

BODILY JURISDICTION: THE FLOOR OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

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1. THE CORE MOVE: JURISDICTION, NOT RIGHT

Bodily autonomy is conventionally argued as a *right* — privacy, substantive due process, equal protection — susceptible to balancing against the state's interests. The bodily-jurisdiction framework restates the argument *structurally*: the body is a sovereign jurisdictional sphere analogous to a state's territorial sphere. The state cannot regulate inside the bodily sphere not because the regulation would interfere with a balanceable interest, but because the regulation operates *outside the state's jurisdiction in the first place*. The state's interest never enters the analysis until its action crosses the jurisdictional line.

This is a categorically different argumentative posture from the *Roe/Casey/Dobbs* tradition. It does not depend on the substantive merit of the bodily decision (it does not require courts to decide whether abortion, refusal of medical care, contraception, or analogous decisions are good policy). It depends only on whether the state's regulatory hand has crossed the structural boundary.

2. THE FLOOR AND THE LAYERED SOVEREIGNTY

Bodily jurisdiction at the individual human level is the **floor** of the entire jurisdictional hierarchy. It is the primary sovereignty from which all higher-level authority is derivative.

The layered structure:

Level	Authority	Relation to the floor
Individual (the floor)	Primary sovereignty over one's own body	Generates all higher-level authority through consent of the governed
Local	Derivative — granted to protect the floor within the locality	Bound by the floor; cannot violate it

State	Derivative — granted to protect the floor within state borders	Bound by the floor; cannot violate it; must constrain local from violating it
Federal	Derivative — granted to protect the floor nationally	Bound by the floor; cannot violate it; must constrain state from violating it
International	Derivative — granted to protect the floor across the international order	Bound by the floor; cannot violate it; must constrain federal-level violations through customary law, <i>jus cogens</i> , treaty obligations

Each level's authority is *protective and derivative* — granted to defend the floor against violations originating from any source (private actor, lower-level authority, or the same level acting outside its derivative warrant). No level has authority that is *prior to* or *above* the floor. The conventional view that treats individual rights as *limits on* a presumptive state authority is structurally inverted: the state's authority is *granted by* and *exists for* the floor.

The floor is symmetric. The same bodily jurisdiction that protects an individual against state encroachment also obligates the state to protect that individual against private encroachment. The state's authority is not absent from the bodily sphere; it is *protective of* the bodily sphere, with no warrant to itself encroach.

3. THE INTERNAL/EXTERNAL TEST

The constitutional line is drawn between:

Internal jurisdiction (Individual authority). Processes wholly contained within the individual's body that do not violate another's bodily jurisdiction. Includes respiration, metabolization, reproductive processes within the body, refusal of medical intervention,

decisions about the body's use, preservation, and function. Authority over the internal sphere belongs exclusively to the individual.

External jurisdiction (Protective authority). Actions that directly violate another's bodily jurisdiction — assault, forced labor, forced medical procedure, true threats, or any conduct that crosses into an individual's internal sphere without that individual's voluntary act first having crossed into another's. The state's authority over external actions is *derivative and protective* — granted to defend the floor against violation, not to regulate based on substantive content or moral assessment.

"Directly impact others" is therefore not an edge case to sharpen. It is *the definition of the violation*: directly impacting another's bodily jurisdiction by crossing into their internal sphere. The state's authority kicks in precisely there. The test asks not *what* the regulated activity is (its substantive content, its merit, its ideological position) but *where* the regulated activity operates — and whether it crosses the boundary of another's floor.

4. MEANS/VIEWS AS A FLOOR-PROTECTION DOCTRINE

Means/Views is not a peer doctrine to bodily jurisdiction — it is *structurally derivative of* the floor. The means/views distinction asks precisely when speech directly causes a floor violation: when speech is *directed to inciting* imminent lawless action against another (the lawless action would be a floor violation by the actor incited) or constitutes a *true threat* (the threat itself induces fear-based harm to the floor of the addressed individual). The state's authority to regulate speech is the same protective-derivative authority that authorizes regulation of any external action — granted to defend the floor against violation, withdrawn when the speech does not directly cause a violation.

The structural parallel is therefore one of *method*, not of position in the hierarchy:

Domain	Means/Views (speech)	Bodily Jurisdiction (the floor itself)
Position	Floor-protection doctrine for the speech domain	The floor itself — individual sovereignty over the body
What the state may regulate	<i>Means</i> — speech that directly causes floor violation (incitement to imminent lawless action; true threats; coordination with FTO)	<i>External</i> actions that directly violate another's bodily jurisdiction
What the state may not regulate	<i>Views</i> — the ideological position the speaker holds	<i>Internal</i> processes — bodily decisions wholly contained in the individual
The structural line	Whether the speech crosses into incitement/true-threats/integral-to-crime	Whether the action crosses into another's internal sphere
What is doctrinally irrelevant	Radicality of the underlying view; speaker's identity; offensiveness	Moral content of the bodily decision; speaker's identity; substantive merit
Anchoring doctrinal apparatus	<i>Brandenburg, Watts, Counterman, Chaplinsky, Giboney, Holder v. HLP</i>	<i>Union Pacific v. Botsford, Schmerber, Cruzan, Lawrence, McFall v. Shimp</i>

Both doctrines draw the constitutional line *structurally* — where does the regulated activity operate, and whether it crosses into another's floor — rather than *substantively* (is the regulated content meritorious?). Both reject the state's invocation of "the importance of what's being regulated" as a basis for crossing the line. The methodological identity is the family resemblance; the structural difference is that bodily jurisdiction *is* the floor while Means/Views *protects* the floor in the speech domain.

5. THE COMMON AXIOMATIC SUBSTRATE: THE LAWS OF SUPREMACISM AND EGALITARIANISM

Both the floor (bodily jurisdiction) and the floor-protection doctrines (Means/Views and the wider family) are downstream applications of the same axiomatic substrate.

State action that crosses into the internal bodily sphere (floor violation) or that targets views (floor-protection violation in the speech domain) is *supremacist by means analysis*: the state's claim is being treated as superior to the individual's claim — over the individual's own body in one case, over the individual's own conscience in the other. Both are $P(E_x, E_\gamma)$ in the substrate's vocabulary.

By the Law of Supremacism — $\forall S, \forall C \subset S, SC(C) \Rightarrow \exists P(E_x, E_\gamma)$ — such actions generate sustained conflict. The post-*Dobbs* abortion conflict and the categorical CT-predicate conflict (analyzed in *Means, Not Views* Part VI) both empirically validate the prediction.

By the Law of Egalitarianism — $\forall S, (\forall E_x, E_\gamma \in S, \text{EqI}(E_x, E_\gamma)) \Rightarrow \neg SC(C)$ — state action that respects the floor (and the floor-protection doctrines that defend it in specific domains) precludes sustained conflict.

