Israel: see Israel–Palestine analysis.

External Exclusivity Diagnostic

Iran: External exclusivity through proxy networks targeting Israeli, U.S., Sunni Arab states' constituents; rhetoric of "Death to America" / "Death to Israel" treats those polities' constituents

as outside the social-contract object; direct involvement in regional conflicts (Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon) extends state authority beyond borders.

United States: Targeted-killing program (Soleimani strike January 2020; broader drone-strike program); maximum-pressure sanctions affecting Iranian civilian population (medical access, food security, currency collapse); cyber operations affecting civilian infrastructure (Stuxnet; subsequent operations).

Israel: Targeted assassinations on Iranian soil (Iranian nuclear scientists by reported Mossad operations); airstrikes on Iranian and Iranian-affiliated assets in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq; intelligence operations within Iranian territory.

Floor Violations

Iran against its own constituents:

- Woman Life Freedom suppression (Mahsa Amini's death in custody, September 2022; subsequent killings, hangings, mass arrests)
- Baha'i imprisonment and property confiscation (ongoing for 45+ years)
- Sunni and Baluch execution rates (UN Special Rapporteur on Iran annual reports)
- Anti-protest violence at scale

Iran against external civilians (via proxies or directly):

- October 7, 2023 attacks were partially Iranian-supported (Hamas's training and funding networks)
- Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping affect civilian seafarers; Saudi/UAE infrastructure attacks
- Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israeli civilians; analogous operations historically

- Iranian-backed militia attacks on U.S. personnel and regional civilians in Iraq and Syria

United States against Iranian persons:

- Targeted killings outside warzone (Soleimani 2020 — extraterritorial in Iraqi sovereign territory)

- Sanctions-induced civilian harm (medical access; food security; documented by UN Special Rapporteur on sanctions)

- Cyber operations affecting civilian infrastructure

Israel against Iranian persons:

- Targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists outside warzone (extraterritorial in Iranian sovereign territory)

- Civilian collateral damage from strikes on Iranian-affiliated assets in third countries

Iranian proxies against various civilians:

- Hamas Oct. 7 attacks (Israeli civilians targeted)
- Houthi missile attacks on Riyadh, Abu Dhabi (Saudi/UAE civilians targeted)
- Hezbollah operations against Israeli civilians

Meta-Violation Analysis

Mutual. Each major state party engages in the meta-violation:

- *U.S. and Israel:* characterize Iranian-supported resistance and the Iranian regime as "terrorism" while engaging in state-sanctioned violence against Iranian persons (targeted killings on Iranian soil; sanctions-induced civilian harm)

- *Iran*: characterizes U.S. and Israeli operations as "terrorism" while engaging in state-sanctioned violence against its own citizens (Woman Life Freedom suppression, religious-minority targeting) and through proxies against external civilians

Each party invokes the "extremism" / "terrorism" rhetoric against the other while exempting its own state-sanctioned violations from the codified framework it is otherwise bound by. The framework's diagnosis: *mutual incongruence* — not one party right, one party wrong, but multiple parties operating asymmetric standards in the opposite direction of the structural asymmetry.

Intervention Warrant

Triggered for multiple parties; institutional capacity fractured.

- U.S./Israel-related: ICJ proceedings (limited because U.S. and Israel selectively non-participating); ICC limited reach; UN Special Rapporteur reports

- Iran-related: UN Special Rapporteur on Iran (annual); UN Fact-Finding Mission on Iran following Woman Life Freedom (established 2022); ICJ proceedings on Iran's targeting of dissidents abroad

- Proxy-related: Houthis designated by U.S. (designation status varies); Hezbollah designated by multiple states; the structural diagnostic does not depend on these designations

Institutional execution: highly fragmented. Major powers (U.S., Russia, China) selectively withdraw or non-participate when their own conduct or allies' conduct is at issue. Civil-society and academic mechanisms supply analytical pressure where institutional intervention is constrained.

Congruent Path

The framework prescribes — at every scale where incongruence exists — extension of the social-contract object across the boundaries currently being drawn.

- *Iran internally*: extend floor protection to women, religious minorities, ethnic minorities, political dissenters, LGBT+ — addressing the Woman Life Freedom dimension
- *Iran externally*: terminate proxy targeting of civilians; engage in regional cooperative frameworks rather than zero-sum proxy networks
- *U.S. / Israel*: address own internal incongruence (IHRA framework, 2026 CT Strategy, occupation-related apparatus); cease state-sanctioned extraterritorial floor violations (targeted killings on sovereign territory of other states; civilian-impact sanctions)
- *Regional inter-state*: a Middle East security architecture extending floor protection across the U.S.–Iran, Israel–Iran, Israel–Arab-states boundaries

The framework predicts (Law of Supremacism) that mutual incongruence at the multi-front scale generates exactly the kind of sustained conflict we observe — 45+ years of U.S.–Iran hostility, multiple shadow-war fronts, periodic escalations, no stable resolution. The Law of Egalitarianism predicts that congruent disposition by *any* major party reduces sustained conflict at that party's incongruence locus; congruent disposition by *all* major parties would preclude it.