The floor and the floor-protection doctrines are therefore not merely analogous; they are *instances* of the same structural method applied at different levels of the jurisdictional hierarchy.

6. MCFALL v. SHIMP AS THE DOCTRINAL ANCHOR FOR THE FLOOR

McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (C.P. Allegheny 1978), is the doctrinal anchor for bodily jurisdiction in the same way *Brandenburg* is the anchor for Means/Views. The *McFall* court refused to compel Shimp to donate bone marrow even where doing so was necessary to save McFall's life. The court reasoned in essentially jurisdictional terms: Shimp's bodily integrity was

an analytical fixed point, not a balanceable interest. Even the compelling external interest of saving McFall's life could not cross the boundary into Shimp's internal sphere.

McFall operates *exactly* on the principle the framework articulates: state authority cannot reach into the bodily sphere even when there is a compelling external reason. The case is doctrinally weak in conventional analysis (Pennsylvania trial-court decision, never appealed) but structurally powerful in jurisdictional analysis because the reasoning is *categorical*, not balancing-test.

The structural-jurisdictional method gives *McFall* the doctrinal weight its reasoning deserves but that its procedural posture has historically denied it. *McFall* is to the floor what *Brandenburg* is to Means/Views: the case that draws the line categorically rather than interpretively.

7. TRANSGRESSION TYPES

The framework distinguishes three kinds of transgression of the floor:

Direct transgressions. State action operating inside the bodily sphere: forced medical procedures, forced labor, assault by state actors, prevention of bodily function. The state's hand directly crosses into the floor.

Indirect transgressions. State action that removes the means necessary to preserve bodily integrity: theft of property necessary for survival, deprivation of healthcare, restriction of access to food/water/shelter. The state's hand operates externally but its effect inhibits the individual's capacity to maintain the floor.

Particularized-enforcement transgressions (also termed *foreclosure transgressions*). State action that operates external to the bodily sphere but effectively forecloses internal

decisions: closing all clinics that provide a bodily-care service through TRAP-style regulation, imposing civil-enforcement liability on aiders and abettors of interstate travel for bodily care, restricting interstate transit to access bodily care. The state's hand never crosses the boundary, but the regulation defeats the realization of the internal decision.

These transgressions are doctrinally reducible to violations of multiple existing constitutional provisions operating simultaneously:

- *Bodily jurisdiction* (the floor) — the substantive decision protected
- *Right to Travel* — *Saenz v. Roe*, *Shapiro v. Thompson*, *United States v. Guest*
- *Dormant Commerce Clause* — burden on interstate market for the affected service;

Pike v. Bruce Church, *Healy v. Beer Institute*

- *Privileges and Immunities Clause* — Article IV, § 2; equal access for non-residents to lawful activity in destination states

- *Due Process and Equal Protection* — disparate impact on protected classes; vagueness; chilling effect

The structural meta-violation is the **Supremacy Clause's mandate of holistic constitutional enforcement** (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). A state cannot enforce one constitutional provision (its police power, its tort law, its border regulation) in a way that defeats others. The Supremacy Clause is not merely a preemption rule; it is a structural requirement that the *entire* Constitution applies as a coherent whole, binding on every state simultaneously. Particularized enforcement — treating constitutional provisions as a menu from which the state may selectively honor what it wishes — is *itself* a Supremacy Clause violation, regardless of which individual provisions are defeated.

Texas's post-*Dobbs* regulatory posture is the paradigm case: each regulation invokes a particular constitutional provision (state police power, state tort law) while operating to defeat multiple others. The category is therefore the floor-level equivalent of the *conventional-extremism corollary* in Means/Views — state action that doesn't directly target the floor but uses particularized enforcement to defeat it. The doctrinal grounding through Supremacy Clause and the converging Right to Travel / Dormant Commerce Clause / Privileges and Immunities lines means the framework operates with existing constitutional doctrine rather than as a new doctrinal category.

The principle ports beyond the U.S. system: every constitutional system encodes some version of holistic enforcement, because selective enforcement of some rights to defeat others is structurally incoherent. ECHR systems address it through "indirect discrimination" doctrine; ICCPR Article 26 forbids discrimination in the enjoyment of rights; the African Charter Commission has recognized that selective state action defeating co-equal provisions is itself a violation. The framework's structural-jurisdictional method converges with these doctrines.

8. THE SOCIAL-CONTRACT CONDITIONAL

The floor exists in every individual at all times. But the floor's *defensive reserves* — the natural right of self-protection that the individual originally holds — operate conditionally on whether a functioning civil law-enforcement framework exists. This is the Hobbesian baseline of the framework, integrated as a structural conditional.

The framework's diagnostic apparatus for distinguishing structural violations from legitimate exercises of authority is developed at length in the companion paper *The Madisonian Separation of Powers Objective Compliance Test*. That paper articulates the Power Separation

Vulnerability (PSV) taxonomy — USURPATION (a Position of Assigned Power exercising authority assigned to a different Position) and ABDICATION (a Position failing to exercise mandatory authority assigned to it) — and supplies the six-step compliance test, the process-challenge / violation-claim distinction, the Supremacy Clause "in Pursuance thereof" validity test, and the recovery of equitable standing for enumerated constitutional violations. The bodily-jurisdiction framework operates on the floor; the Madisonian framework supplies the diagnostic tools for identifying when the floor has been violated at any scale of the constitutional hierarchy.

A. The Social-Contract Transfer and the Operational States of Law

1. The Social-Contract Transfer

In the state of nature (Hobbes, *Leviathan*), the individual holds absolute natural right to defend person and property — there is no civil institution to which protection has been delegated. Civil society is formed by transferring the natural right of force-defense to the sovereign in exchange for the sovereign's protection. The transfer is conditional: the sovereign's legitimate exercise of derivative authority depends on actually providing the protection.

Once the transfer is in place — that is, once a functioning civil law-enforcement framework exists and operates effectively to protect the floor — the individual no longer holds the unilateral right to defend property by force against another civilian. The right has been delegated to the state; theft is a civil-criminal-law matter, not a floor-level emergency. The individual retains the floor — bodily integrity itself is never transferable — but the *indirect-transgression* protections (against theft, deprivation of means, etc.) operate through the civil framework.

This resolves the indirect-transgression scope question. Theft is a floor-level matter *only* in the absence of effective civil law enforcement, i.e., under Hobbesian state-of-nature conditions. Where civil law enforcement is functioning, theft is a derivative-rights matter handled by the floor-protection family — specifically, by property jurisdiction operating through civil and criminal law.