CROSS-CONFLICT PATTERN OBSERVATIONS

Three patterns emerge consistently across the three diagnostic cases.

1. The meta-violation pattern is universal where state-sanctioned violence is present.

In every conflict examined, the party (or parties) with greater civil capacity characterizes the adversary's floor-defense as "terrorism" or "extremism" while exempting its own state-

sanctioned violence from the codified framework it is otherwise bound by. The framework's § 8.D meta-violation diagnosis applies symmetrically. The diagnostic does not require any normative judgment about whose substantive policy is correct; it identifies the asymmetric-standards application as a structural violation, regardless of the speaker's identity.

2. Exclusivity at one scale predicts incongruence at adjacent scales. Internal exclusivity correlates with external exclusivity in every case: Israel's internal Nation-State Law / two-tier legal system predicts and structurally validates its external occupation posture; Russia's internal LGBT-designation / dissent-criminalization predicts and validates its external invasion; Iran's internal Woman Life Freedom suppression / religious-minority targeting predicts and validates its external proxy network targeting civilians. The fractal imperative operates with structural consistency — politics incongruent at one scale are incongruent at adjacent scales. This is the framework's predictive function in operation (per 'bodily_jurisdiction_framework.md' § 9.D).

3. Congruent paths exist in every case and are structurally identifiable without substantive moral judgment. For each conflict, the framework can articulate what congruent disposition would look like — extending the social-contract object across the disputed boundary in some institutional form. The framework does not prescribe which form; it does not require parties to agree on substantive policy. It predicts (Law of Supremacism) that any path retaining exclusivity will generate sustained conflict, and (Law of Egalitarianism) that any path extending the object will preclude it. The empirical record of all three conflicts confirms the prediction for the exclusivity-based posture: sustained, generation-spanning conflict in each case.

LIMITS AND CAVEATS

What the diagnostic does not do:

- It does not supply political will. Authoritarian and supremacist movements reject the framework precisely because it constrains their categorical-predicate apparatus.
- It does not resolve substantive policy disputes. Whether Iran's nuclear program is itself a floor threat; whether Israel's security justifies any of its measures; whether Russia's claimed grievances against NATO enlargement have substance — these are substantive questions the framework does not adjudicate.
- It does not predict timelines or guarantee specific resolutions. The Law of Supremacism predicts sustained conflict under exclusivity; it does not predict when or how conflict ends.
- It does not pick winners. Where multiple parties are mutually incongruent (US/Israel/Iran case), the framework identifies the multilateral pattern rather than choosing one party as "the" supremacist actor.

What the diagnostic does:

- Identifies meta-violations regardless of which party commits them
- Distinguishes self-defense (floor-defense by parties without civil capacity) from extremism (floor violations by anyone)
- Supplies structural ground for civil-society advocacy, academic analysis, strategic litigation, journalism, and diplomatic framing
- Produces consistent diagnostic outputs across conflicts, enabling cross-case comparison and pattern observation
- Identifies congruent paths forward without requiring substantive policy agreement among the parties

TEMPLATE FOR FUTURE CASE ADDITIONS

For each new conflict, apply the seven-step structure:

N. [Case Name]

Civil-Capacity Inventory [Table: each party | status | bound by what framework]

Internal Exclusivity Diagnostic [Per-party analysis: does the polity secure the floor for all its constituents?]

External Exclusivity Diagnostic [Per-party analysis: does the polity extend floor protection to constituents of other social contracts?]

Floor Violations [Cataloged direct, indirect, particularized-enforcement transgressions; with source citations]

Meta-Violation Analysis [Does any party apply asymmetric standards in the opposite direction of the structural asymmetry?]

Intervention Warrant [Triggered or not; what institutional mechanisms are available or in operation; institutional capacity]

Congruent Path [What egalitarian binding would look like, per the fractal imperative; structurally identifiable without substantive policy prescription]

Candidate future cases (in no particular order):

- Sudan civil war and Darfur 2.0
- Myanmar military regime and ethnic-minority displacement
- Hungary (Fidesz era) — domestic incongruence diagnostic
- Turkey (AKP era) — internal exclusivity + anti-terror prosecutions
- India under UAPA and Section 153A — extensive analysis available in *Means, Not*

Views Part VIII.B.3

- People's Republic of China — Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Tibet, the 709 lawyers crackdown

- U.S. domestic application of the 2026 CT Strategy — extensive analysis in *Means, Not Views* Part VI

- North Korea — total foreclosure of civil framework
- Saudi Arabia and Gulf monarchies — religious-establishment exclusivity + external operations

- Brazil (Bolsonaro era) and the recovery under Lula — democratic-backsliding diagnostic

- The Philippines under Duterte and Marcos — extrajudicial killings, drug-war floor violations

The framework operates symmetrically and the template's consistency is what makes the cross-case pattern observation possible.

End of applied diagnostics — initial three cases.