The exception: where theft *immediately* threatens life (stealing life-saving medicine from a person in active medical emergency, depriving someone of food at a deprivation level that threatens survival), the indirect transgression collapses back into a direct floor threat, and natural defensive rights apply even within a civil framework. These are rare cases that test the boundary of the social-contract transfer, and they are not exceptions to the principle but applications of it: the indirect transgression has become so severe that it operates as a direct floor violation, against which natural defense is structurally reserved.

2. The Three Structural States of Law

The framework distinguishes three structural states corresponding to the operational status of Law at a given scale of social organization. The states are not points along a single quantitative dimension; they are structurally distinct operational modes.

State 1 — The Hobbesian baseline. No social-contract transfer has occurred at the relevant scale. No binding framework operates over the parties. Each party retains unilateral defensive rights and operates in unmediated relations with all other parties. Law does not operate.

State 2 — Uninstituted (or partially instituted) rule of Law. The social-contract transfer has occurred at the principled level. A codified framework with binding principles exists; deliberation has produced the framework's substantive content; member integrity to the codified

principles holds the framework together. No institutional enforcement infrastructure operates coercively over the members. Law operates through member integrity rather than through enforcement. This is the operational state of the international order at the global scale; it is also the operational state of transitional polities and constitutional foundings during the period between the deliberative articulation of the framework and the construction of its enforcement infrastructure.

State 3 — Instituted rule of Law. Institutional enforcement infrastructure (police, courts, executive coercion, military if required) operates coercively over the members. Law operates not merely through member integrity but through the framework's capacity to constrain conduct against the will of the constrained party. This is the operational state of mature civil societies; in the contemporary United States, the federal-state interface is the paradigm instituted-rule-of-Law condition.

The three states are not arranged in a hierarchy of legitimacy. They are structurally distinct operational modes. State 1 lacks the binding-character commitment that constitutes Law; State 2 has the commitment but operationalizes it through voluntary integrity rather than coercive enforcement; State 3 supplies the coercive enforcement that operationalizes the commitment against members who have lost integrity to the framework's principles. State 3 is not the *completion* of State 2; it is the *extension* of State 2 with coercive enforcement that backs up the voluntary integrity. Without the underlying State 2 — member integrity to the principles the enforcement is enforcing — State 3 becomes authoritarian coercion rather than democratic Law.

3. The Treaty Period

The treaty period is the structural phase corresponding to State 2 — the operational phase during which Law has been articulated through deliberation but not yet (or not fully) executed through enforcement infrastructure. The phase exists necessarily in any deliberative founding because deliberation produces principles before institutions exist to enforce them; ratification commits members to the principles before the institutional infrastructure that would enforce them is constructed; the infrastructure is built by the same members who have ratified the principles, and the building takes time. During the treaty period, the framework's binding character operates through member integrity rather than through institutional enforcement.

The American constitutional founding is the paradigm temporary case. Between the 1776 Declaration and the 1789 Constitution's full institutional ratification (and arguably extending through the early Republic), the United States was in the treaty period at the federal scale. The Articles of Confederation supplied the framework's deliberative articulation; institutional enforcement was incomplete; member-state integrity held the framework together; the framework's weakness during this period was precisely the absence of executed enforcement. The 1787 Convention and the subsequent ratification process began the transition from treaty period to executed social contract at the federal scale; *Texas v. White*'s 1869 articulation of the indissolubility doctrine completed the transition by foreclosing the possibility of unilateral state exit.

The international order, by contrast, is the paradigm *permanent* case. There has never been an executed social contract at the global scale; no global sovereign has emerged to institute the framework with coercive enforcement infrastructure operating over sovereign states. The codified democratic order has been progressively articulated since 1945 through treaty law, customary international law, regional frameworks, and the UN system. The order exists *as a*

framework of principles that operates through member integrity. The framework is permanently in the treaty period at the global scale.

The treaty period's distinctive vulnerability is that it operates entirely through member integrity. There is no enforcement infrastructure to constrain members who lose integrity to the framework's principles. A member that rejects the framework's binding character cannot be coerced into compliance; the framework's only recourse is the integrity of the other members. The treaty period's stability is therefore a function of the members' collective commitment to the codified principles; its instability is a function of any individual member's defection from that commitment.

4. The Uninstituted Character as Constitutive of Democracy

The uninstituted character is not a defect of Law at State 2 that the development to State 3 is intended to remedy. The uninstituted character is constitutive of democracy itself.

Democracy is constituted by deliberation. Deliberation is the form through which principles become Law within a democratic framework. The deliberative form requires that members operate the framework through their voluntary integrity to the principles, because no higher coercive authority operates over the members to compel adherence. If a higher coercive authority operated, the framework would be authoritarian rule rather than democratic Law. The treaty period is therefore not a defective intermediate phase that democracy must transcend — it is the operational mode in which democracy actually operates.

The institutionally instituted phases of democratic Law (State 3) are *expressions* of the underlying State 2 operation, not replacements of it. The institutional infrastructure depends on the underlying member integrity to be effective; institutional enforcement against a member who has lost integrity to the framework's principles is structurally distinct from institutional

enforcement among members maintaining integrity. The former is authoritarian coercion; the latter is democratic Law in operation. State 3 is democratic only insofar as State 2 underlies it — only insofar as the members operating under institutional enforcement maintain voluntary integrity to the principles the enforcement is enforcing.

At the international scale, the uninstituted character is structurally unavoidable. There is no higher coercive authority above sovereign states; the framework is operated by the members; the framework's operation is its members' integrity to the codified principles. The framework's structural foundation is therefore member integrity rather than coercive infrastructure. This is not a defect to be remedied by building a global sovereign with coercive enforcement; building such a sovereign would *replace* democratic Law with authoritarian rule, not complete it. The international order's democratic character depends on its preservation in State 2, not on its progression to State 3.

This is a foundational structural commitment of the framework. The analysis of the codified democratic order at the international scale operates on the recognition that the order is permanently in the treaty period and that the treaty period is the operational mode of democracy at that scale. The order's stability depends on member integrity; its instability is a function of any individual member's defection from integrity. The diagnoses developed in § 8.D (rejection of Law in the uninstituted condition), § 9.B (fractal democracy operation through reciprocation and policy), and companion documents (the Sumud case as paradigm operational assault; the Rejection of Law analysis at the federal-international interface) proceed on this foundational commitment.

B. Asymmetric Civil Capacity in Cross-Party Conflict

Where two parties to a conflict differ in civil capacity — one with effective social-contract protection, one without — the framework applies *structurally asymmetrically*.

A party with sufficient civil capacity (functioning democratic law enforcement, judicial review, codified rights protections, treaty obligations) is bound by the entire codified democratic framework: legality, specificity, means-not-views, self-correction, reciprocity, the floor-protection doctrines, and its international and regional obligations. Its violence against any party — including parties without civil capacity — is judged under these standards.

A party without sufficient civil capacity (stateless populations, populations under occupation, populations where the nominal civil framework is captured or ineffective) does not face the same set of obligations because the social-contract transfer has not occurred for them. They retain the natural right of self-defense at the floor — defense of bodily integrity and of the means necessary to preserve it — because they have no civil institution that has assumed protection.

The asymmetry is structural, not moral. The framework does not say one party is right and the other wrong. It says:

- **The party with civil capacity** is bound by its codified obligations and may not invoke "self-defense" to evade them. Its violence is *state-sanctioned* and must satisfy the framework's structural tests (Means/Views, the five codified principles, treaty obligations). It cannot escape the obligations by characterizing the other party as "extremist."

- **The party without civil capacity** retains natural defensive rights at the floor. Its defense of bodily integrity and of the means of survival is *individualized self-defense*, not extremism, even when carried out collectively against an organized adversary.

C. Application: Israel and Palestine

The asymmetric-conflict analysis applies to Israel and Palestinian populations as a representative case. Israel has a functioning social contract: parliamentary democracy, judicial review (including the *Kol Ha'am* line and the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence), codified rights protections, ratified ICCPR and analogous international obligations. It is bound by the entire codified democratic framework analyzed in *Means, Not Views* Part VIII.B.4. Its state action — military operations, administrative-detention authority, civil-society restrictions — is judged by these standards.

Palestinian populations (in Gaza, in the West Bank, and stateless Palestinian populations elsewhere) lack a functioning civil state with effective law enforcement. The Palestinian Authority's civil capacity is severely constrained by occupation and external control; Hamas operates outside a recognized civil framework; stateless Palestinians have no civil institution that has assumed protection of their floor.

The framework's structural analysis: Israeli state violence against Palestinians is *state-sanctioned violence* judged under Israel's codified obligations. Palestinian defensive violence against Israeli state action operating to violate Palestinian floors is *individualized self-defense at the floor level* — not extremism — provided it operates as defense of bodily integrity and the means of survival, not as floor-violation of others.

This does not license all Palestinian violence. The floor's symmetry remains intact: Palestinian violence that violates Israeli civilians' bodily jurisdiction (attacks targeting civilians without floor-defense justification) is extremism by the same floor analysis. Similarly, Israeli civilian violence against Palestinians (settler violence, for example) is extremism subject to

Israeli civil-criminal jurisdiction (and, when state-sanctioned or state-tolerated, state-sanctioned violence under Israel's codified obligations).

The structural distinction:

- *Self-defense at the floor* — defense of bodily integrity and the means of survival, by a party lacking civil capacity, against state action by a party with civil capacity — is structurally distinct from extremism.

- *Extremism* — violation of others' bodily jurisdiction without floor-defense justification — applies symmetrically regardless of the actor's civil capacity. A stateless individual who attacks civilians without floor-defense justification commits extremism; a stateless individual who defends himself against state forces operating against his floor exercises self-defense.

The asymmetry is in the *obligations*, not in the *floor's symmetry*. The party with civil capacity has additional obligations (the codified framework) that the party without civil capacity does not. Both parties are bound by the floor.

D. Doctrinal Force

The framework's distinction between self-defense and extremism is structurally precise and does not require substantive judgment about the underlying conflict's policy questions. It asks:

1. Does the actor have civil capacity (effective social-contract framework)?
2. If yes, the actor is bound by the codified democratic framework. Violations are judged by Means/Views, the five codified principles, and treaty obligations. The actor cannot invoke "self-defense" to evade these obligations.

3. If no, the actor retains floor-level defensive rights. Defense of bodily integrity and the means of survival is *not* extremism, even when carried out collectively or organized as resistance.

4. Either way, the floor's symmetry applies: action that violates others' bodily jurisdiction without floor-defense justification *is* extremism, regardless of the actor's civil capacity.

The framework thereby distinguishes the conventional asymmetric-warfare puzzle (who is the terrorist?) from its structural answer: apply the asymmetric *obligations* and the symmetric *floor*. The asymmetric-obligations doctrine is recovered in international humanitarian law's distinction between occupying powers and resistance movements (the Hague Regulations; the Geneva Conventions; Additional Protocol I), in the just-war tradition's *jus ad bellum* / *jus in bello* distinction (Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*), and in the customary international-law recognition of national-liberation movements. The framework grounds these conventional distinctions structurally rather than by separate moral arguments.

The meta-violation has three structural levels — each an expression of the same deeper structural act: the rejection of Law itself. Violation of the floor occurs not only through direct state action but through the rhetorical and institutional moves that allow direct violations to persist without consequence. Law is constituted by its binding character — its capacity to constrain conduct regardless of the constrained party's preference about the constraint's content. Jurisdiction is the operative form of binding character; rejection of jurisdiction is rejection of Law. The three meta-violation levels are operational modes in which the rejection appears. Each is procedurally distinct; all three are structurally identical at the level the framework's diagnostic operates on. The framework's diagnostic recognizes three distinct

levels at which the structural asymmetry is inverted, each contributing to the persistence of the underlying conflict:

Level 1 — Direct floor violation. State-sanctioned conduct that crosses into the bodily sphere of persons whose voluntary act has not first crossed into another's. The party with civil capacity holds maximum obligations; the party committing the violation is bound by the codified framework's full set of constraints. This is the visible injury.

Level 2 — Rhetorical-inversion meta-violation. A party with civil capacity (typically the perpetrator or an allied actor) characterizes its adversary's floor-defense as "extremism" or "terrorism" while exempting its own state-sanctioned violence from the codified framework. The party with greater obligations positions itself as if it had fewer; the party with floor-level defensive rights is characterized as if bound by obligations it does not (structurally cannot) hold. The 2026 *U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy's* anti-Israel-extremism predicate and the IHRA framework's anti-Zionism predicate (both analyzed in *Means, Not Views* Part VI) are paradigm cases at the domestic-policy scale; the U.S. Treasury's 2026 sanctions characterizing humanitarian-aid delivery to Gaza as "pro-terror" is the same pattern at the international scale. Level 2 supplies the rhetorical infrastructure that exempts level 1 from accountability.

Level 3 — Deference-based non-execution meta-violation. Parties holding *triggered jurisdictional warrants* — flag states with exclusive jurisdiction over their vessels under UNCLOS Article 92; states with diplomatic-protection standing for nationals injured abroad; High Contracting Parties bound by Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions ("respect and ensure respect"); states bound by ICJ authority where the Court has issued binding provisional measures; states with universal-jurisdiction or extraterritorial-jurisdiction statutes — fail to execute those warrants while *performing the rhetoric* of compliance. Summoning ambassadors,

issuing public condemnations, and demanding consular access are performance-of-compliance moves; they are not the execution of the structural warrants the codified framework supplies. The performance of compliance without execution is itself a structural violation: the most-obligated parties exempting themselves from action while invoking the rhetoric of the framework they nominally honor.

The three levels operate fractally and interdependently. Level 3 is what allows levels 1 and 2 to persist: the system fails not at the perpetrator but at the *unwilling enforcer*. If the parties holding triggered warrants executed those warrants, the meta-violation at level 2 would face institutional consequences and the floor violation at level 1 would face direct accountability. The deference equilibrium at level 3 is what sustains the structure of impunity.

All three levels share a deeper structural feature: each places the violating or enabling party *outside Law with respect to the rejected domain*. The party may continue to claim the privileges of being inside the framework (membership, recognition, treaty network benefits, alliance protections, Security Council seat) while operating in the Hobbesian baseline with respect to the framework's binding character over its own conduct. The procedural form of the rejection — formal withdrawal of accepted jurisdiction, "unsigned" of a signed treaty, characterization of the body as illegitimate, sanctions on the body's officials, deference-based non-execution of triggered warrants — does not change the structural status. The party is, on the framework's diagnostic, structurally indistinguishable from a party that never recognized the framework at all — but with the rhetorical infrastructure of bound membership concealing the structural exit. The reciprocity inversion makes the disguised case *more* indefensible than the consistent case: the consistent never-bound party at least operates without claiming privileges it

has not earned; the disguised case operates the exit while demanding all the privileges of bound membership.

The structural-indistinguishability claim sharpens further when the rejected framework operates in the uninstituted condition (§ 8.A.2, State 2). In the instituted condition, the rejection of Law by a member is constrained by the framework's enforcement infrastructure; the framework continues to operate because the enforcement mechanism constrains the rejecting party against its will. In the uninstituted condition, the framework has no enforcement infrastructure to constrain the rejecting party; the framework operates only through member integrity. The rejection of Law in the uninstituted condition is therefore not merely a violation that the framework absorbs through enforcement; it is the *destruction of the framework's operational foundation*. The framework holds together only insofar as members maintain integrity to the codified principles; the rejecting member is operating, with respect to the rejected domain, to remove the structural mechanism by which the framework operates at all.

At the international scale, where the codified democratic order is permanently in the uninstituted condition (§ 8.A.3), this sharpening is operationally consequential. The most-obligated parties of the order — the states with full civil capacity, with treaty-network membership, with the institutional infrastructure of recognized democracies — are precisely the parties whose integrity holds the framework together. Their rejection of Law's binding character is the destruction of the structural mechanism by which the framework operates at all. The four-decade pattern of unilateral declarations of unbinding (developed at length in the companion research brief) is therefore not just a sequence of violations; it is the operational dismantling of the framework's foundation at the global scale.

The diagnostic consequences are structurally precise. The deliberative-revision distinction (§ 9.A) is not merely a normative claim about how disagreement should be expressed within a democratic framework; in the uninstituted condition, it is the *operational mechanism* by which the framework is held together. Refusal of deliberation while declaring unilaterally that the framework does not apply is not just structural rejection; it is the withdrawal of the structural participation the framework requires to operate. The reciprocity-inversion violation is not just structurally worse than the consistent non-member case; it is operationally destructive of the framework in a way the non-member case is not. The non-member operates outside the framework; the disguised rejecter operates *against* the framework while claiming the protections that the framework's operation supplies. In the uninstituted condition, this distinction is the difference between a state that does not participate in the framework and a state that participates in dismantling it.

The framework's intervention principle (§ 10) must therefore be read at the *peer-actor* scale as well as the higher-level scale. Peer states with civil capacity hold not only the standing to act but the *obligation* to act when the warrant is triggered. Deferring upward to higher-level mechanisms (ICJ, ICC, UN bodies) when one's own warrant is triggered does not discharge the obligation; it transforms the deferring state into a third-level meta-violator. The conventional-extremism corollary in *Means, Not Views* Part V applies fractally: a conventional democratic order failing to enforce its codified principles is structurally analogous to a conventional state apparatus maintaining a conventional position through unconstitutional means. Both are the apparatus exempting itself from the framework it nominally honors.

9. THE OBJECT OF SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FRACTAL IMPERATIVE

The social contract exists for a single ultimate object: **cooperation between constituents to secure persons and property, and therefore collective survival**. Everything derivative — state authority, legal institutions, codified rights, the floor-protection doctrines, the intervention principle, the remedial channel — exists to serve this object. The object is the framework's organizing purpose, not an ancillary feature.

A. The Object at the Floor

The object exists in its irreducible form at the floor (bodily jurisdiction at the individual human level). At the floor: individuals cooperate to secure each other's bodily integrity and the means necessary to maintain it. This is the social contract in its most fundamental operation. The state-of-nature alternative (§ 8.A) — absolute individual self-defense with no transfer — is not the absence of the object; it is the absence of *institutional means* to pursue it. The object itself is constant: secure persons and property. The shift from state of nature to civil society is a shift from individual to collective execution of the same object.

The object's operational form requires Law. Without binding Law, the social contract is aspirational rather than operational — a set of normative principles to which constituents may opine but which exerts no constraint on conduct. The shift from state of nature to civil society is operationalized through Law. Law is constituted by its binding character — its capacity to constrain conduct regardless of the constrained party's preference about the constraint's content. Without the binding character, the framework reverts structurally to the state of nature, regardless of what other features (institutions, codified principles, deliberative bodies, public

statements of commitment) the framework retains. Binding character is constitutive of the social-contract object, not ancillary to it.

The deliberative-revision distinction follows. Democratic Law specifically supplies mechanisms for the revision of its content through deliberation. Disagreement with the framework's substantive content is *internal* to Law: parties argue for alternative interpretations, propose amendments through the framework's amendment procedures, develop subsequent state practice and *opinio juris*, file written submissions and oral arguments, engage in diplomatic and judicial dialogue, and accept the framework's adjudication of disagreements while continuing to argue for revisions in subsequent cases. The deliberative mechanisms are what democratic Law supplies *as the form of legitimate disagreement within Law*. A party that engages the mechanisms remains a participant in the framework even when arguing against its specific outcomes.

What distinguishes legitimate disagreement from rejection of Law is engagement with the deliberative process. A party that refuses to engage the deliberative process and instead declares unilaterally that the framework does not apply has not exercised disagreement; it has rejected the framework's binding character. The declaration is the structural act of rejection; the procedural form (formal withdrawal, never-ratified, "unsigned" of a signed treaty, characterization of the body as illegitimate, sanctions on the body's officials) is post-hoc justification. The framework's diagnostic engages the declaration, not the procedural form.

B. The Fractal Imperative

The fractal imperative is not a normative claim derived from the framework's own architecture; it is a constitutional mandate textually grounded in the United States Constitution and operational

at every scale of the constitutional hierarchy. The Guarantee Clause (Art. IV, § 4) commits the United States to guarantee a Republican Form of Government to every state in the Union — a textual mandate of fractal republican governance at the federal-state interface. The Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, cl. 2) elevates ratified treaties to supreme Law of the Land, co-equal with the Constitution and federal statutes — extending the framework's binding character to the federal-international interface where treaties institute international democratic deliberative bodies. Article V supplies the exclusive constitutional process for structural modification at every scale; no Position of Assigned Power may circumvent Article V through unilateral action.

The Madisonian framework articulates the diagnostic apparatus for identifying when the fractal mandate has been violated: the six-step Compliance Test, the PSV taxonomy (USURPATION/ABDICATION), the textual consistency principle, and the recovery of equitable standing for citizen enforcement of binary textual violations. The bodily-jurisdiction framework here supplies the operational diagnostic at the floor; the Madisonian framework supplies it at every higher scale; the constitutional text itself supplies the mandate that both frameworks operationalize. The historical paradigm is the Civil War: Confederate secession was attempted unilateral state exit from the federation that the Constitution textually bound the states to; the Union's enforcement of Article IV, § 4 (through Article I § 8 cl. 15's calling-forth power, Article I § 8 cl. 11's war-declaration power, the Reconstruction Amendments under Article V, and the post-1865 institutional regime) was the operation of enumerated constitutional jurisdictional grants against the USURPATION attempt. *Texas v. White* (1869) retrospectively confirmed the constitutional propriety of what the political branches had already done by force. The structural identity with executive unilateral treaty withdrawal at the federal-international interface is developed in the companion paper *The Rejection of Law*.

The object recapitulates at every scale of social organization. The template — *cooperation between constituents to secure persons and property* — is identical at each level; only the constituents change:

Scale	Constituents	Object expressed as
Individual	Persons	Mutual respect for each other's floor; cooperation to secure persons and property
Civil society	Persons within the polity	Civil-society binding to secure persons and property of all members
Federation	States within the federation	Inter-state binding to secure persons and property across member states
International order	Nation-states / federations	Higher-order binding to secure persons and property across nation-states

The same Hobbesian/Lockean dynamics that build civil society from the state of nature operate at every higher scale: when constituents bind together through consent, the binding generates strength that does not procure opposition; when one party imposes, the dynamic generates the coalition that natural law guarantees will form against the imposer. The laws of nature do not dissipate at any scale of social organization; they recapitulate.

A leader who extends the social contract to other societies through treaty, alliance, mutual respect, multilateral institution, or integration is *completing the same founding process at a higher scale*. The Constitutional Convention and the Marshall Plan are structurally identical operations applied at different scales. The work is never done; it scales fractally with each new layer of social organization.

The operational mechanism by which the fractal imperative operates at the inter-state scale has two complementary components: *reciprocation among members* and *policy toward*

non-members. Together these are the operational form of fractal-democracy promotion — the work by which the framework expands at each scale of social organization in the uninstituted condition (§ 8.A.2).

Reciprocation among members. The framework operates through members treating each other according to the framework's principles. The mutual treatment is the framework's operation in practice. The framework is held together by the consistency of the reciprocation: each member's adherence to the principles in its dealings with other members reinforces every other member's commitment to the same adherence. In the uninstituted condition, where no coercive enforcement infrastructure operates over the members, reciprocation is the *operational mode* by which the framework is held together. The summoning of an ambassador in response to a violation; the execution of treaty obligations under judicial review; the recognition of other members' jurisdictional authority; the participation in deliberative bodies — each is reciprocation in operation; each is the framework operating through member integrity rather than through coercive enforcement.

Policy toward non-members. Members operating with integrity extend the framework's principles to their dealings with non-members. The extension is fractal-democracy promotion in its constructive form: humanitarian aid; refugee protection; trade preferences conditioned on democratic governance; technical assistance to transitional polities; support for institution-building in post-conflict states; recognition of and engagement with national-liberation movements operating with floor-defense justification; the broader project of incorporating non-members into the codified order through deliberative engagement and mutual recognition. The Marshall Plan, the EU accession process for post-Soviet states, the post-apartheid international support for South African transition, the post-conflict support for Tunisian and Colombian

transitions, and the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement framework are all expressions of fractal-democracy promotion through policy toward non-members.

The Constitutional Convention and the Marshall Plan are structurally identical operations not because they share specific institutional features but because they share the same operational template: deliberative founding of a higher-order framework through reciprocation among parties already aligned to its principles, plus extension to parties not yet aligned through policy designed to bring them into alignment. The Constitutional Convention performed this operation at the federal scale (deliberative founding among ratifying states; extension to non-ratifying states through the Article V amendment mechanism and admission of new states); the Marshall Plan performed it at the international scale (deliberative founding of a post-war Atlantic order; extension to non-member states through reconstruction assistance and policy alignment). Each operation is the work by which the social-contract object recapitulates at the higher scale.

The contemporary US/Israeli pattern of the past four decades is the structural opposite of fractal-democracy promotion. The pattern is *contraction* of the framework rather than expansion: defection from international adjudication rather than extension of it; sanctions on enforcement infrastructure rather than support for it; withdrawal from international organizations rather than incorporation of non-members into them. The contraction operates through both the rejection of reciprocation among members (the rejection of Law's binding character documented in the companion research brief) and the withdrawal of policy toward non-members (the 2026 sixty-six-organization memorandum; the sanctions on humanitarian-aid organizations; the defunding of UN agencies; the suspension of bilateral assistance programs aligned with democratic-governance goals). The structural diagnosis: the most-obligated parties of the framework are operating not to expand the framework's fractal reach but to contract it.

The fractal-democracy operation supplies the constructive counterpart to the rejection-of-Law diagnostic. The diagnostic identifies how the framework fails when members reject Law; the operational mechanism identifies how the framework succeeds when members extend Law through reciprocation and policy. The framework's project — at every scale of social organization — is the construction and preservation of the conditions under which the fractal-democracy operation can be sustained.

C. Exclusivity as Structural Violation of the Object

A social contract that operates through **exclusivity** — defining who is "in" versus "out," securing only the in-group, applying state-of-nature/imposition rules to outsiders — violates its own object. The object's universality at the floor (every individual has bodily jurisdiction; the object exists wherever the floor exists) cannot be partially honored at higher scales without contradiction.

Two forms of exclusivity, each structurally incongruent:

- **Internal exclusivity** — denying floor protection to some members of the same polity. Slavery, apartheid, second-class citizenship, racial caste systems, gender-restricted franchise, religiously restricted civil status. The internal social contract is *partial* — it secures persons and property only for some constituents and operates state-of-nature/imposition rules against the others. The Law of Supremacism predicts (and history confirms) that internal exclusivity generates sustained internal conflict.

- **External exclusivity** — denying floor protection to constituents of other social contracts. Imperial conquest treating colonized populations as outside the social-contract object; isolationism that ignores cross-border floor violations; anti-cooperative posture against

neighboring societies; categorical CT predicates that treat foreign populations as targets rather than as constituents of a higher-order social contract. The external posture is *partial* in the same way — it secures only the home polity's constituents and treats outsiders as state-of-nature targets. The Law of Supremacism predicts (and history confirms) that external exclusivity generates the coalition of opposition that destroys the imposer.

Both forms violate the object because the object is universal at the floor. Exclusivity at any scale denies the universality and is therefore structurally self-defeating, regardless of whether the exclusion is justified rhetorically by "national security," "cultural preservation," "great-power competition," or any other framing.

D. Congruent Disposition Replaces "Greatness"

The conventional invocation of national "greatness" is the term leaders reach for when they have not cognized the object. The term is supremacist in its grammar (X is greater than Y), comparative in its structure, and therefore structurally self-defeating per the Law of Supremacism. The structurally precise alternative is **congruent disposition**: alignment with the object at every scale at which the polity is active.

A polity has congruent disposition to the extent that it serves the object at its own scale (internal cooperation to secure all constituents' persons and property) and at higher scales (extending cooperation to constituents of other social contracts through treaty, alliance, multilateral institution, mutual recognition, integration). Congruence is *non-comparative* — it does not require ranking against other polities — and therefore non-conflict-generating. The Law of Egalitarianism predicts: a polity in congruent disposition cannot sustain conflict that arises

from its disposition, because the disposition is itself the absence of the supremacist axiom that generates sustained conflict.

The diagnostic asks four questions:

1. Does the polity secure the floor for all its constituents (no internal exclusivity)?
2. Does the polity extend the same protections to constituents of other social contracts (no external exclusivity)?
3. Does the polity operate through cooperation rather than imposition at every scale at which it is active?
4. Does the polity honor the fractal imperative — recognizing that the social-contract object at higher scales is structurally identical to the object at lower scales, and pursuing higher-scale binding through the same template?

A polity scoring yes on all four is in congruent disposition. A polity scoring no on any is incongruent — and the Laws of S/E predict that its incongruence will manifest as sustained conflict, with the polity's apparent strength inverted into actual structural weakness over time. The historical pattern is consistent: Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, Pax Americana each held during their egalitarian-binding phases and collapsed during their supremacist-imposing phases. The collapse is not coincidental; it is the natural-law dynamic operating predictably across all scales.

The framework therefore makes "greatness" structurally measurable as congruent disposition — replacing rhetorical aspiration with structural diagnosis.

10. THE INTERVENTION PRINCIPLE

If the floor is the primary sovereignty and every higher level is *derivative* of and *bound by* it, three intervention consequences follow.

First — the state's authority is unauthorized when it violates the floor. When the state crosses into the bodily sphere without the individual's voluntary act having first crossed into another's, the state has exceeded its derivative warrant. The action is not merely *unconstitutional* in a balancing sense; it is *unauthorized* in a jurisdictional sense. The state never had the authority to begin with — its derivative warrant exists only to protect the floor and serve the social-contract object, not to encroach on either.

Second — the next-higher level has warrant to intervene when a lower level violates the floor. Local violates → state intervenes. State violates → federal intervenes. Federal violates → international intervenes. This is not humanitarian-intervention-by-moral-consensus; it is structural intervention by derivative authority operating where the lower level has forfeited its protective warrant. The intervention principle is *symmetric*: every level of the hierarchy holds the same protective mandate over the floor and has warrant to act when the level below has defected from that mandate.

Third — peer-level intervention follows the same logic for cross-jurisdictional violations. When State X's law violates the bodily jurisdiction of an individual in State Y (e.g., extraterritorial criminalization of conduct lawful in Y), the federal level has warrant to intervene as the next-higher level binding both states to the floor. State Y also has standing to defend its citizens' floors against State X's violation; the floor's symmetry gives each state's protective mandate equal weight, and the federal level adjudicates the conflict by reference to the floor itself, not to either state's substantive policy.

This recovers the standard humanitarian-intervention argument and the federalism enforcement-clause argument as instances of a single structural principle: derivative authority intervenes when primary sovereignty is violated by another derivative authority. The Reconstruction Amendments' enforcement clauses are the constitutional encoding of this principle at the federal-state interface. ICC jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, ICJ jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention, and the various humanitarian-intervention doctrines in international law are the international-level encodings of the same principle.

The intervention principle integrates with the social-contract conditional in § 8 and the object/fractal imperative in § 9: when a state with civil capacity systematically violates the floor of a party without civil capacity, the structural-asymmetric analysis (§ 8.B) characterizes the violation, the object/fractal analysis (§ 9) identifies it as exclusivity-based incongruence, and the intervention principle (this section) supplies the warrant for higher-level intervention. The party without civil capacity holds floor-level defensive rights; the next-higher derivative authority (where one exists) holds intervention warrant; the intervention is structurally congruent with the object because it extends floor protection across the boundary the violating party tried to draw.

11. THE DOCTRINAL-FAMILY CLAIM

Means/Views and the family of floor-protection doctrines operate *above* the floor as domain-specific protective doctrines. Each governs state authority to regulate a specific kind of activity; each draws a structural line; each rejects substantive balancing; each anchors on the Laws of S/E.

The family is open. Other candidate floor-protection doctrines:

- *Property jurisdiction* (boundary of the individual's resource sphere; Takings Clause doctrine) — operates within civil-capacity conditions per the social-contract conditional in § 8; reverts to floor-level defensive rights under Hobbesian conditions

- *Associational jurisdiction* (boundary of voluntary association; *NAACP v. Alabama* line)

- *Informational jurisdiction* (boundary of information possession and flow; First Amendment press doctrine)

- *Electoral jurisdiction* (boundary of the electoral process; voting-rights doctrine)

Each could be articulated using the same structural-jurisdictional method. The methodological contribution of recognizing the family is that the means/views distinction is not merely a speech doctrine but an *instance* of a more general approach: structural-jurisdictional reasoning that asks where a regulated activity operates relative to the floor, rather than substantively balancing interests.

12. WHERE THE FRAMEWORK STILL NEEDS SHARPENING

Two development needs before publication-grade deployment:

Particularized-enforcement transgressions — handling mixed-motive regulations.

Per § 7 (revised), the distinction between particularized and legitimate external regulation is doctrinally grounded in the Supremacy Clause's mandate of holistic constitutional enforcement and in the converging Dormant Commerce Clause / Right to Travel / Privileges and Immunities doctrines. The core test — *would this regulation exist absent the state's desire to defeat the internal decision?* — works for pure-foreclosure cases (admitting-privilege requirements with no external rationale) and for pure-legitimate cases (universal sterilization standards). Mixed cases are where operational sharpening is still needed: regulations with *some* genuine external interest

plus *some* particularized intent. The Supreme Court's "undue burden" line (*Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt*, *June Medical Services v. Russo*) has struggled with mixed-motive cases. Candidate operational rules the framework should choose among: (a) any particularized component triggers strict scrutiny; (b) the state bears the burden of severability — must show the regulation would exist in identical form absent the disfavored bodily decision; (c) the regulation must be re-enacted purged of particularized features; (d) the regulation is invalid in proportion to the particularized share of its rationale.

Intervention threshold — procedural mechanism. When does a higher-level intervention warrant *trigger*? The substantive answer (when the floor is violated) is structurally clear; the procedural answer (what institutional mechanism executes the intervention) varies by level. At the federal-state interface, the answer is constitutional adjudication, federal civil-rights enforcement, and (in extreme cases) federal occupation under the Reconstruction Amendments' enforcement clauses. At the international-federal interface, the answer is ICJ proceedings, ICC indictments, treaty-body decisions, regional-court rulings, and (in extreme cases) collective security action. The framework names the warrant; the procedural mechanism is institution-specific.

Civil-capacity threshold — when is the social-contract transfer effective? The social-contract conditional in § 8 turns on whether civil capacity is "sufficient." A complete framework needs to specify the threshold: how effective must civil law enforcement be before the social-contract transfer applies and natural defensive rights are delegated? Edge cases include failed states, occupied territories with nominal civil institutions, captured states where civil institutions exist but are predatory, and transitional polities in which civil capacity is being built or rebuilt.

The threshold is structural — civil capacity must effectively protect the floor in practice, not merely on paper — but the precise operationalization needs development.

13. DEPLOYMENT

The framework is immediately usable for:

- **Strategic litigation** in bodily-autonomy cases (abortion travel, gender-affirming care, end-of-life decisions, refusal of medical intervention, drug-use prosecutions where the conduct is purely internal). The structural-jurisdictional argument is independent of *Roe/Casey/Dobbs* and operates on different doctrinal anchors (*Botsford, Schmerber, Cruzan, Lawrence, McFall*).

- **Constitutional drafting** in post-transition polities; the internal/external test is a clean structural standard that can be encoded in a bill of rights at the foundational level, with the layered-sovereignty model encoded in the federalism articles, and the social-contract conditional encoded in the rights-of-defense and emergency-powers articles.

- **International human-rights deployment** through ICCPR Article 17 (privacy), Article 7 (cruel and degrading treatment), ICESCR Article 12 (right to health), CEDAW Article 12 (reproductive rights). The structural-jurisdictional method supplies the substrate-layer argument that withstands the standard interpretive defenses (margin of appreciation, cultural relativism, national-security exception).

- **Intervention scenarios** — federal civil-rights enforcement against state floor-violations; international-court jurisdiction (ICC, ICJ, regional courts) against state floor-violations meeting threshold criteria; civil-society advocacy that names the structural intervention warrant rather than relying on moral-consensus appeals.

- **Asymmetric-conflict analysis** — application of the social-contract conditional to specific conflicts (Israel-Palestine, occupations, national-liberation movements, anti-colonial resistance, indigenous self-defense against state action) to identify structurally which party is bound by which set of obligations and which party retains natural defensive rights at the floor.

- **Predictive diagnosis** for democratic backsliding: a polity that begins to enact floor violations (forced procedures, prosecuting bodily decisions, foreclosing access through external regulation, restricting travel for bodily care) is on a trajectory toward conventional extremism, in the same diagnostic sense that view-based categorical predicates are.

14. SUMMARY

Layer	Content	Function
Object (purpose)	Cooperation between constituents to secure persons and property, therefore collective survival	The framework's organizing purpose; everything else exists to serve it; recapitulates at every scale; violated by any social contract operating through exclusivity
Substrate (axiomatic)	Laws of Supremacism and Egalitarianism	Explains <i>why</i> violation of the object generates sustained conflict; respecting the object precludes it
Floor (primary sovereignty)	Bodily jurisdiction at the individual human level	Where the object originates; the most fundamental unit of sovereignty; source of all derivative authority through consent of the governed
Fractal imperative	The object's template recapitulates at every scale of social organization	Individual → civil society → federation → international order; same template; same Hobbesian/Lockean dynamics; congruent execution at each scale is <i>congruent disposition</i> (the

		structural replacement for "greatness")
Social-contract conditional	Whether civil law-enforcement framework is effective	Determines whether the indirect-transgression protections operate through civil law (transfer effective) or revert to natural defensive rights at the floor (transfer absent); produces asymmetric obligations in cross-party conflict
Floor-protection doctrines (operational)	Means/Views (speech), and family members (property, associational, informational, electoral jurisdictions)	Domain-specific structural-jurisdictional doctrines that protect the floor against violation in specific kinds of state action; operate under civil-capacity conditions
Intervention warrant	Higher levels intervene when lower levels violate the floor	Local → state → federal → international, symmetric across the hierarchy; recovers humanitarian intervention as structural; integrates with the social-contract conditional and the object/fractal imperative
Remedial channel (institutional)	International and regional human-rights frameworks	Downstream codifications of the floor and the floor-protection doctrines; institutional mechanisms for binding constraint that serve the object at the international scale

The framework's unifying claim: the social contract is *fractal*, with a single object (cooperation to secure persons and property → collective survival) that recapitulates at every scale of social organization. Bodily jurisdiction is the floor — the primary sovereignty from which all higher-level authority is derivative. Means/Views and the family of floor-protection doctrines defend the floor in specific domains. The social-contract conditional determines when

these doctrines operate (civil capacity) and when natural defensive rights revert to the floor (Hobbesian conditions). The intervention principle gives every higher level structural warrant to defend the floor against violation by the level below it. Exclusivity at any scale violates the object and is structurally self-defeating per the Laws of S/E. Congruent disposition — alignment with the object at every active scale — replaces the conventional rhetoric of "greatness" with a measurable structural property. The architecture is portable across democratic constitutional systems through the same substitution mechanism Means/Views uses for its doctrinal counterparts; the fractal imperative explains why portability is structural rather than coincidental.

End of integration brief.